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ABSTRACT
There are wide variations in the manner in which states experience
national recessions. This thesis develops an empirically based model to
explain these cross-state variations in cyclical behavior.
The model explains a state cycle in two sectors, an export indus-
try and a residentiary sector. The export sector proposes that a state's
recession can be explained by national demand for a state's exports as
well as five state-specific economic and institutional factors. The
cycle in the residentiary sector is explained as a function of the fluc-
tuation in the state's export sector.
The model is tested on data from five post World War II recessions
between 1950 and 1975 and forty-seven states. This analysis is carried
out at the all-industry level. A model similar in form but different in
theoretical implications is used to test data on the machinery and textile
industries, at the 2-digit manufacturing level.
The findings suggest that the industry mix of a state's exports,
the state's capital-labor ratio, the age of its capital stock, the level
of its unemployment insurance benefits, the extent of unionization of its
labor force, and a short-run export-base multiplier all influence the
severity of a state recession.
Thesis Supervisor: William C. Wheaton, Jr.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
There are substantial differences in the severity with which
regions experience national recessions. Some regions have tended to
experience severe and prolonged downturns, while other areas have been
by-passed by national recessions altogether. The purpose of this thesis
is to identify the economic and institutional factors that explain the
differences in regional responses to national cyclical employment. The
approach is largely empirical, using data at the state level for five
recessions.
The extent of cross-regional differences in cyclical behavior can
be seen in Table 1.1. When the United States is divided into nine cen-
sus regions, and the trend-adjusted severity of each region's recessions
is calculated, there are observable variations in regional recessions.
For example, during the 1953-54 recession the nation experienced a 2.67
percent deviation in employment from the long-term growth trend. During
this recession the East North Central states experienced a 3.8 percent
decline in employment, while the West North Central states experienced a
decline of only 1.3 percent. As can be seen from Table 1.1, such devia-
tions are clearly the pattern for all five recessions of the 1950's,
1960's and early 1970's. It is the purpose of this thesis to explain
these cross-regional differences in the severity of recessions.
There are several reasons for attempting to determine the factors
that give rise to spatial differences in the business cycle. First, the
study of regions may shed light on national economic relationships.
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Table 1.1
Trend Adjusted Severity
of
Regional Recessions
(Percentages)
I I III IV
Severity in the Severity in the
Severity of the Most Strongly Least Strongly Standard
Year National Recession Hit Region Hit Region Deviation
1953-54 2.67 3.83 1.27 .721
(East North Central) (West North
Central)
1957-58 2.37 3.34 .91 .678
(Pacific) (West North Central)
1960-61 1.60 2.53 .93 .435
(East North Central) (New England)
1969-70 1.32 1.90 .88 .674
(East North Central) (Pacific)
1973-75 2.10 3.28 1.29 1.704
(East North Central) (Mid Atlantic)
Source: Calculated from quarterly, regional data obtained from Data Re-
sources, Inc.
3Because of the high personal and social costs of unvoluntary unemploy-
ment, the maintenance of full employment has been a national priority
since 1946. Extensive research efforts have been devoted to identifying
reasons for cyclical unemployment and many of the findings have informed
federal stabilization programs. The study of business cycles at the re-
gional level may contribute to our understanding of national business cycles
by providing a new perspective and insights that are overlooked in national
time series data.
Studying the business cycle at the state level, we obtain fifty ob-
servations at one point in time, holding political and economic institutions
constant. Factors that are found to aggravate or stifle the amplitude of
the cycle in this cross-regional analysis may be extrapolated to national
phenomenon.
A second reason for studying regional business cycles is based on
a concern for regional equity in national policy. By identifying economic
and institutional variables that aggravate or dampen state's employment
cycles, it may be possible to anticipate a regional economy's response to
the national cycle. This information could, in turn, be used by govern-
ment in designing regional countercyclic employment programs and in incor-
porating regional considerations into monetary and fiscal policies. The
Economic Development Administration has already demonstrated an interest
in using countercyclic public works investments as one method of regional
economic stabilization policy. For example, in response to the 1970 re-
cession, Congress allocated $92 million to accelerate public works construc-
tion (Vernez et.al., 1977: v). The effectiveness of such programs would be
greatly enhanced if policy makers were able to predict the length, timing,
4and severity of the regional fluctuations that accompany national cyclic
changes.
This study will also shed light on the regional impact of national
monetary and fiscal policies and provides information that may be useful
for national macroeconomic stabilization policy making. For example,
monetary policy, which tightens the money supply to put a rein on infla-
tion, probably differs in its regional impact. We should know the answers
to such questions as which regions respond more quickly and dramatically
and why; and do some states bear a disproportionate burden of the nation's
economic stabilization policy? While it is widely believed that federal
government policies should be relatively equitable in their regional im-
pact, there has been little work done on the extent to which the effects
of monetary and fiscal stabilization policy are evenly distributed across
regions.
There are two bodies of literature that have developed peripherally
to the subject and approach of this thesis. The main focus of the busi-
ness cycle theorists in the post-Keynesian period has been on the taming
of the short-run cycle. Adherents to this body of thought assumed the
causes of the cycle were no longer relevant because, through the fine
tuning of monetary and fiscal policy, cyclical fluctuations could be elim-
inated. It has only been more recently, with the advent of the supply-
side shocks and the growth of the Monetarist school that economists have
started returning to the exploration of institutional and economic causes
of instability (Lucas, 1976). The emphasis, however, has been on the
cycles of national economies.
5A second body of literature, which also bears on this thesis,
belongs to the field of regional economics. In contrast to macro-
economists, regional economists have focused almost exclusively
on long-run regional growth and long-term regional inequalities,
and have ignored cross-regional differences in short-run fluctuations.
The theory and empirical evidence laid out in the chapters
that 3olow is an attempt to bridge the gap between research on
business cycles at the national level and economic growth at the
at the regional level. This thesis is similar to current research
on national busisness cycles in that it seeks to find economic
and institutional variables that influence cyclical activity. At
the same time, it draws on the work of regional economists by,
for example, relying on export-base theory, a theory developed to
explain regional growth.
More specifically, this study is the first to test whether
local economic and institutional factors influence the severity
of regional recessions. Many authors (Borts, 1960; Browne, 1978)
have studied the degree to which cross-state differences in reg-
ional cycles can be explained by cross-state differences in industry
mix. These as well as other authors concur, industrial composition
explains some but not all of the cyclical variability of a state's
employment. This thesis proposes that and tests the extent to
which such factors as a state's capital-labor ratio, age of its capital
stock, unionization of its labor force, the level of its unemployment
6insurance benefits, its peak-year unemployment rate, and a multiplier
influence the state's cyclical behavior.
Not only does this thesis contribute to the literature by
identifying variables other than industry mix to explain cross-state
variations in cyclical employment, but these variables are framed and
tested, for the first time, in a broader theoretical context. Earlier
empirical studies have proposed that state cycles are explained largely
by fluctuations in national industries, appropriately weighted by a
state's industry mix. These studies have either run simple correlations
between an expected recession based on industry composition and the ac-
tual severity of a state's cycle; or they have regressed the later
variable on the first. This study frames the question in a theoretical
context. Both the theory and empirical test are structured by an export-
base model. A state's cycle in this model is determined by national
demand for the composite of state exports, the effect of the local
institutional and economic factors described above on variability in
exports, and fluctuations in a residentiary sector of the economy. The
severity of the cycle in the residentiary sector is a function of the
cycle in the export sector. Before presenting the theory, model and
empirical findings in detail, we review the causes and characteristics
of the five national recessions which served as the study's foundation.
National Business Cycles
Before introducing the topics of each chapter in more detail, we
begin by reviewing the definition and measurements of business cycles and
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recessions, in general, and the timing and causes of the recessions be-
tween 1950 and 1975. The five recessions falling between 1950 and 1975
are the basis for the empirical work of this study.
Business cycles are recurrent sequences of expansions and contrac-
tions in economic activity. These movements in aggregate economic activ-
ity are clearly observable in the major series measuring economic activity,
such as GNP, employment, investment, etc. Business cycles are irregular
in appearance, that is, they vary in duration, amplitude and scope, and
they are widely diffused throughout the economy. A business cycle can be
divided into four parts, including an expansion, a peak, a contraction,
and a trough which is followed by another expansionary phase. The full
cycle, whether measured from peak to peak or trough to trough, has been
defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) as having a
duration of at least fifteen months. The expansionary or contractionary
phase of the cycle must have, by NBER definition, a duration of at least
five months. The minimum duration allows a period sufficiently long
for cumulative movements in economic activity to develop in both down-
ward and upward directions (Handbook of Cyclical Indicators, 1977: 170-
172).
The NIBER analyzes a large collection of time series in assessing
the phases of the business cycle. While the actual measurement of histor-
ical and current cycles is complex, the basic appraoch can be summarized
by considering the division of the time series into three categories,
leading, coincident and lagging, indicators. As the names imply, these
groups of indicators precede, coincide, or lag behind the movement of the
business cycle, respectively. Leading indicators include an index of stock
8prices, new orders of consumer goods and materials, contracts and orders
for plant and equipment, etc. Coincident indicators include the index
of industrial production; personal income; and the indicator used in this
thesis, the number of employees on non-agricultural payrolls. Principal
lagging indicators are the duration of unemployment, manufacturing and
trade inventories, and commercial and industrial loans outstanding.
The NBER has identified five contractionary or recessionary phases
ofthe cycle between 1950 and 1975. The general timing of these recessions
was adopted for this study. They are:
Recession Date of Peak Date of Trough
I 7/53 5/54
II 8/57 4/58
III 4/60 2/61
IV 12/69 11/70
V 11/73 3/75
Source: (Handbook of Cyclical Indicators, 1977: 198).
The five recessions between 1950 and 1975 were varied in their
origins and characteristics. The two earliest recessions were caused by
inventory overinvestment and military cutbacks. The 1960-61 and 1969-70
recessions originated from tight monetary policy, and the 1973-75 reces-
sion was brought on by inventory overinvestment and dramatic increases
in world oil prices. The recessions were also varied in their severity.
The 1953-54, 1957-58 and 1973-75 recessions were relatively severe by
post World War II standards. The 1960-61 and 1969-70 recessions were
brief and mild. The sectoral impact of each recession was also different.
9For example the construction industry was resilient in the first two re-
cessions, and cyclically sensitive in the last three recessions. By way
of background to the empirical work that follows, the severity of each
recession, the impetus for the downturn, and the cyclically immune and
hardest hit sectors will be briefly identified for each recession.
The 1953-1954-Downturn
The 1953-54 recession was due primarily to inventory overinvest-
ment and a decline in military expenditures. In the early 1950's, United
States military expenditures for the Korean War effort increased rapidly.
In anticipation of rising prices and shortages, consumers also increased
their purchases sharply. This increased aggregate demand led to the econo-
mic expansion of 1950 and 1952. Federal expenditures for new goods and
services doubled, from $20.9 billion to an annual rate of $47.2 billion
between the fourth quarter (IV) of 1950 and 1951 IV (Handbook of Cyclic
Indicators, 1977: 156). Personal consumption expenditures in current
dollars rose during the same period, late 1950 to mid-1953, from $209.9
to $234.3 billion (Handbook of Cyclic Indicators, 1977: 151). The expan-
sion was extended after the 1952 steel strike. Private sector demand,
especially for durable goods, was strong as firms attempted to replenish
inventories depleted during the strike.
As military expenditures began to level off in late 1952, deferred
civilian consumption for consumer durables resumed. After a year and a
half of restraint in purchases, consumers stepped up their buying of con-
sumer durables. However, retail sales began to level off in the first
half of 1953, and consumption expenditures shifted from the purchase of
durables to that of services and nondurables. With the leveling off of
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retail sales, output levels attained in 1952 and early 1953 could not be
sustained. The production levels in this period were geared to meeting
the increases in consumer demand, and expectation of expansions in further
demand, and replenishments after the 1952 steel strike. When this demand
for consumer durables was not realized, inventories became excessive, and
overstocks of inventories led to declines in output and employment.
The 1953-54 recession would probably have been a mild inventory
recession had it not coincided with the wind down of the Korean War and
the decline in defense expenditures. The cutbacks in military spending
aggravated the problem of already excessive inventories.
Another factor that may have contributed to the 1953-54 downturn
was a restrictive monetary policy. In an accord between the Federal Re-
serve Bank (FED) and the United States Treasury, in March 1951, the Fed
again acquired the right to pursue an active and independent monetary
policy. Until June of 1953, the Fed exercised this right by tightening
credit. When it became clear in mid-1953 that the economy was slowing
down, the Fed reversed its tight monetary policy and credit conditions
eased. The Fed's tight monetary policy was less to blame for the reces-
sion than overstocked inventories and retrenchment from the Korean War.
Throughout this downturn several sectors of the economy remained
vigorous. The severity of the recession was dampened by a strong demand
for residential and non-residential construction, and by state and local
governments throughout the recession. Residential and nonresidential
construction tended to behave countercyclically because falling interest
rates that accompanied the downturn eased mortgage credit and stimulated
the construction industry. Population growth also encouraged demand for
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housing. Expenditures by state and local governments remained strong
throughout the recessionary phase of the cycle, because again low interest
rates along with a strong market for state and local bonds allowed states
and localities to meet the tremendous demand for schools for children of
the post-War baby boom, and for roads, streets, and public services for
the expanding suburbs.
The 1953-55 recession lasted thirteen months. Throughout that period
industrial production fell 10 percent, real GNP fell 3.3 percent (McNees,
1978: 45), and unemployment rose from 2.5 percent to 6 percent. As in all
post World War II recessions, prices were resistent to downward pressure.
The 1957-1958 Contraction
The 1957-58 contraction was also brought on by inventory over-
investment and cutbacks in military spending. According to the NBER, the
1957-58 recession lasted nine months, from the peak in August 1957 to the
trough in April 1958. The contraction was concentrated in investment
goods and consumer durables, and because demand for consumer nondurables
and construction remained strong throughout the period, the recession was
relatively brief and mild.
As the economy moved toward the 1957 peak, production levels and
profits began to stabilize, and signs of declining demand for business
investment and consumer durable purchases were beginning to materialize
This slowdown in investment coincided with announced reductions in de-
fense awards and military procurements.
Contractions in investment took place in manufacturing, mining,
and transportation industries, the same major industry divisions where
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sales and profits had weakened a few months earlier. Within manufactur-
ing there were more severe cuts in outlays for durable goods than for
nondurable purchases, a pattern that was in contrast to previous reces-
sions where nondurable and durable goods had moved concurrently. Nearly
every manufacturing industry experienced this pattern in the 1957-58 re-
cession (Osborne, 1958: 11).
Reductions in consumer spending for durable goods was concentrated
in the auto market and was the principal factor in a $6.5 billion decline
in the annual rate of automotive gross product -- a measure of total U.S.
output attributed to auto sales (Osborne, 1958: 12). Sales also fell off
for furniture and appliances; however, cutbacks were not as marked in these
industries as was the decline in demand for autos.
Stability and even growth in consumer nondurables, residential
construction, and state and local governments moderated the effects of
the downturn. Due, in part, to automatic stabilizers, such as unemploy-
ment insurance, transfer payments, corporate dividends, etc., declines
in disposable income were a small 3 percent (Osborne, 1958: 12).
Residential construction was also relatively strong throughout 1958.
With low interest rates and the easing of eligibility requirements for VA
and FHA loans residential construction expanded throughout that year.
In July of 1957, private annual housing starts totaled 1,191 and they
increased every year throughout the recession, with annual housing starts
equaling 1,598 in December of 1958 (Handbook of Cyclical Indicators, 1977:
85).
State and local government expenditures continued to grow through-
out the recession. From $36.7 billion in 1957 II, state and local
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expenditures increased to $42.7 billion in 1958 IV (Handbook of Cyclical
Indicators, 1977: 156). As in the case of the 1953-54 recession, the
strength in this sector can be attributed to low interest rates, strength
in municipal and state bond markets, and a seemingly insatiable demand for
schools, roads, and infrastructure (Osborne, 1958: 9-17; Moore, 1959:
292-308; and Gordon, 1974: 124-126).
The 1960-1961 Recession
The 1960-1961 contraction was mild and brief, lasting from April
1960 to February 1961. Gross National Product (GNP) fell, in real terms,
by only 1.5 percent, and unemployment rose from 5 to 7 percent.
At least in part, this recession can be attributed to the Fed's
excessively tight credit policy during 1958 and 1959. This Fed policy
was later reversed but not before the economy began to experience slow-
downs in several sectors. As in the earlier recessions the major por-
tion of the loss in GNP was centered in producer durables and consumer
durables. Gross output of consumer durables fell by 9.1 percent, and
producer durables fell by 11.5 percent. In contrast to earlier reces-
sions residential construction also fell by 6.1 percent (Gordon, 1974:
132). Automatic stabilizers, especially corporate dividends, bolstered
disposable income throughout the contraction; consequently, income and
consumer nondurable purchases were stable.
Federal expenditures began to rise rapidly in early 1961, as the
federal budget moved from a $7 billion surplus in the last 1960's to
about a $5 billion dollar deficit in 1961 I. A turnaround in inventory
investment in conjunction with expansionary monetary and fiscal policy
provided the basis for an economic recovery and the beginning of an
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economic upswing that was to last throughout the 1960's (Gordon, 1974:
131-133).
The 1969-70 Contraction
The downswing lasting from December 1969 to November 1970 was a
"policy recession." In an attempt to slow the accelerating inflation of
the late 1960's, the Federal Reserve authorities began to tighten credit
in 1968. By increasing reserve requirements and the discount rate and
contracting the money supply through open market operations, interest
rates were driven up to levels "not reached in a centurly" and the growth
of the money supply was curtailed from an annual rate of 7.5 percent in
1968 IV to about 1.5 percent in 1969 IV (Gordon, 1974: 170).
Fiscal policy, working in harmony with monetary policy, was also
contractionary. In real 1972 dollars, Federal purchases of goods and
services declined from $260.9 billion in the third quarter of 1968 to
$249.2 billion in the second quarter of 1970 (Handbook of Cyclical Indi-
cators, 1977: 156).
Business expenditures on plant and equipment were relatively resil-
ient. Purchases of plant and equipment increased slightly, in constant
dollars, from $77.8 billion in 1969 III to $81.9 billion in 1970 III, but
then declined to $78.63 billion in 1970 IV before expanding again. The
General Motors strike caused the slowdown in the last quarter of 1970,
and without it the recovery would have probably occurred several months
earlier (Gordon, 1974: 171).
As in the earlier recessions the largest losses to GNP were felt
in consumer durables, which fell by 9.6 percent and in investment in
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inventories, which fell by 49.7 percent in real 1958 dollars (Gordon,
1974: 161). Disposable income was, as in the previous four recessions,
stable. However, consumption of nondurables appears to have been more
sensitive than history would have predicted. The personal savings rate in-
creased sharply from about 6.5 percent in the second half of 1969 to over
8 percent in the second half of 1970.
With the end of the strike and expansionary monetary and fiscal policy
and economy began its recovery. During the 1969-70 recession unemployment
had climbed from 3.5 percent in December 1969 to 6.1 percent in December
1970 (Gordon, 1974: 170-173).
The 1973-1975 Recession
In terms of GNP, the 1973-75 recession was the most severe of the
post war period. As shown in Table 1.2 GNP growth rates fell to -7.5 in
1974 IV and then to -9.2 in early 1975 (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1978:
535-36). From peak to trough, real GNP dropped 5.9 percent, nearly twice
as much as the largest previous post-war decline of 3.3 percent in 1953-
54 (McNees, 1978: 45).
Table 1.2
Growth Rates of Quarterly Real GNP,
and Unemployment Rate, 1973-1975
1973 1974 1975
I II III IV I II III IV I II
Growth rate
of real GNP 8.8 0.2 2.7 1.4 -3.9 -3.7 -2.3 -7.5 -9.2 3.3
Unempl oyment
rate 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.3 5.9 7.2 8.5 8.7
*
Last month of quarter.
Source: Economic Report of the President 1975, 1976.
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It is clear in retrospect that the U.S. economy was heading for a
downturn prior to the oil embargo. As shown in Table 1.2 GNP growth rates
had begun to fall prior to the end of 1973. This slowdown may have been
in part due to contractionary monetary and fiscal policies designed to
curb inflation; high food prices, caused by the shortfall in world grain
production in 1972; and increased costs of imports due to the depreciating
dollar. The quadrupling of oil prices at the end of 1973 and increases
in agricultural prices in mid-1974 explain the sharper declines in GNP,
as well as the increase in unemployment from 4.9 in 1973 IV to 8.7 in
1975 II, shown in Table 1.2.
In large part, the fall in the GNP growth rate from 1973 I to
1973 II was attributable to declines in residential investment and con-
sumer spending. Residential investment fell as a result of the high
interest rates. The treasury bill rate had gone from 5.6 percent in
1973 I to 7.5 percent in 1973 IV (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1978: 537).
Consumption expenditures, especially for durables, also fell. From 1973 I
to 1973 III personal consumption expenditures on durable goods fell from
$124.9 billion to $121.2 billion. During that same period demand for
services increased, while demand for consumer nondurables stabilized.
These figures and observations are all based on 1972 dollars (Handbook of
Cyclical Indicators, 1977: 151-153).
During the most acute phase of the recession the major sources of
reduced demand were, as in 1973, residential construction, inventory in-
vestment, and consumer demand. Residential construction fell from $64.5
billion to $33.6 billion from 1973 I to 1975 I. This was equivalent to
45% of the decline in GNP during that period. Inventory investment fell
from $11.9 billion to $9.0 billion in the same period and
purchases by consumers fell from $124.0 billion in 1973 I
in 1975 I. The decline in consumer durable purchases was
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durable goods
to $104 billion
concentrated in
the auto industry (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1978: 538-540).
The path of non-agricultural employment did not track the path of
real GNP throughout the recession. Despite the severity of the drop in
output, employment declined by only 1.3 percent. This was a smaller
decline in employment than any of the post World War II recessions, except
the very mild 1969-70 recession. The slow growth in employment during the
recovery suggests that labor hoarding during the recession explains the
relatively mild employment decline (McNees, 1978: 53).
Data from these five recessions provide the empirical base for the
model tested in this thesis. The five recessions differed in their origins,
severity, and sectoral impact. The 1953-54 and 1957-58 recessions are
explained by overinvestment and cutbacks in military spending. Two
recessions, the 1960-61 and 1969-70 recessions, were due primarily
to a tight monetary policy on the part of the Fed while the 1973-75
recession is attributed primarily to shortages and price increases in
essential commodities. These differences, as well as other major dif-
ferences in sectoral impact, and severity, test whether the model laid out
in Chapter Three is a general one. Can it explain cross-state differences
in cyclical employment independent of the recession's particular
characteristics?
Concept of a Region 18
Before proceeding to outline the remaining six chapters, one addi-
tional introductory topic should be mentioned, if only briefly. Most
regional economics theses begin with an acknowledgement of the ambigu-
ities inherent in defining a region. A region is, in some sense, an
artificial subdivision of the national economy.
For the purposes of this study, the more hamogeneous the industrial
composition, the production process, the institutional setting, and the
labor market, the more appropriate the region is for testing the model
presented herein. Greater homogeneity within regions means that there
will be a more precise measure of the variables. For example, one varia-
ble measures the age of a state's capital stock. This variable is actu-
ally the age of all the capital stocks of all manufacturing firms in a
state. The more similar the age of each firms' capital stock to the
mean state value the more precisely the age variable will be calculated.
On the other hand the greater the differences in values across states,
the greater the variance in the independent variable and the better an
econometric model will test the hypotheses proposed in this thesis.
Thus, the ideal region would maximize homogeneity within a region and
maximize heterogeneity across regions.
However, all such discussions about the appropriate delineation of
a region is limited by the availability of data. The data needed to test
the hypotheses proposed in Chapter Three are spatially disaggregated in
public documents only to the state level, and not to smaller regional units.
A regional division by state is thought to be adequate for the following
reasons.
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Two of the variables to be tested, including unionization and unem-
ployment insurance benefits, are influenced by state laws and regulations.
Thus we would expect unemployment insurance benefits to be almost always
uniform within state boundaries and union practices to be similar within
state boundaries. For example, right-to-work laws influencing union
practices, are instituted and enforced by state government.
The smaller the regional unit the more precisely three additional
variables-the industrial composition, age-of-the-capital stock, and
capital-labor ratios-will be measured. The best measure for unemployment
rates would be labor markets, which are approximated but not alwasy
adequately specified by state boundaries. The smallest spatial unit,
given the available data, is the preferable regional breakdown. For this
study that breakdown is the state level.
Outl ine of the Study
The purpose of this thesis is to determine why recessions have
had a differential impact on state economies. Chapter Two of the thesis
reviews two sets of previous research that bear on the topic. First
business-cycle theories are examined, and secondly, several models of
regional business cycles are considered.
Chapter Three presents the theory and empirical model. This
chapter lays out hypotheses explaining regional differences in the
employment cycle during recessions. These hypotheses propose that cross-
state differences in business cycles occur because of differences in
industry composition, production processes and labor market characteristics.
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The model designed to test the hypotheses is econometric and relies
on data for 48 states and five recessions.
Chapter Four describes the data. It addresses its sources as well
as the transformation of the original data into variables needed to test
the model formulated in Chapter Three.
Chapter Five presents empirical regularities; this chapter addresses
such questions as which regions are most cyclically sensitive and which are
most stable? Are the same states consistently stable or volatile over time?
Are the variables calculated to test the model consistent with data on
regional economic trends, and are state cycles becoming more alike with
time?
Chapter Six-presents the estimations of the model. Here we examine
the findings which support, contradict and do not support the original
hypotheses. The conclusions, policy implications and directions for
further work are laid out in the final Chapter Seven.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Much of the literature relevant to business cycles in general
and regional fluctuations in particular has been woven into Chapters
Three, Four, Five and Six. However, there are two sets of literature
which are not covered, yet provide background and context to
this thesis, and, consequently, are important to review. One set of
literature covers the theoretical research into the origins and pro-
traction of the business cycle, while the second set focuses on model-
ing regional cyclic behavior. These two areas of research will be sum-
marized in this chapter. The first section reviews business-cycle
theory, the second considers several regional business-cycle models,
and the third compares and contrasts the findings of the regional
models as they relate to the framing of the problem in this thesis.
Business-Cycle Theory
While there are many permutations, refinements, and extensions
of business-cycle theories, they can be broadly divided into two cate-
gories: the accelerator-multiplier theory and the monetarist theory.
It is not the purpose of this section to recount these theories in
detail. That topic would not only be a thesis in and of itself, but
it has been explored before, for example, see Haberler (1964) Depressions
and Prosperity. Rather it is the intention of this section to give a
brief introduction to the two, broadly defined schools of business cycle
theories and then to draw several conclusions that shed light on regional
differences in cyclical amplitude.
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Accelerator-Multiplier Theory
The best articulated theory of business-cycles is that which re-
lies on the accelerator and the multiplier. This theory was formalized
by Paul Samuelson (1939) and extended by many others (Hicks, 1950;
Goodwin, 1951).
According to the accelerator theory, investment occurs in order
to enlarge the capital stock which must be increased to meet rising out-
put levels. The magnitude of the increase in investment under these
circumstances depends upon the capital-output ratio, that is, how much
additional capital is needed to produce the required output levels.
The accelerator theory combined with the multiplier lays out a
relationship where a rise (or fall) in autonomous investment brings
about an increase (or decrease) in the level of income in the next peri-
od, through the Keynesian multiplier. Increases in income lead to in-
creases in consumption. Producers meet this new demand for goods by adding
to their capital stock, which in turns stimulates demandin investment-goods
industries. As output and purchases of capital goods rise, incomes rise,
generating increases in consumption and the process continues. The re-
sult is a cyclical path of income and an even more volatile path of in-
vestment.
Samuelson's (1939) mathematical formulation of the accelerator-
multiplier principle can be summarized with the following equation:
Yt = Ca + cYt 1 + Ia + W(Ct - C t 1 ) (2-1)
This equation states that aggregate income and output in any
23
period equals the sum of autonomous consumption (C a) and autonomous
investment (Ia) plus an additional amount of consumption that depends
on the marginal propensity to consume (c) times the income of the pre-
ceding period and an additional amount of investment that depends on the
accelerator () times the difference between consumption in the current
period and the previous period. The accelerator, w, is equivalent to
the capital-output ratio. It can easily be shown, using a simple num-
erical example, that a one time rise in Ia to a higher, but constant,
value will lead to a series of self-generating cyclical fluctuations.
Whether this cyclical process dampens or explodes depends upon
the different combinations of values for c and w. The various types of
movements that result from the multiplier-accelerator interaction have
been the basis for the formation of two groups of business cycle theor-
ists. Hicks (1950) and Goodwin (1951) claimed that the cycles are ex-
plosive, but bounded by a "ceiling" and "floor " while Frisch (1966)
and Hansen were proponents of the weak accelerator theory. Hansen's
view was that through the accelerator-multiplier interaction, a shock to
the economic system results in an increasingly mild cycle and than a new
equilibrium (Shapiro, 1974: 363). The economists that argue this posi-
tion explain history's pattern of continuous cyclical fluctuations in
terms of continuous shocks to the system. Frequent shocks, generated
by inventions, population growth, and exploitation of frontiers keep the
system in motion and prevent its settling down into equilibrium.
Hicks (1950), on the other hand, described cycles as oscillating
around a Harrod-Domar growth trend. An upward divergence from the trend
is bounded by full employment and resource capacity constants, while the
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downward divergence from the growth trend is halted by the underlying
secular growth rate of the economy. Thus when the economy hits full
employment, the rate of growth in output falls, investment falls even
more severely, and income falls, etc. At some point, the increase in
investment induced by the underlying growth trend reverses the direction
of the cycle (Shapiro, 1974: 363-367).
Whether the cycles produced by the accelerator-multiplier model
are explosive or deadened with time depends, as stated above, on the
values of the multiplier and the accelerator. A relatively low multiplier
(e.g., 2.5) and high accelerator (e.g., 5) or a high multiplier (e.g., 10)
and a low accelerator (e.g., 2.5) will produce explosive cycles. Similarly,
both a low accelerator and multiplier will produce dampened cycles (Shapiro,
1974: 360-361).
A notable characteristic of the business cycle that is important
for understanding regional business cycles is the highly volatile nature
of durable goods. The empirically observed volatility of the producer
goods industries is consistent with the accelerator-multiplier theory.
Fluctuations in output should be greatest in those stages of production
furthest from consumption. If replacement demand for capital goods is
constant, then demand for durable goods changes with the rate of change
in final demand not with the absolute change in final demand (Haberler,
1964: 85-94). Therefore, during the boom or expansionary phase of the
cycle when the rate of output is growing, capital is added to the current
stock, and growth in investment goods production is strong. During the
downturn when the rate of increase is zero or negative, a sufficient or
excess capital stock capacity discourages all new investment and causes
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a precipitous drop in demand for producer goods.
Among the theorists that have addressed the issue of business-
cycles, there are differences in opinion about the impetus to upswings
and downturns. Theories about the initiatives of expansion are that an
increase in final demand results from expansionary monetary policy or the
shift from one commodity to another. The shift in demand from one commod-
ity to another stimulates investment in industries producing the now popular
good (Haberler, 1964: 98-105). Another set of theories explain the origin
of the expansionary phase of the cycle as beginning not with final demand,
but investment. An autonomous jump in investment increases incomes,
consumption, further investment, etc. These theories attribute the
initial increase in investment to profitable opportunities brought in
by monetary policy or technological change (Haberler, 1964: 72-84).
The turning at the peak of the cycle is also addressed by several
theorists. First, the contractionary phase of the cycle can be brought
on by a tightening of credit, which increases interest rates, reducing
investment, income, etc. (Haberler, 1964: 20-21). A second theory is
that the contraction is brought on when the round-about process of pro-
duction is complete, that is, capital goods are finally in place, and
then they begin to produce consumer goods. Investment demand falls,
followed by a decline in incomes, consumption etc. (Haberler, 1964:
103). A third theory blames the downturn on underconsumption. Savings
rates that are too high result in sufficient aggregate demand. The
high savings rate is primarily blamed on an unequal income distribu-
tion which worsened during the previous expansion (Haberler, 1964: 122-
123). Finally, a fourth theory blames the contraction on the breakdown
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of capital investment due to overinvestment during the expansion. This
overinvestment during the expansion may have been caused by interest
rates that were too low or an actual rate of interest that was below
the "natural" rate (Haberler, 1964: 45-49). Once the upturn or down-
swing is generated, the momentum of the cycle is created through the
accelerator-multiplier interaction.
The proponents of the accelerator-multiplier theory integrate
both monetary and non-monetary phenomenon into their explanations of
the business-cycle. In contrast, monetarists propose that changes in
the flow of money are the sole and sufficient cause of economic fluctu-
ations. This monetarist view, as advocated by current day as well as
early economists will be briefly set forth in the next section.
Monetarist Theory of Business Cycles
The monetary theory of business cycles argues that changes in
the flow of money are the only causes of economic fluctuations. The
monetary theory of business cycles is set out by R.G. Hawtrey, Wicksell,
Hayes, and more recently, by Friedman and Schwarz, and Lucas.
The monetarist view as presented by Robert Lucas (1975 and 1976)
is that cyclical fluctuations in employment and output are caused by
changes in prices. Fluctuations in prices, in turn, are brought about
by movements in the quantity of money. Consider a single entrepreneur.
An economic agent faced with a change in the selling price of his product
is uncertain as to whether the observed price increase is permanent or
temporary. If the producer believes the price increase to be a perman-
ent change in the selling price, labor supply and thus employment will
fall. This conclusion is based on the assumption that real wages remain
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constant and the empirical evidence that labor-supply elasticities are
negative or zero.
If, at the opposite extreme, the price change is viewed by the
economic agent as transitory, the employment and output response to an
observed increase in price depends upon the rate at which the producer
is willing to substitute labor today for labor tomorrow. If leisure
is highly substitutable over time, and empirical evidence by Ghez and
Becker (1974) suggest it is, the agent will work longer on high price
days and close early on low price days. On the basis of this argument
employment should be highly elastic in response to transitory price
changes, a result consistent with observed co-movements of prices and
empl oyment.
Economic agents also make investment decisions based on observed
prices. If a price increase is viewed as transitory and the current
capital stock is satisfactory for current output levels, then the ra-
tional producer will not acquire additional capital which will raise
his output-per-hour in future periods. By the time the new capital is
in place, the price movements that made it appear profitable will have
vanished. On the other hand a price change that is perceived as a per-
manent change in a relative price will have the maximum impact on capital
accumulation and, therefore, output.
To arrive at the empirically consistent result of price movements
coinciding with employment and output levels, it must be the case that
the producer facing uncertain price movements perceives them to be a
mix of transitory and permanent elements. The transitory component of
price leads to increases in employment, whereas it is the permanent
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component of the price increase that leads to increases in investment
and output.
To recapitulate, our hypothetical producer is taken
to face stochastic price variability, which is des-
cribable as a mix of transitory and permanent compon-
ents, both unobserved . . . . Under assumptions con-
sistent with rational behavior and available evidence,
his response to an unforeseen price increase is a
sizeable increase in labor supplies, a decline in fin-
ished inventory, and an expansion in productive capital
accumulation of all kinds. Thus behavior is symmetric;
the responses to price decreases are the opposite.
(Lucas, 1976: 19)
For the same reason that a producer faced with a change in the
selling price of her product finds it difficult to decide whether the
change is permanent or temporary, she finds it difficult to tell
whether the price change represents a change in relative or general
prices. A change in relative prices signals increasing demand for the
product and the producer will want to respond by increasing employment,
investment and output. If the price change is only part of a general
rise in the price level, output expansion is unwarranted.
In the initial stages of a general price rise, many economic de-
cision makers will mistakenly perceive the price changes as relative,
and a sign of expanding demand. Many producers will also perceive the
price changes to be a mix of transitory and permanent price movements.
The net effect will be an expansion in employment, output, and investment
along with prices, just as observed over the business cycles. Thus this
theory depends crucially on economic agent's confusion between relative
and general, and transitory and permanent price movements.
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The monetarist explanation of the cyclically sensitive nature
of the durable goods industry also depends upon the generally risky
and uncertain situation faced by economic actors. For individual
investment projects, rates of return are highly variable. A quick res-
ponse to what may be a weak signal is often the key to a successful in-
vestment. An agent who waits until the situation is clear may lose the
chance to supply the perceived increase in demand. As many economic
agents confuse a general price rise for a change in relative prices
favoring their product, high amplitude changes in investment will be
observed.
The economic downturn is automatically built into the expansion.
When producers begin to recognize the price rises as general inflation
rather than a relative change in prices for their products, they will
adjust capital capacities downwards. Misperceived signals lead to over-
investment which must be compensated for by underinvestment in the next
period, causing the downturn in the cycle.
The Austrian or "monetary-overinvestment" theorists, such Hayek
and Machlup, also base their argument on a mistaken investment decision
caused by a misreading of price changes. The difference between the
monetary overinvestment theorists and the new monetarists appears to be
that the first group concentrates on interest rates rather than product
selling price as the misread signal which causes the business cycle.
The overinvestment theorists introduce a natural or equilibrium
rate of interest. The natural market rate of interest is defined as
that rate at which the demand for loan capital just equals the supply
of savings. A contraction of the money supply pushes the actual interest
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rate above the natural market interest rate, demand for credit will fall,
some savings will not be used and deflation will follow. If the actual
interest rate is lower than the natural rate, capital appears artificially
cheap and the production process "elongates" due to the shifting of re-
sources from the production of consumer goods to production goods. Prices
in the consumption goods industries rise faster than real incomes and
demand for these products fall. The structure of the economy has become
"top heavy" with an over-production in capital goods industries and fall-
ing purchases of consumer goods. The capital goods industry is most sev-
erely hit as the economy readjusts to the proper balance between invest-
ment and consumer goods.
To summarize, the argument for an expansionary phase of the cycle
is as follows. An over extension in the money supply drives actual
interest rates below the natural rate of interest. The artificial lower-
ing of the interest rate lures economic actors into over investing. Only
when expansion credit halts will the economy be unable to sustain the "top
heavy" or capital goods heavy production process, and a recession will
ensue. Capital projects remain idle as the capital stock is over-sized
for meeting consumer demand (Haberler, 1964: 33-68).
Price (including interest rate) movements, according to the mon-
etarists, are the source of business cycles, and changes in the quantity
of money are, in turn, responsible for price fluctuations. Thus monetary
forces and frequent mismanagement of monetary policy is the impetus for
the real business cycle.
It was not the purpose of this brief review of the monetarist and
non-monetarist theories on business cycles to debate which set of theories
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is correct and to what extent. Rather the intention was to look for
additional insights into the causes of national and regional business
cycles, as well as to provide background for the review of regional
business cycle models that follow.
Interregional Business-Cycle Models
This chapter now turns to two categories of business-cycle models.
One category includes an interregional business-cycle model, based on
the Hansen-Samuelson multiplier-accelerator theory, and the second cate-
gory focuses on models that emphasize the effect of monetary policy on
regional fluctuations.
The Multiplier-Accelerator Model
The multiplier-accelerator interregional model is based on a
merger of the multiplier-accelerator principle and trade theory. The
business-cycle or multiplier-accelerator portion of the regional model
is based on the Samuelson model described earlier in this chapter. And
the multiplier-accelerator model explains the initial shock and perpetu-
ation of the cycle. International trade theory provides the links for
the transmission of cycles from region to region once they have occurred.
The most comprehensive model of regional business cycles is by
Airov (1963). Harry Richardson (1969: 281-286) presented an interregional
business cycle model in his text Regional Economics. However, Richardson's
formulation appears to have been based primarily on the work of Airov.
Airov's paper is, in turn, dependent on the work of Lloyd Metzer (1950).
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Metzer's model dealt with the effects of investment in one region
on the employment and income in all other (n) regions in the country.1
His major contribution was to expand trade relationships between two
regions to trade relationships between n regions.
Briefly, Metzer's study made the following contribution. Regional
income is set equal to expenditures on consumer's goods and services,
plus net investment plus exports of goods and services less imports of
goods and services. Consumption, net investment, and imports are all
dependent on the level of income and employment at home, while the
remaining item, exports, depends upon income in all of the regions to
which goods are sold. Metzler then used a Leontief input-output type
table to show the interregional relationships. In other words, regions
replaced the industries, and imports and exports replaced inputs and
outputs in the Leontief framework. From this table the marginal (aver-
age) propensities of a region to import from another region could be
calculated.
Airov (1963) used both the multiplier-accelerator principle and
Metzler's trade matrix to model the transmission of business cycles
from one region to another.
Summarized, his model was the following. For region i, d =
domestic and f = foreign, Y. = net regional income
C = Cdi + Cfi = personal consumption expenditures by residents
of region i (2-2)
Idi d .+ (Id~fi = net private domestic investment (2-3)di
1Metzler's work was applied to trade among countries as well
as regions.
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(Id fi = net private domestic investment purchased fromforeign regions
X = exports, M = Cfi + (Id fi = imports
E = net regional expenditures (NRE)
Edi =di + (I d)i = net NRE on domestic production
(2-4)
(2-5)
(2-6)
(2-7)
Thus imports and export may consist of both investment and
consumption goods. According to regional income accounting:
Y i= Cdi + (I d)i + X
E. = C + I .i
(2-8)
(2-9)
Y = E ; only if X = M
The basic accounting identities for region i are
Y. = E . + X
E. = E . + M
(2-10)
(2-11)
Using equations 2-10 and 2-11, the accounting framework for an
n-region income and trade model was developed.
Let
X.1I] = imports from the ith region to j
M i = imports from the ith region to j
(i j)
(i j)
From this a table (Table 2.1) was constructed with the net regional pro-
duct of region i,
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Y E di + X..
in row i; and in the corresponding column
E. = E . + M.
Table
Regional
Region 1 . . . n Income
1 21
n X ni Edn n
Using a simple consumption function
C. = M..Y. (2-12)
t It-1
where mi.. is the domestic marginal propensity to consume and
C = m.. Y. (2-13)
where consumption in region i of j products is a function of the mar-
ginal propensity of i to consume j's products time i's income. These
multipliers can be put into the Leontief input-output framework. Because
one region's exports can be considered another region's imports, the
whole matrix of multipliers can be described in terms of import multipliers.
In terms of matrices and vectors:
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Y(t) = C(t) (2-14)
C(t) = FRY(t-1) (2-15)
Substituting into the n-equation multiplier model in n regions
is:
Y(t) = RY(t-1) (2-16)
where M = [i 3,,a matrix of consumption coefficients.
Airov's interregional model in vectors and matrices was composed
of the following components:
Y(t) = C(t) + I(t) (2-17)
C(t) = AY(t-l) (2-18)
I(t) = B[Y(t-1) - Y(t-2)] (2-19)
Equation 2-17 is the regional accounting identity. Equation 2-19
is the consumption function where A is a matrix of consumption coeffi-
cients m and m . Equation 2-19 is the interregional accelerator,
which states that investment is a function of change in the income levels
in the previous periods. B is the matrix of accelerators or capital
coefficients, where b i is the accelerator for investment goods purchased
from region i as a function of the rate of change in income in region i.
So that :
Id. (t) = b i[Y (t-l) - Y (t-2)] (2-20)
is the intraregional investment expenditures by region i caused by the
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rate of change in the level of income in region i.
(Id)fij(t) = b 1 [Y (t-l) - Y (t-2)] (2-21)
is the export of capital goods from region i to region j as a function
of the rate of change in income in region j. Having derived the consump-
tion function and the induced investment function, we get the interregional
accelerator model.
By substituting equation 2-12, 2-13, 2-20 and 2-21 into the income
identity gives this result:
Y = m. Y .(t-1) + b .[Y (t-l) - Y.(t-2)]
+ m..Y.(t-1) + b. .[Y.(t-l) - Y.(t-2)]. (2-22)
The mathematical solution to these equations depends on the
interregional trade patterns. The system is indecomposable if each
region trades directly or indirectly with every other region; it is
decomposable if some regions are isolated or there are blocs that
only trade with each other; and it is completely decomposable where
any region is isolated from all others. When the system is indecompos-
able, the system's solution is found by solving one simultaneous system.
T.his case is probably most appropriate for an industrialized nation
such as the United States.
This model will generate cycles that vary by region, but will
exhibit similar timing. The amplitude of the cycles will depend on
the values for m and b, the proportions of the regional economy's activ-
ity in consumption and investment, the extent of trading relationships
37
with other regions, and the stability or instability of those trading
partners.
The disadvantages of the model are its massive data requirements
and the fact that the multipliers and accelerators are likely to be
unstable throughout the recession. The multipliers and accelerators
are calculated as average values at one point in time. The true margin-
al values are likely to vary substantially over the phases of the bus-
iness cycle.
One strength of the Airov model is the degree to which the inter-
regional transmission of the business cycle is made explicit. Fluctu-
ations in investment and consumption are transmitted from state to state
via the multiplier, m.., and accelerator, b.., so that a state trading
with a cyclically variable region will experience larger than expected
cycles. Cross-regional differences in recessions due to the stability
or instability of trading partners could not be captured in the simpler
model of this analysis.
Monetary Models of Regional Business Cycles
Another type of regional business cycle model stresses the links
between changes in the money supply and short-run fluctuations in region-
al incomes. These models are based on the argument that monetary policy
is not neutral in its regional impact. First, federal policies, such as
open-market operations, may vary in their effect on the net source base
of a region.2 Secondly, the interest elasticity of demand for money may
vary across regions and finally, there may be variations in the extent to
which changes in interest rates affect local aggregate demand.
2Net source base is equivalent to high powered money.
38
Roberts and Fishkind's (1979) model of the Florida economy is
based on the assumption of regional differences in the second stage
described above, that is, there are cross-regional differences in the
interest elasticity of demand for money. In a two region model of the
United States, Miller (1978; 1979) explored in detail regional differ-
ences in the first of two stages of monetary policy and in less detail
the third stage. In a third paper, Beare (1976) studied the impact of
national changes in the money supply on regional incomes. Each of these
papers will be considered in turn.
Roberts and Fishkind argue that although capital is more mobile
than any other factor of production, it is not perfectly mobile and
that, in fact, regional differences in interest rates are significant.
To support these two claims, Roberts and Fishkind cite the evidence of
Lbsch's study (1954), comparing interest rates for bank credit in a num-
ber of U.S. cities from 1923-35. Lbsch found that interest rates paid
in bank deposits increased uniformly with distance from a Federal Reserve
Bank City. Lbsch attributed this to regional differences in the supply
and demand for funds, with peripheral areas growing faster and thus having
a greater demand for funds.
This evidence presented by Roberts and Fishkind is, however, sub-
stantially out-of-date. Improvements in communication technology since
the 1930's should lead to the elimination, through arbitrage, of any
spatial differences in interest rates. Therefore, Roberts and Fishkinds
argument for persistent cross-region differences in the level of interest
rates is not convincing. The importance of this question for regional
business cycles is that persistently higher interest rates in a region
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would discourage investment and thus lead to a relatively severe cycle
in that high-interest rate region.
A second slightly more convincing argument made by Roberts and
Fishkind is that the interest elasticity of demand for money varies by
region. As evidence, they cite the empirical findings of Ebner (1976).
Ebner found that deposits in savings and loan institutions were more
sensitive to fluctuations in the treasury bill rate in some states than
in others. For example, deposits in California, Florida, and Ohio were
more responsive to changes in the treasury bill rates than in New Mexico
and Idaho. This evidence suggests that the interest elasticity of demand
for money varies by region and the more isolated an area, the less inter-
est elastic the demand for money. Therefore, we should expect the slope
of the LM curves to vary across regions. The greater the slope of the
LM curve, due, for example, to a greater elasticity of demand for money,
the larger impact a change in exports, government expenditures, autono-
mous investment (or any shift in the IS curve) will have on regional
income in the short run.
To analyze the effects of regional compartmentalization of finan-
cial markets, the authors built two models, neither of which was laid out
in their published paper. One model was a fully specified structural reg-
ional financial market with monetary and financial variables. In partic-
ular, it contained saving flows into banks and savings and loans, which,
in turn, determined housing starts, which, in turn, determined employ-
ment in construction and other industries. Their second naive model
predicted Florida's employment as a function of national employment
weighted by the ratio of Florida population to U.S. population. From
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a simulation of the models, they found that the structural financial
model captured the behavior of Florida's employment during the period
1972:1 to 1974:IV far better than the naive model. The structural model
was especially an improvement over the naive model in predicting troughs
and peaks.
Fishkind and Roberts' finding suggest that the monetary sector is
important in explaining regional business cycles; however, because their
model only includes Florida, it does not test for any across-region dis-
parities in the impact of monetary policy.
A second attempt to model the monetary sector of regional econo-
mies was made by Randall Miller. In the fourteen simultaneous equation
model, Miller attempted to explain the impact of monetary policy on in-
comes of two regions, the Northeast and the rest of the country.
Rather than present the formal model here, in mathematical terms,
the equations will only be briefly described. Miller's model simulates
the process by which exogenous changes in the net source base (high
powered money), due to monetary actions by the Fed, affects the income
levels of two regions. The first equation in the recursive model estim-
ates the flow of the net source base to the Northeast, while the second
estimates the flow of the net source base to the rest of the country.
The net source base in each region is a function of the level of demand
deposits in the last period in that region, the level of demand deposits
in the last period in the other region, the change in federal reserve
float, the change in the gold stock, the change in other Fed assets,
and the change in other Fed liabilities.
The second set of equations estimate the endogenously determined
41
interregional flow of the net source base. This flow is considered to
be a function of the net interregional commercial and financial trans-
actions. Because those data were not available on a quarterly basis,
Miller used the average level of demand deposits in each of the two
regions during the preview period as a proxy for interregional trans-
actions.
Once the flow of the net source base to the regions is deter-
mined, the flow of money in each region is determined by the inter-
action of the net source base and the regional money multiplier. Miller's
seventh and eighth equations state that the change in the money supply in
a region during the period equals the product of the money multiplier for
the region and the change in the net source base, plus the level of the
net source base at the beginning of the period times the multiplier.
Miller made explicit two reasons why we would expect the magni-
tude of the money multiplier to vary by region. First, the ratio of
member to non-member banks in the Federal Reserve may differ. Member
banks must comply with more stringent reserve requirement minimums than
non-member banks.3 Therefore, a region with a larger proportion of non-
member banks would have a larger money multiplier. Second, because of
discretion or actions of the banking or non-banking public, some regions
may keep large excess reserves. For example, the variance in demand or
interregional money flows may differ by region and areas with large vari-
ances in demand would be likely to keep a relatively large pool of excess
reserves. Greater excess reserves means a smaller money multiplier.
3Current legislation has made this argument out of date. Non-member
banks must comply with the Fed's reserve requirements. See Wall Street
Journal, November 5, 1980.
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Once the change in the money supply for the two regions is pre-
dicted, two equations indicate the impact of that change on the personal
incomes of the regions. The equations state that current period changes
in nominal personal income are functions of current and lagged values of
changes in a region's money supply.
The model is recursive so that the system predicts changes in a
region's money supply as a function of the regional multiplier and the
region's net source base. These changes in the money supply generate
changes in nominal personal income in the current period. The changes
in nominal personal income lead to changes in the interregional relation-
ships and the interregional money flows. These interregional money flows
lead to endogenously determined changes in income.
Miller estimated the coefficients in the model using quarterly
data from the period 1960-75. He then checked to see how well the model
tracked the historical path. He found that the model successfully tracked
the historical series for the regional flow of the net source base. While
the results often fell short of the actual magnitude of change in a region's
net source base, it did pick up the various peaks and troughs. The model
did not track the changes in the money supply as accurately as it did the
net source base, and the poorest results were in estimating regional in-
comes.
There are several findings in Miller's study that directly ad-
dress cross-regional differences in cyclical activity due to monetary
policy. All exogenous factors, excluding the Federal Reserve float vari-
able, have a larger current-period impact on the rest of the country than
in the Northeast. For example, a unit increase in the Fed's holdings of
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securities, the gold stock, and other assets have an impact of .5, .6,
and .5 on the personal incomes in the Northeast, respectively. The same
impact multipliers for personal income in the rest of the country are
1.5, 1.3, and 1.4, respectively. The relatively larger impact on the
income of the rest of the country is a result of a larger impact of
Federal Reserve activities on the net source base of that region as well
as a larger increase in personal income caused by the change in the money
supply.
An important implication from Miller's study, relevant to this
thesis, is that there appears to be cross-regional differences in short-
run regional incomes due to monetary policies on the part of the Federal
Reserve. This study suggests that these regional variations are due to
differences in the growth of the net source base, in money multipliers,
and the response of income to the change in the money supply.
Three shortcomings of the Miller study as it relates to the topic
of the current thesis are apparent. First of all, the regional results
are not weighted by the size of the regions. Therefore, because the
Northeast is a smaller region than Miller's rest-of-the-country region,
we would expect that an increase in the Federal Reserves holdings of
government securities in the current period would have less of an impact
on the monetary base of the Northeast than on the rest of the country.
Given this shortcoming it is unclear whether Federal nonetary
policy has a greater proportionate effect on one region than another.
Second, the institutional and economic factors that Miller hypothe-
sizes will cause cross-regional variations in cycles appear to produce
only temporary disequilibriums. For example, a larger money multiplier
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in region A than in region B will cause a larger contraction in A's money
supply, when the quantity of high-powered money is reduced. This rela-
tively large reduction in A's money supply will lead to relatively large
increases in A's interest rates, and ceterus paribus, a greater decline
in A's aggregate demand than in region B's. If the differences in
interest rates persisted, A would experience the more severe recession.
However, these regional differences in interest rates would probably be
small and temporary. Through arbitrage, the regional discrepancies in
interest rates would quickly disappear. Thus, it seems possible that
regional differences in monetary policy may explain some of the differ-
ences in timing of recessions, and possibly the magnitude of severity
in the earliest stages of the recession, but not total amplitude.
Third, Miller assumes that the distribution of the monetary base
influences regional growth, when in fact the causal relationship may
move in the opposite direction. Miller's model is based on the premise
that flows of money to regions stimulate economic growth. However it
is more likely that money is drawn to areas that are growing for economic
reasons, such as low wages, no unions, nice climate, etc. Money might,
therefore, be an endogenous variable, rather than exogenous, and income
growth may be exogenously determined rather than endogenously determined.
A third study of the regional impact of monetary policy is by
Beare (1976). Beare's model was applied to the Prairie Provinces of
Canada. His single equation was
E = + B 1 M + B A (2-23)
where E. was expenditures on products in the ith region, M was the
45
national money supply, and A. was autonomous expenditures on products
of the 1 th region.
The question of interest to Beare was: how do expenditures, by
region, fluctuate with changes in the national money supply? He argued
that this regional effect would depend upon the income or wealth elasti-
city of demand for the products of each region. The model was tested
with annual data spanning the period 1956 to 1971 with net income from
farm operations being used as the proxy for autonomous investment. The
regression equations for all Prairie Provinces as well as each province
separately suggested that money is of much greater importance in explain-
ing income levels than is farm income in the short run.
It is interesting to note that the coefficient on the money supply
variable is roughly similar for Manitoba and Saskatchewan, .09 and .05
respectively, but larger for Alberta at 1.9. These differences between
Manitoba and Saskatchewan and Alberta suggest that changes in the money
supply may have a differential short-run impact on regional expenditures.
However, reasons for these differences are not a point explored by Beare,
and his results are by no means conclusive.
Beare's study suffers from one of the same problems as Miller's.
Beare also assumes that the positive association between flows of money
and income are due to the influence of the money supply on growth.
However, as stated earlier, the causal effect may be the opposite,
with money flowing to growing regions.
Although not addressed by any of the above authors there is one
area where the monetary sector may have uneven spatial impacts. Due to
regulation Q, when interest rates rise, savings and loan institutions are
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faced with severe losses of funds through disintermediation. The
effects of this rapid contraction on construction industry capital may
have a differential regional impact.
During periods of low interest rates, financial capital flows
out of savings and loans located in slow-growth regions to support con-
struction in fast-growth areas. When interest rates rise and savings and
loan funds dry up, the contraction is felt only marginally in slow-growth re-
gions. Construction was not occurring there anyway. The fast-growth
regions, on the other hand, lose capital from local as well as national
sources. A booming local construction industry, in this case, faces
severe reductions in capital availability, and a more severe recession
than its slow-growth counterpart.
This uneven regional effect does not enter into the model of
this thesis. The reason is that the construction industry cycle gener-
ally precedes the GNP and employment cycle. Therefore, when the employ-
ment cycles are in the downswing, real interest rates are falling and
construction activity expanding. Because this thesis only considers
the employment cycles from peak to trough, it does not capture downturns
in the credit and construction cycles.
Summary and Comparison
This chapter has reviewed several theories and models of national,
as well as regional business cycles. The strengths of the Airov model
are that it makes explicit the importance and role of the Keynesian multi-
pliers, the accelerator principle and trade relationships in explaining
regional business cycles. Its disadvantages are the massive data requirements
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to implement the model, and, once estimated, the likely instability of
the coefficients over the business cycle.
The monetary business cycle models suggest, but do not make
explicit, one reason why the timing of regional cycles may vary. The
evidence of Roberts and Fishkind, Miller, and Beare suggest that there
may be temporary regional differences in interest rates that influence
local investment and explain differences in the timing of local cycles.
But none of the authors establish the existence of persistent regional
differences in interest rates. Consequently there is little evidence
that cross-state differences in the severity of recessions can be found
in variations in the elasticity of demand for money or in local banking
practices. While monetary policy may well be responsible for bringing
on a national recession, it does not appear to explain cross-state dif-
ferences in the severity of recessions, except, as mentioned above, pos-
sibly in the case of construction industries.
How does the approach of the reviewed studies compare with the
approach of this thesis? First of all, both the Airov and Miller models
address the strength of economic interrelationships at an earlier stage
of the recession. If a recession is caused by misguided or intentional
contractionary monetary policy and the contraction is divided into stages,
then 1) the Federal Reserve Bank tightens the money supply; 2) the supply
of high powered money or in Miller's terms, the net source base, declines;
3) the demand for money falls as interest rates rise; 4) investment and
consumption fall; 5) aggregate demand falls; 6) output falls; 7) and
employment declines. Miller's model dissects the regional impacts of the
first five steps of the contraction. Airov focuses on stages 4 and 5 of
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the downswing while this thesis concentrates on the regional variations
in stages 5 through 7 of the recession. If the recession is not caused
by monetary policy, Miller's framework is irrelevant for explaining that
recession.
Second, both Airov and Miller's models formulated specific mech-
anisms for the interregional transmission of cycles. This thesis does
not. Third, the Miller and Airov models predict income cycles over time.
The model of this thesis is static. Fourth and finally, both the Miller
and Airov formulations are theoretical with either no empirical testing
or else tested only at a two-region level. The simpler model presented
in this study allowed for a thorough empirical test including forty-eight
states and five recessions. We now turn to the theory and model tested
in this thesis.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORY AND MODEL
The formal model is presented in this chapter. First, the
general framework is laid out, followed by a discussion of the hypothe-
ses to be tested and the underlying theory. Finally, the models and
their functional form are presented.
The focus of this thesis is on the reasons for cross-state
differences in employment declines during recessions. The hypotheses
proposed to explain these differences are framed in an export-base model.
Export-base theory distinguishes between two sectors of a regional eco-
nomy, an export or basic sector, and a residentiary or non-basic sector.
Employment in the basic sector is determined by national and interna-
tional demand for a region's goods and services. Employment in the non-
basi c or residentiary sector is a function of employment growth or de-
cline in the basic sector because, according to this framework, a region's
non-basic activities exist to cater to the community producing export
commodities (North, 1955; Tiebout, 1959 and 1962).
Growth in exports are transmitted to the residentiary sector via
an export-base multiplier, which quantifies the strength of the relation-
ship between growth in residentiary activities and exports. For example,an
employment multiplier estimates the total number of jobs created in a
region for every job created in basic industries. So that a multiplier
of three implies that one job in the basic sector supports two jobs in
the residentiary sector. Economic activities generally considered basic
are manufacturing, mining, and agriculture. Non-basic activities usually
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include services, wholesale and retail trade, and government.
The export-base model is adopted here as the framework for ex-
plaining regional business cycles. It is assumed that national reces-
sions are transmitted to state economies via states' export industries.
A region whose export commodities are cyclically sensitive will experi-
ence a relatively severe recession. Regions producing commodities re-
sistant to cyclical demand will exhibit relative stability.
While the severity of the recession in export industries is as-
sumed to be determined nationally cyclical variability in a region's
non-basic sector is determined locally. The recessionary impacts are
transmitted from the export sector to the residentiary sector via a
short-run multiplier, which ranges between zero and the long-run multi-
plier. The severity of the recession in service industries should,
therefore, depend upon national demand for local exports and the size
of the short-run multiplier.
Using the export-base model as the underlying framework, the
severity of a state's recession is equivalent to the weighted recessions
in the state's manufacturing (export) and residentiary sector.
E E
jr m E M)jr + (Es E jr (3-1)
where;
= Trend-adjusted severity of the state's recession.
E = Trend-adjusted severity of the recession in the manufac-
m turing sector.
E = Trend-adjusted severity of the recession in the residen-
tiary sector.
E m/E = Proportion of total employment in manufacturing.
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Es /ET = Proportion of total employment in residentiary activ-ities.
r = States 1, ... , 48.
j = Recessions 1, ... , 5.
A number of economic and institutional factors are hypothesized
to explain cross-state variations in export sector ( m) and residentiary
sector ( s) employment. The proposed causes of cyclical variability
in each sector will be addressed, in turn, with the export-sector analy-
sis presented first.
Export Sector
To simplify the analysis, the causes of cross-state variability
in export-sector employment are divided into a national and a local
component. The national component captures the short-run fluctuation
in export-sector employment that occurs because of the fluctuation in
national demand for the state's exports. The local component posits
that state-specific economic and institutional factors explain, in part,
cross-state variations on state cycles.
To restate:
E = E.+E
mjr jr Ljr (3-2)
where the variables are the same as above except that:
= The national component of states' manufacturing cycles.
EL = The local component of states' manufacturing cycles.
Before exploring the national and local factors, in detail, the
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implications of considering employment cycles rather than fluctuations
in sales or output should be addressed.
The state business cycles are measured in terms of employment,
because these data are the only series available on a monthly basis,
by state. Monthly or even quarterly data on sales or output are either
not available by state or extend only to the recent past. Monthly em-
ployment data, on the other hand, are available from 1947 to 1980 for
most states.
Employment, however, is a derived demand, and such, is a function
of aggregate output. Aggregate output is, in turn, a function of sales
or aggregate demand. Consequently, during a national recession, state
employment fluctuations may differ from one state to another for any
one of three reasons. First, the percentage change in aggregate demand
may vary across states. Some states may experience stable demand through-
out the recession while others experience highly volatile demand for
their output. Second, the same percentage reductions in aggregate de-
mand across states may have a differential effect on output levels, and
finally, even if states experience the same percentage declines in out-
put, layoff practices may differ.
What factors might lead to a spatially uneven fall in demand,
output, or layoffs? Percentage declines in demand for good and ser-
vices may vary across states because of differences in industry mix,
capital-labor ratios, or the age of the capital stock. Output respon-
ses to reductions in aggregate demand may differ across states because
of variations in industry composition, inventory practices, inventory
laws, local economic conditions, and markets. Cross-state differences
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in layoff practices may occur because of industry composition, the
economic position of the industry, the cost of rehiring or retraining
new workers during the recovery, and employee preferences. Because
the only series we can observe is employment, the existence of cross-
state differences in demand,output, and layoffs can only be inferred
by testing for the significance of variables expected to cause these
differences. The variables, tested here, that are expected to cross-
state differences in output are the industry composition (national com-
ponent), capital-labor ratio, and age-of-the-capital stock. Whether
cross-state differences in layoffs are due to the level of unemployment
insurance benefits, unionization of the labor force, peak-year unemploy-
ment rates or industry composition will also be tested. We now turn to
consider the national component of a state's manufacturing cycle. This
is the only variable expected to explain cross-area differences in
cyclical demand, output, and layoffs.
National Component
The national component proposes that a state's employment cycle
is caused by fluctuations in national demand for local exports. This
fluctuation in demand is measured by viewing each state economy as a
unique composite of industries. Because various export (manufacturing)
industries are more or less sensitive to the business cycle, we expect
state responses to national cycles to vary, depending on the industrial
make-up of the state's manufacturing sector. For example, regions with
high proportions of business-cycle sensitive industries would be expec-
ted to show larger-than-average fluctuations. The concept is clearly
54
stated by Walter Isard (1957):
Differences in the intensity and timing of regional
cycles are explained in terms of differences in the
sensitivity and responsiveness of particular indus-
tries. Cycles of a regional economy are simple
composites of the cyclical movement of the economy's
industries appropriately weighted. (Isard, 1957: 31)
One of the most thorough empirical tests of the importance of
industry mix in explaining regional cycles was conducted by Borts
(1960), who studied variations in manufacturing employment from 1914
to 1953 in 33 states. His hypothesis was that "the cyclical behavior
of each industry group in a particular region is independent of its
location" (Borts, 1960: 154-55). The implication is that regions
with the same industrial compostition will experience the same cyclical
behavior.
In order to assess the importance of industrial composition,
Borts estimated an expected regional cyclical amplitude--the amplitude
the region would have experienced if all its industries had performed
the same way regionally as they did nationally. He found a strong
relationship between the actual and expected cycles in the period 1929
to 1937 and a weaker correspondence between expected and actual fluctu-
ations for the period 1948 to 1953, suggesting that industrial composi-
tion was a less-important explanatory variable during this later period
than during the former period. In his analysis Borts also found that
industries producing consumer durables experienced more severe cycles
than those industries that produced nondurable goods.
In another study Engerman (1965) attempted to determine the
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relationship between industrial structure and rates of decline and
expansion during regional recessions. Engerman used annual non-
agricultural employment data for two recessions. He correlated rates
of decline during the cyclic downturns in two periods between 1949
and 1958, with the share of employment in manufacturing and mining
and the share of employment in durable goods production. He found
that all were positively and significantly correlated. Engerman's
results are shown below.
RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN TWO INDICES OF
INDUSTRIAL COMPOSITION AND RATES OF ECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT
DURING RECESSIONS'
Percent of Nonagricultural Percent of Nonagricultural
Rates of Decline Employment in Manufacturing Employment in Durable Goods
in Employment and Mining Industries
1949-54 .56 .46
1954-58 .66 .63
Source: Engerman, 1965: 24.
1See footnote 2 for description of calculation of variables.
When the same correlations were calculated between the two indices of
industrial composition and rates of expansion and average amplitude,
the results were insignificant.
In a third empirical study, Lynne Browne (1978) examined how well
industry mix predicted changes in regional income in three recessions.
Using the nine census regions as the geographical breakdown, Browne
weighted national industry changes in labor and proprietors income,
by the importance of each national industry in each region. These
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weighted income changes were then used to explain the regional ampli-
tudes, adjusted for trend, over three cycles. Browne's results suggested
that in the 1969-70 and the 1973-75 recessions industry mix was a factor
in determining how a recession affected various regions. For 1961, she
found that although the relationship between the industry mix variable
and the trend-adjusted amplitude was positive, the relationship was not
strong enough to permit such a conclusion. Browne further argued that
the relationship between income level based on industry mix and the
actual income level in all recessions in sufficiently weak to indicate
factors other than industry mix are at work.
In a second test Browne ran a separate time series regression
for each region, using a variant of the industry mix variable, to
explain proprietors income over the cycle. She found that industry
mix was a significant explanatory variable in all regions except Pacific
(Browne, 1978: 47).
The findings of Borts, Engerman, and Browne all indicate that
industry mix is an important explanatory factor in regional recessions.
However, the strength of the relationship between an expected cycle
based on industry mix and the actual severity varies across reces-
sions as well as regions. Moreover, the failure of the expected reces-
sions to explain all of a region's cyclical fluctuation suggests that
factors other than industry mix explain the severity of regional reces-
sions.
The national component of the export sector cycle is computed
using the same technique as Borts (1960). This expected recession
controls for the proposition that cross-state differences in business
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cycles may occur because of variations in state's industrial struc-
ture.
Several assumptions are hidden in the calculation of this
expected recession. As stated above, demand for labor is a derived
demand, and as such is dependent on demand for the products that labor
produces. Because the calculation of the expected recession used in
this study depends upon employment data, several assumptions about
demand for an industry's product, the way in which the industry adjusts
output levels in response to that fluctuating demand, and finally the
industry's layoff practices are hidden in the calculation of the expec-
ted recession.
The assumptions that are incorporated in the expected reces-
sion are as follows:
If
Q = aD0 (3-3)
E0 = 00 (3-4)
Qr = aDr (3-5)
r = r 
(3-6)
where D = aggregate demand, Q = aggregate output, E = employment,
subscript o = nation, subscript r = state, and supercript i = industry.
Then for the expected recession it is assumed that
i i - i iAD 0 /Do ADr /D r(3-7)
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a =^i (3-8)
(3-9)
If 13 = 1 and ^x =ca and AD /DI =ADr /Dr we then can
get the result implied by the expected recession.
AE /E = AE 0/E I (3-10)
r r o o
In words, this hypothesis states that each national manufactur-
ing industry behaves the same way independent of that industry's loca-
tion. So that the local industry experiences the same percentage reduc-
tion in aggregate demand, the same proportionate reduction in output,
and the same proportionate reduction in employment as the national
industry.
Weighting the change in each manufacturing industry's national
employment by the importance of that industry in each state, we derive
the expected recession or the nationally determined component of states'
manufacturing cycles.
20 . .
jr J o (r
where
E = The expected recession.
E = The severity of the recession in national industry i.
o i= The proportion of employment in industry i.
r = States 1, ... , 48.
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j = Recessions, 1, ... , 5.
i = Industries at the manufacturing 2-digit SIC level.
The expected recession is the percentage decline in employment that a
state would experience if the assumptions in equations 3-7, 3-8 and
3-9 held.
Local Component
As suggested by the findings of Borts, Engerman, and Browne,
the industry mix of exports does not explain all of the cross-state
variation in recessions. Five hypotheses propose reasons for the
divergence between the expected recession and the actual recession
within the export sector. The first two hypotheses propose reasons
for cross-state variations in the percentage drop in aggregate demand
during recessions. The next three hypotheses suggest reasons for
cross-state differences in layoff practices, or 3. This section con-
cludes with a discussion of hypotheses about local or state-specific
factors that would be likely to influence states' cyclic behavior in
the export sector, but which could not be tested due to the absence
of data.
Factors Influencing Aggregate Demand for Regional Exports
There are two variables that are expected to explain spatially
uneven declines in aggregate demand during recessions, after industry
mix is held constant. They include the manufacturing sector's capital-
labor ratio and the age of the capital stock.
60
Capital-Labor Ratio
Capital-labor ratios are used as a proxy for the ratio of firms'
fixed to variable costs. This ratio is expected to influence the sever-
ity with which firms and consequently regions experience national reces-
sions. The argument applies to both the multiplant and single-plant
firm.
Economic theory predicts that regions with relatively low wages
tend to attract labor-intensive industries. Similarly, theory suggests
that plants located in relatively labor-abundant, low-wage areas will
adjust the composition of their inputs to take advantage of the low
cost of labor relative to the cost of capital. In either case we would
expect firms located in low-wage states, like the Southern regions of
the U.S., to be more labor-intensive than their counterparts in the
relatively high-wage states, such as the Northern areas of the U.S.
The cross-regional differences in production methods should, holding
industry composition constant, have an impact on regional business
cycles. First, we consider the multiplant firm.
A manager of a multiplant firm faced with declining demand for
output, will shift cutbacks to the plants where the short run marginal
costs are highest. In other words, the plant in which total costs
fall most rapidly with reductions in output will be the plant that
absorbs the greatest proportion of the recessions impact.
The argument that the higher marginal cost firm will be the
labor-intensive firm can be made clearer with the following equations.
If
TCK = TCL (3-12)
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and
fK >fL (3-13)
then
VCL > VCK (3-14)
since
TC = f + VC (3-15)
where TC = total costs, f = fixed costs, VC = variable costs, subscript
K = capital-intensive firm, subscript L = labor-intensive firm.
Differentiating
6TC 6VC
K Q K (3-16)
6Q 6QK
and
STCL 
_ 
6VCL 
(3-17)
6QL SQL
Since VCL > VCK then
6VC SVC
L , K (3-18)
6QL 6Q
The cost-minimizing strategy for the multiplant firm, faced with
declining demand for its products, is to reduce production in the labor-
intensive plant (L) first. If cutbacks are made in L, then relatively
large numbers of employees and small amounts of capital will remain
idle. Whereas if the capital-intensive operations (K) experienced the
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same reduction in output as L, the company would have to absorb the cost
of idle capital and could take advantage of only small reductions in
variable costs.
This hypothesis would not be reasonable without the evidence of
Feldstein (1976), McLure (1977), and Vickery (1979). All three re-
searchers found that with current methods of experience rating in the
unemployment insurance system, firms do not bear the full cost of lay-
offs, especially in cyclically sensitive firms. For example, Vickery
found that in California, over the period from 1965 through 1974, the
contract construction industry accounted for 8 percent of all wages in
covered industries, only 10 percent of all employer contributions into
the unemployment insurance fund, and 18 percent of all insurance bene-
fits collected. In 1974 benefits exceeded contributions for contract
construction by $91 million (Vickery, 1979: 7). While this finding
refers to industries rather than firms, it does indicate that many
firms, especially those that are cyclically sensitive, do not pay the
full actuarial cost of their layoffs, thus the findings of Feldstein,
McLure, and Vickery support the view that cyclically volatile firms do
not bear, the full cost of idle labor.
The behavior of the single-plant firm as well as the multiplant
firm lead to differences in state recessions to the extent that there
are different rates of shut downs or bankruptcies across states. A
profit-maximizing or loss-minimizing strategy for the single-plant
firm is to operate, even when revenues are exceeded by costs, as long
as average variable costs (AVC) are met and some fixed costs (FC) are
covered. At the point where average revenues (AR) are equal to AVC's
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the owner will be indifferent to operating and when AVC's are greater
than AR's the firm will shut its doors, temporarily or permanently.
Labor-intensive plants have higher AVC's relative to fixed costs
than do capital-intensive plants. It may be that capital-intensive
plants find that, during a downturn, it is easier to meet AVC and cover
at least some of their fixed costs. Here the capital-intensive plant's
loss-minimizing strategy is to continue operation. On the other hand,
the labor-intensive plants, whose costs are comprised largely of vari-
able costs may have more trouble meeting these costs and therefore will
minimize losses by shutting down. This is not to say that total profits
or losses will be greater in one plant over the other, rather that there
will be differential points when AVC < AR and consequently more severe
cyclical unemployment in regions where labor-intensive plants are con-
centrated. This analysis applies to the competitive market case with
flexible prices as well as the case where AVC's rise due to a reduc-
tion in output. To my knowledge, this hypothesis has not been previously
tested.
Because capital and skilled labor are complements in the produc-
tion process, owners of capital-intensive firms may be reluctant to re-
duce output through layoffs due to the high cost of replacing skilled
workers during the recovery. This effect would reinforce a negative
sign on the capital-labor coefficient. Unfortunately skill-level data,
by state, is not available so that we could not control for the affect
of skill levels on the severity of state recessions.
Age-of-Capital Stock
The next hypothesis is that differences in the age of the states'
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capital stock may lead to differential reductions in demand for states'
output. The hypothesis predicts that, with industry mix held constant,
the older the capital stock of a state, the more severe the decline in
aggregate demand. This hypothesis applies both to the multiplant as
well as the single-plant firm. The argument for the multiplant firm
applies to firms that respond to falling demand by cutting prices, as
well as to cases where prices are rigid and adjustments are made by
reducing output.
We expect a newer capital stock to be, on the average, more ap-
propriate for current relative prices of land, labor, energy, and other
inputs than old plant and equipment. For this reason, it is posited
that branches of multiplant firms, with a high average-age of capital,
will have higher marginal costs than plants producing the same product
with a newer capital stock. In the case of a recession, when aggregate
demand has fallen nationally, company managers of cost-minimizing firms
will distribute the loss in demand for their products unevenly across
plants, cutting demand in the higher marginal cost plants first.
The following diagram clarifies this argument.
At price level P1, qA is produced at plant A and qB is produced
at plant B. Total output is equivalent to qA + qB. If the price falls
to P2 (or output is reduced with prices constant), the largest percent-
age declines on output take place in the highest marginal cost firm,
plant B. If the price level falls below P2 (or output is reduced below
qA) plant B while shut down, and total output will be produced at plant A.
The age of capital stock argument also applies to the single-
plant firm in a competitive industry with both flexible and rigid prices.
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Figure 3.1
Production Levels for Plants of Multiplant Firm
Single-plant firms with relatively old capital are expected to have
high average variable costs (AVC) for the same reasons stated above.
That is, old capital stock requires combinations of variable factors
that are inefficient due to changes in relative factor prices. Thus
AVC are expected to be higher for firms with old capital stocks than
for firms with recently installed capital.
As long as AR exceed AVC a single-plant firm will stay in busi-
ness (even if total revenues are less than total costs). However,
when AR fall below AVC, the loss-minimizing firm will close its doors.
Firms with high AVC will have a greater probability than firm's
with low AVC of failing to cover variable costs, and, therefore, will
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have a greater probability of shuting down, either permanently or
temporarily. If a region has relatively more high variable cost firms,
it may have a higher than average proportion of bankruptcies, and con-
stantly a more severe recession. This analysis does not necessarily
assume that prices fall during the recession. It is possible that
prices remain constant, and that average costs rise when the volume of
output falls (Bolton, 1978).
New-capital firms are expected to have lower marginal and average
costs than old-capital firms, because a new capital stock is more appro-
priate for current relative prices. This assumption should, however,
be stated with some qualification. Relative energy prices fell slowly
during the post war period, 1945 to mid 1973, encouraging a transition
toward energy--using capital. Well known events of late 1973 have led
to a reversal of the energy price trend and relative energy prices have
increased. Newer energy-intensive capital may now be less efficient
than older energy-saving capital, leading to higher marginal costs for
the new-capital firm or plant. This particular change in relative
prices would only affect the result for the last recession (1973-75)
included in this study. However the possibility of other reversals
in relative price trends necessitate a qualification of the hypothesis.
A third reason that an old capital stock may be related to more
severe recessions is that retirement of obsolete capital are probably
concentrated in regions where the average age of capital is higher.
During the expansionary phase of the cycle scheduled retirement may be
postponed, because either the revenues from running the old capital are
temporarily higher than the salvage value of the land labor and capital,
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or orders from regular or new customers must be met. With the end of
the expansion, the delayed retirements combined with the regularly
scheduled retirements are bunched together creating the appearance of
a more volatile cycles (Varaiya and Wiseman, 1977).
A number of other researchers have hypothesized that the age of
capital stock plays a role in explaining the amplitude of regional
cycles, however, there is little evidence that the hypothesis has been
tested. For example, in a paper analyzing the sensitivity of state
payrolls to state business cycles, Friedenberg and Bretzfelder (1g80)
suggest that swings in manufacturing payrolls were greater in the North
than in the South and West.
[Piroduction costs in the North stay relatively high
over the cycle, because capital stock is relatively
old and, thus, expensive to maintain. Declining reven-
ues and continuing high costs squeeze profit margins,
and so Northern manufacturers tend to reduce the rate
of capacity utilization early in recessions (Friedenberg
and Bretzfelder, 1980: 17).
When asked for documentation on this argument both researchers agreed
that they had no evidence other than casual empiricism.
The age of a state's capital stock is associated with the state's
rate of economic growth. Both slow growth and a high average age of
capital occur when new and replacement investment fail to enhance the
productive capacity of a local economy. Because both the secular growth
rate and the average vintage of a state's capital stock are theoretically
highly correlated, it is worth citing, in this context, studies that
have tested the significance of the long-run regional growth and cyclical
sensitivity relationship. Evidence supporting a relationship between
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strong secular growth leads to mild trend-adjusted recessions would
strengthen the age-of-capital-stock hypothesis forwarded here.
Both Borts (1960) and Engerman (1965) addressed the hypothesis
that secular growth is related to a regions cyclical activity. Borts,
using manufacturing employment for 33 states for the years 1914 to
1953, compared states cyclical amplitudes and rankings of states by
growth rates. He found that strongly growing states were, on the aver-
age, more variable than weakly growing states. Borts' evidence is not
overwhelming. As he recognizes, he has not carefully controlled for
industry mix in the states, and secondly he finds a number of exceptions.
Out of 17 cases, Borts found four cases in which weakly growing states
had, on the average, more variability in their cycles than did strongly
growing states (1960: 184).
Engerman (1965), on the other hand, claimed a positive correlation
between growth measured as employment growth, and rates of expansion dur-
ing the business cycle and a negative relationship between secular growth
and rates of decline during the recession. These correlations shown
below, were significant at the one percent level.2
2Borts' measures were the following: Decline rates and expansion
rates = changes in cycle values per year/an average of all observations
over the cycle (1960: 200). Trend growth = employment at one cycle peak/
employment at an earlier peak (1960: 156). Engerman's indicators are
similar. Expansion = peak minus initial trough/average of all observations
over the cycle. Decline = peak minus terminal trough/average of all obser-
vations over the cycle (1965: 16). Growth = employment at one peak/employ-
ment at an earlier peak (1965: 29).
Borts and Engerman both used rank correlations of average annual
amplitude against growth. Borts' measure of average annual amplitude =
1/2 *((peak minus initial trough/number of years of rise) + (peak minus
terminal trough/number of years of decline)) / average of all observa-
tions over the cycle. Engerman's cycle amplitude measure = average
annual expansion [expansion/number of years of upswing] + average annual
decline.
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ENGERMAN'S RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
BETWEEN GROWTH AND CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR IN TWO CYCLES
1949-54 and 1954-58
Growth and: 1949-54 1954-58
Rate of Expansion + .71 + .78
Rate of Decline - .63 - .51
Source: Engerman: 29.
One reason for the significant relationship between secular growth
and rates of expansion and decline in Engerman's study is probably due to
the fact that the decline and expansion rates are not adjusted for secular
trends. Through the influence of secular growth trends, a fast-growing
region would experience weaker declines and more rapid expansions than
a slow-growing region. A better test of the existence of a relation-
ship between secular growth and the behavior of business cycles would
eliminate the trend from cyclic fluctuations.
Engerman also tested for a relationship between growth and a
cycle's amplitude. Using a trend-adjusted measure for the business
cycle, he found the correlations to be insignificant.
Another study of the relationship between secular growth and
the business cycle was conducted by the author (Howland, 1979). The
study regressed the trend-adjusted severity of regional recessions
against the percent of a region's employment in durable goods produc-
tion, and the region's peak-to-peak growth rate over the period prior
to the recession. Using data on five post World War II recessions and
nine census regions, there was no evidence that long-run regional income
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growth had any effect on the severity of regional recessions.
Although there is no substantial evidence of a relationship be-
tween economic growth and cyclical activity, tests replacing growth with
the age-of-the-capital stock may suggest otherwise. The major theoretical
reason for secular growth to be associated with cycles condenses into
an age-of-capital-stock argument, therefore the more theoretically sound
and precise measure, the age-of-capital stock, may prove to be signifi-
cant, whereas secular growth is not. The age of capital stock is mea-
sured, where possible, with three previous years of real investment
divided by the value of the capital stock in the final year.3
Factors Influencing Layoffs
The second set of three hypotheses to be explored here are factors
that are proposed to create cross-state differences in layoff practices
during a recession. The hypotheses suggest that holding industry mix
constant, the magnitude of unemployment insurance benefits, peak-year
unemployment rates, and unionization of the work-force will influence
states' cyclical employment.
Labor Surplus or Shortage
The first hypothesis is that employers in labor-surplus markets
may expect low labor search costs during the recovery and therefore
readily lay off workers during the downturn. Comparable firms in labor-
short states may anticipate difficulties in rehiring and, therefore,
find it cheaper, in the long run, to hoard workers throughout the recession.
3 am grateful to Roger Bolton for his suggestion to calculate the
age of the capital stock in this manner.
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Using the annual peak-level unemployment rate as a proxy for the tight-
ness of the labor market, it is hypothesized that the higher the annual
peak level unemployment rate, prior to the recession, the greater the
severity of the state recession. At least one empirical study supports
this hypothesis. Thirwall's (1966) findings, using data from Great
Britain, indicate that regions experiencing the greatest cycle sensitiv-
ity were those that persistently had unemployment rates above the national
average.
Unemployment Insurance
The next hypothesis is that regions with greater unemployment
insurance benefits (UI) will appear to experience more severe regional
recessions. The greater the state's UT, in relation to wages, the more
likely workers are to wait out the recession without looking for and
taking another job. Employers may, therefore, be inclined to lay off
workers expecting them to be available for rehiring at a later date.
In contrast the unemployed in low UI states are likely to feel pressed
to seek, and possibly relocate to take, another job. In these low UI
states employers may expect rehiring to be problematic during the re-
covery and decide to keep employees on the payroll throughout the reces-
sion. It is also possible that employees with some bargaining power are
more likely to accept lay offs in high UI states than in low UT states.
In low UI states workers may prefer wage or hour reductions to lay offs.
In either case, it is expected that the higher the UI, the greater the
reduction in employment during the recession.
There is a contradictory hypothesis raised by Welch (1977). An
experience rating UI system, even one that does not fully attribute UI
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benefit costs to the responsible firms, will raise a firm's costs of
laying off workers. As a consequence experience ratings should reduce
labor turnover. Given that the payroll tax is greater in high benefit
states than low benefit states, the incentive for firms to hoard labor
through the recession may be greater in the states with high UI bene-
fits. This hypothesis contradicts the previous hypothesis and may, in
fact, cancel the proposed positive relationship between UI benefits and
layoffs.
The literature on the economic effects of unemployment insurance
indicates that UI programs have had an impact on both temporary layoffs
and the duration of unemployment. Two empirical studies have estimated
the effect of UI benefits on unemployment during recessions. Hamermesh
(1972) found that the national unemployment rate, during recessions was
.45 percentage points greater during the depth of recessions than it
would have been in the absence of the UI programs. He suggests that
further extensions in benefits or coverage would produce further increases
in the unemployment rate (Hamermesh, 1972: 125-126).
Feldstein (1978) looked more specifically at the effect of UI
benefits on temporary layoffs. Feldstein used longitudinal data from
the Current Population Survey (CPS) and state formulas on UI benefits.
He divided those samples into six categories. The six categories repre-
sented levels of the ratio of an individual's potential UI benefit to
his or her foregone earnings, net of taxes. Thus, a 60 percent "benefit
replacement ratio" means that an unemployed individual could lose 40
percent of his income, net of taxes, by being unemployed. In comparing
the replacement ratios with the CPS data, Feldstein found that the
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greater the benefit replacement ratio, the higher the probability of
being on temporary layoff. Feldstein's conclusion suggests that the
UI program distorts the behavior of firms by encouraging them to lay
off workers rather than cutting hours worked, reducing prices, or build-
ing inventories.
The implications, of the Hamermesh finding, for this study are
unclear. The .45 percent increase in the unemployment may be due either
to increases in layoffs or decreases in discouraged job searchers. The
first effect would show up in the data of this thesis; the second effect
would not. Feldstein's findings are consistent with the relationship
hypothesized here.
Most empirical findings concur that UI benefits lengthen the
duration of unemployment. The greater the benefits, the longer the job
searchers take to select another position (Holen, 1977; Classen, 1977;
and Welch, 1977). Classen's evidence is typical. Looking at the exper-
ience of UI claimants in Pennsylvania and Arizona who received benefits
in 1968, Classen found that a 10 percent point increase in the weekly
benefit-to-wage ratio led to an increase of about one week in the total
period for which claimants record benefits (Classen, 1977: 440). These
results suggest that once laid off, higher UI benefits encourage job
searchers to look longer before taking another job (or leaving the labor
force). This is consistent with the argument that it is easier for employ-
ers to rehire during the recovery in high UI benefit states than in low
benefit states, and therefore may be more inclined to lay off in high UI
benefit states during the downswing.
An additional complication with the UI variable should be noted.
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That is that the causal relationship may, in fact, move in a direc-
tion opposite to that hypothesized. More clearly, we may obtain a
positive relationship between UI benefits and severity of the reces-
sion because states with cyclically sensitive industries may have been
more aggressive in instituting larger UI benefits. Thus a positive
and significant relationship between UI benefits and cyclical volatil-
ity must be interpreted judiciously.
Unionization
The third argument hypothesizes that cross-state differences in
layoff practices are due to cross-state differences in union strength.
The argument is based on the "exit-voice" model of Albert 0. Hirschman
(1970), which was applied more directly to labor markets by Richard
Freeman (1978).
According to Freeman's application of the "exit-voice" model
workers respond to an unpleasant workplace, low wages, and insufficient
benefits in one of two ways. Either workers exit (which includes re-
jecting a job offer, quitting, absenteeism, a partial withdrawal of
labor time,malingering on the job, or quiet sabotage) or workers escape
from the objectionable state of affairs through the voice option by
staying and establishing collective bargaining.
In non-unionized firms, where discontent leads to quitting,
employers judge worker preferences inferentially by linking changes in
workplace conditions with quit behavior or by taking "exit surveys."
In such cases the limited information obtained by management is based
on the objections of the marginal worker, who is more likely to be
young and mobile.
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Whereas quits reflect the preferences of marginal workers, voice
reflects the demands of the average worker. Trade unions "transform
the supply side of the job market by making median rather than marginal
preferences the determinant of the labor control" (Freeman, 1978: 286).
Worker-employer agreements are a complex package of pecuniary and non-
pecuniary benefits. The composition of this package, under an exit or
competitive market will differ from that established under voice or
collection bargaining. Freeman cites the following example. Method A
greatly reduces the well being of immobile senior workers, whereas
method B has no effect on senior workers, but is unacceptable to the
more mobile younger workers. In a market where information is conveyed
by quits, the behavior of the young would lead management to choose
method A despite the loss in welfare to older workers. In a market
with collective bargaining the union might arbitrate the difference in
preferences so that the firm will pick B and then provide some compen-
sation for the younger employees.
In a 1979 article, Medoff applied the Freeman version of the
"exit-voice" model to the market for labor. Medoff tested the hypothesis
that workers in unionized firms have significantly higher probabilities
of being laid off than workers in similar nonunionized firms.
When demand for labor falls, management has several options for
reducing their workforce; leave positions vacated by quits unfilled,
reduce or slow the growth in real wages, reduce hours, and increase lay-
offs.
Adjustments through unreplaced quits are less of an option for
the unionized firm than the non-unionized firm. The reason, as implied
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by the above argument, is that the quit rate for unionized firms is
relatively low (Freeman, 1978; Johnson, 1976).
A second option for labor adjustments is a reduction in wages.
Empirical studies indicate that the relative impact of unions on wages
has tended to increase during economic downturns. Hamermesh (1970; 1972)
and Lewis (1978) found that wages in the union sector are less sensitive
to changes in the unemployment rate than are wages in the nonunion sec-
tor. This finding suggests that unionized establishments are relatively
less likely to respond to falling labor demand by reducing wages. With
lower quit rates and less ability to reduce wages, union firms must make
use of either layoffs or work sharing.
Work sharing is likely to be the preferred strategy of the younger
more recently hired workers. With work sharing the marginal worker
bears only part of the cost of the cutback whereas with layoffs, the
recently hired or marginal worker bears the total cost. The older workers,
on the other hand, would prefer cutbacks to take the form of layoffs. Un-
der a policy favoring layoffs, senior workers are likely to retain their
jobs, and therefore incur no or little cost.
Because in non-unionized firms, the marginal worker preference is
transmitted to management, it is likely that cutbacks in such firms will
take the form of work sharing and cuts in wages. In unionized firms
where the demands of the average and more senior workers predominate,
layoffs will be more likely to prevail.
Based on 2-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) data
for several state groupings, Medoff's results implied that in the 1965-69
period, workers in unionized establishments had a higher probability of
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being laid off than did nonunionized workers in similar firms. Using
3-digit SIC code data for 1958-71, Medoff's results suggested that the
average monthly layoff rate during the 1956-71 period was .010 in non-
union firms and .022 in similar but unionized firms.
Medoff's result is supported by Feldstein (1978). In the same
study cited earlier, on the effects of UI benefits on layoffs, Feldstein
found that the relationships were stronger for union members than non-
union members. That is, union members had higher temporary layoffs and
their layoffs were more sensitive to UI benefits than non-union members.
In a sample of 6,845 union members, the temporary layoff rate was 3.14
percent, twice the rate of non-union members. In a regression equation
of layoffs regressed against UI benefits and a union dummy, the coeffi-
cient on the union variable indicated that the temporary layoff unemploy-
ment rate was 1.15 percentage points higher than the rate for non-members
(Feldstein, 1978: 840-841).
There is one additional hypothesized reason for the positive re-
lationship between unionization and layoffs. Managers of unionized firms
may find a policy favoring layoffs acceptable because they anticipate low
rehiring costs during the recovery. Laid off union workers are not likely
to give up a union job. Rather, they will collect unemployment benefits
and wait to be recalled. This ensures the firm a ready pool of workers
to draw from during the upswing, making firms less reluctant to lay off
workers during the downturn. Additional evidence has shown that years
of tenure with an employer are positively correlated with unionization
(Freeman, 1978). These results are consistent with the argument that
workers are willing to wait out the recession to hold on to a union job.
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Union members tend to be highly skilled workers. Since workers
are reluctant to lay off highly skilled employees, the impact of union-
ization on the severity of states recessions will be counteracted by
the fact that the workers are more likely to be skilled and costs of
retraining relatively high.
Summary--Local Component
To summarize, the local component includes state-specific eco-
nomic and institutional factors, hypothesized to influence the cyclical
variability of states. These local factors are the capital-labor ratio,
age-of-the-capital stock, unionization of the labor force, peak-level
unemployment rates, and the ratio of unemployment benefits to wages.
The local component is measured as:
E .=[E (S KL. + 3 A. + f3 U. + S UE.+ U.)(-9Ljr jr l jr 2 Ajr 3 jr 4 jr + 5 UIjr) (3-19)
where the 's are parameters to be estimated and the variables are the
same as above except that:
KL = The capital-labor ratio.
A = The age of capital stock.
U = The proportion of the labor force that is unionized.
UE = The peak level unemployment rate.
UI = The ratio of unemployment insurance benefits to wages.
The local component, equation 3-19, includes the national compon-
ent, E. This formulation implies that the magnitude of the beta coeffi-
cients depend upon the level of the national component. A large expec-
ted recession signifies that the state has a large proportion of cyclically
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sensitive industries. Firm managers of those industries must make out-
put and layoff decisions and the more severe the decline in demand the
greater the necessary adjustments in output and layoffs. It is these
output and labor adjustments which are influenced by capital-labor
ratios, age-of-the-capital stock, unionization, etc. Thus the greater
the cyclically sensitivity of a firm's exports, the more important the
local component in explaining fluctuations in employment and output.
Variables not Included Due to an Absence of Data
There are several additional local factors that may cause differ-
ences in cyclical employment across states but that could not be tested
due to the lack of data. A discussion of these factors is the current
topic and again the points will be organized by whether they propose
cross-state differences in industry's aggregate demand, output responses
to reductions in aggregate demand, or employment responses to reduction
in output.
Cross-state variations in aggregate demand may still occur even
when industry mix is held constant. In addition to testable hypotheses
discussed earlier, it is hypothesized that these variations may occur
because a state supplies a disproportionate share of its output to foreign
markets or because of multiplier impacts on intermediate suppliers. The
timing of foreign business cycles generally be distinguished from domes-
tic cycles. Thus it is possible that states or industries within states
that depend on foreign purchasers will appear to experience, during a
domestic recession, a milder decline in aggregate demand than will states
supplying domestic markets during a recession.
80
Furthermore, the aggregate demand of intermediate producers tied
to local markets will diverge from that industry's behavior nationally.
Intermediate producers supplying local and cyclically stable industries
will be less sensitive than the national average whereas firm supplying
cyclically volatile industries will be more sensitive than average. For
example, SIC code 227, floor coverings, may be more cyclically sensitive
in Michigan, where they produce carpeting for cars, than in California,
where rugs are produced for homeowners.
The stability or instability of trading partners should also in-
fluence the amplitude of a state's cycle. Demand for intermediate pro-
ducts sold to cyclically sensitive states will be more volatile than
the national average of an industry's behavior would suggest. So that,
for example, a state whose tire industry supplies Michigan should exper-
ience a cycle larger than that of the national tire industry, while a
state selling tires to Kansas should expect a smaller than average cycle.
The influence of the cyclical behavior of states trading partners is not
captured in the model of this study.
In addition to cross-state differences in aggregate demand, in-
dustries may respond to similar reduction in aggregate demand with dis-
similar inventory policies. If inventory policies are inconsistent
across states, the result will show up in cross-state differences in
employment cycles. A number of factors determine a firm's inventory
holdings, many of which will be accounted for in the industry mix, or
expected recession variable. For example, firms producing quickly ob-
solete goods tend to hold small inventories; firms with a high variability
in sales generally hold larger inventoriesgreater total sales generally
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correspond to a smaller proportion of inventory holdings; and oligo-
polists may hold larger inventories in order to stabilize prices
(Scherer, 1970: 152). These and other determinants of inventory
holdings are held constant by controlling for industrial mix.
However, there are probably some factors that are not accounted
for. Again, firms producing for a local market are more susceptible
to the behavior of their local purchasers than firms producing for export
to a national market. Therefore, these firms faced with a more volatile
demand from purchases may be more likely to increase inventories during
the recession than firms supplying to a more stable purchaser. Also,
it is possible that inventory taxes and laws vary across states. While
it has not been possible to find data to shed light on this question,
it is clear that firm's inventory policies are highly responsive to tax
policies.
Finally, employment policies, or layoffs, may vary across states
because of differences in employee skill levels. Firms that use unskilled
labor in the production process can lay off workers during the recession
and rehire new workers during the recovery without the expense of re-
training, whereas firms dependent on skilled labor may anticipate high
retraining costs and be more inclined to retain their workers through
the recession. It, therefore, seems reasonable for firms in different
regions within the same industry to have different skill requirements
and that regions with a high proportion of firms dependent on unskilled
labor will experience more severe employment losses.
Unfortunately, there are limited data on skill levels or the
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amount of on-the-job or prior training in industries by state. However,
there is some evidence that skill levels do affect firms' layoff deci-
sions. In a study of the New England machine tool industry, Glynnis
Trainer found that during the 1973-75 recession the machine tool indus-
try tended to hoard labor. Shortages of skilled workers made it diffi-
cult for them to rehire during past economic recoveries and employers
had learned from experience that it was more efficient to support their
workforce through the downturn than to lay off and attempt to rehire
them later (Trainer, 1979: 94). While Trainer found that shortages of
skilled machine tool workers were geographically pervasive, this finding
does point out the existence of a relationship between employee skill
levels, labor shortages, and layoff practices.
Some of the failure to capture the importance of cross-state dif-
ferences in skill levels will be captured in the capital-labor ratio and
unionization variables. Skilled labor and capital tend to be complements.
This positive association will reinforce the hypothesized result of a
negative relationship between layoffs and capital-labor ratios. Skilled
labor and unions also tend to be complements and the higher expected
layoffs for union members is expected to be counteracted by the lower
layoff rates for skilled labor.
To summarize, it is proposed that within the manufacturing or
export sector of a state economy the severity of the actual recession
deviates from the expected recession for five reasons. The capital-labor
ratio, age-of-the-capital stock, unionization, unemployment insurance ben-
efits, and peak-level unemployment all influence the severity of state re-
cessions, and cause the actual recession to be either greater or milder
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than the expected recession. A final factor expected to influence the
severity of the regional recessions are differences in the decline in
employment in state's residentiary activities.
Residentiary Sector
The severity of a recession in residentiary activities is assumed,
in this thesis, to be explained by the severity of the recession in the
export or manufacturing sector of the local economy and the short-run
multiplier. As demand for exports fall, incomes in the export sector
fall, leading to a decline in demand for local services. So that the
more cyclically sensitive the state's composite of export industries
and the larger the export-base multiplier, the greater the impact on
residentiary employment.
The residentiary sector in this study was assumed to include con-
struction; wholesale and retail trade; transportation; utilities; finance,
real estate, and insurance; government; and services. The formulation
of the multiplier is described in more detail in the following section.
Multiplier
The multiplier measures the impact of a percentage decline in export
employment on the percentage decline in residentiary employment. More
specifically the multiplier was formulated in the following manner. The
short-run export-base multiplier was incorporated into the model by hypoth-
esizing the relationship that:
E
sj E m~jr (3-20)5jr T mr
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where
= Trend-adjusted severity of the recession in resi-
dentiary industries.
E m = Trend-adjusted severity of the recession in the
manufacturing industry.
Em /ET = the proportion of total employment in manufacturing.
superscript r = State, ... , 48.
subscript j = Recessions 1, ... , 5.
The larger Em Em /ET and p the more severely the recession affects
the residentiary sector. The parameter p is an endogenously determined
short-run multiplier, measuring the affect of severity of the recession
in the export sector, weighted by the size of the export sector, on the
state's residentiary sector. The parameter p should range between zero
and the long run export-base multiplier, 1/(1 - E s/E T) or /(E m/E T)
and should approach the long-run multiplier the more prolonged the reces-
sion. This is shown below in equations 3-21 through 3-23.
In the long run Es =m or the percentage decline in manufactur-
ing employment leads to an equivalent percentage decline in services.
In this case, replacing Em with E s;
E
s. = y - E)jr (3-21)Jr T
E
( ) = y( ) (3-22)
s
p = /(E m/E 
(323
(3-23)
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The severity of the recession in manufacturing, Em, is weighted,
in equation 3-20, by the proportion of state employment in manufacturing
because it is not only the severity of the recession in the export sector
that influences the severity of the recession in residentiary activities,
but the relative size of each sector. Without the weighting of $m by
Em/ET, p would be biased downwards.
The parameter y is expected to be small relative to other multi-
pliers such as those of the Multiregional Input Output Model (MRIO) or
the Regional Industrial Multiplier System (RIMS). The estimated y of
this study measures the effect of a short-run, temporary, and marginal
change in export employment on residentiary employment, whereas the
multipliers of the RIMS or MRIO models estimate long-run, permanent
and average multipliers.
Because p is a short-run multiplier it is likely that the first
round of impacts of change in export employment on residentiary employ-
ment are not played out. That is, given the relatively brief nature of
the five post World War II recessions, p may not reach the size of first
round or direct multipliers calculated from comparable but long-run models.
The parameter p is also expected to be of small magnitude because
it measures the effect of a temporary change in manufacturing employment
on residentiary employment. Because employers in the residentiary sector
expect the fluctuation in manufacturing to be temporary, they are less
likely to alter their behavior, by cutting output and laying off resi-
dentiary sector workers. Moreover, workers in the manufacturing sector
are more likely to draw from savings and maintain current levels of de-
mand for residentiary services when the downturn is expected to be
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shortlived. In either case, we would expect a relatively stable resi-
dentiary sector and a small value for p.
Alternative multiplier estimates, such as those made by RIMS and
MRIO are not only long run estimates but they measure the effect of a
permanent change in employment in a given sector on total employment
in the state. Economic actors, in this case, are assumed to behave as
if the exogenous change in employment (such as a cut in regional de-
fense expenditures) is permenent. Entrepreneurs, therefore, alter their
behavior by laying off employees, halting all expansion of capital, and
cutting orders on raw materials and inputs. This is one reason for the
expected difference between the size of multipliers of the RIMS and
MRIO models and the expected value of p.
Another reason for an expected small value for p in relation to
other multiplier estimates is that p captures a marginal change in
employment whereas multipliers estimated with the Multiregional Input
Model and the RIMS model are average values. Changes at the margin
should be smaller than average changes, in part due to the above argu-
ment, but also because supply constraints and substitutability among
factors are ignored in empirically estimated average multipliers, but
accounted for in empirically estimated marginal multipliers.
A final difference between p and other commonly used multipliers
is that p does not capture interindustry effects. Thus we should expect
p to be smaller than multipliers, such as the RIMS or MRIO multipliers,
that capture these effects.
87
Shortcomings of the Export Base Formulation
There are a number of shortcomings of the export-base formula-
tion, many of which have been well documented (Blumenfield, 1955; Tie-
bout, 1956; Borts and Stein, 1964; and Richardson, 1969). Only the
criticisms particular to this study will be addressed here. First the
division between manufacturing as exports and services as non-basic is
not clear cut. Some services are exported and their demand determined
exogenous to the state. For example, insurance services in Connecticut
are an export industry.
Secondly, agriculture is an export industry and an important one
for some states, such as California. Because agricultural employment
was excluded from the data, p is likely to be biased in agricultural
states because Es reflects percentage changes brought about by fluctua-
tions or stability in agriculture, when agricultural employment is not
included in Em'
m
Third, the multiplier estimated by equation 3-23 is an average
value calculated with cross-section data. Interesting and important
cross-state differences in p will, of course, be missed because data
limitations eliminated the possibility of calculating a separate
for each state with time-series data.
Finally, service or residentiary activities may behave indepen-
dent of the manufacturing sector. For example, services in some states
have grown rapidly in the last few years because of the growth of retire-
ment communities. In such cases service industries are independent of
manufacturing fluctuations and instead grow and decline with the changes
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in the number of retirees and social security and other retirement
benefits.
Econometric Model
This final section of Chapter Three lays out the models used to
test the hypotheses described above. The statistical methods were
primarily econometric, using a combined cross-section time-series equa-
tions. The analysis was carried out for all industries, the machinery
industry (SIC 35) and the textile industry (SIC 22).
All-Industry Model
The final all-industry equation was derived by substituting equa-
tions 3-2, 3-11, 3-19, and 3-20 into 3-1. This equation is equal to:
EsE E E ^
E. _=s-9_anE- l + - (E. + E. ( KL. + 3A. +jr ET ET m ET jr jr 1 jr 2 jr
(3-24)
3 Ujr + 64UE + 65UI ))
Replacing Em with equations 3-2, 3-11, 3-19:
E s
jr T E {[Em/ET. jr + jr (l KL + f2A + f33U + 14UE + 5UI))]}
E 
(3-25)
+ m(E + E (S KL + 2A + 63U + 4UE + 65UI))
T
factoring out the component, m.
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jr = [1 + y (Es/ET)] [(E m/ET) a jr + Ejr 'lKLjr +
(3-26)
62Ajr + 3Ujr+ 4 UEjr + 5UIjr
where
m.
AJr
E s/ET
E m/ET
Wr
KL
I
KL
U
UE
UI
subscript s
subscript m
subscript T
20 1
. o . wjr
= jr(t) + Ijr (t-1) + Ijr(t-2))/Kjr(t)]
= Trend-adjusted severity of a recession, calculated
as the percent decline in employment.
= Short-run multiplier.
= Proportion of total employment in local or service
industries.
= Proportion of total employment in export or manu-
facturing industries.
= Percentage of each state r's manufacturing industry
in 2-digit industry i.
= Capital-labor ratio.
= Total investment in fixed plant and equipment.
= Value of the capital stock.
= Percent of the labor force that is unionized.
= Peak-year unemployment rate.
= Ratio of weekly unemployment insurance benefits
to the average weekly wage.
= Residential or local industries.
= Manufacturing or export industries.
= Total employment.
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subscript j = Recessions 1, ... , 5.
subscript o = National data.
subscript r = States 1, ... , 48.
superscript i = Manufacturing industries, 1, ... , 20.
subscript t = Time.
Equation 3-26 explains the severity of a state's recession in
two components. First there is an employment decline in the manufactur-
ing sector. This percentage fall in cyclical manufacturing employment
is caused by a decline in demand for a state's exports as well as several
characteristics of the local manufacturing sector that may either ag-
gravate or dampen the recession's impact. The effect of the recession in
the manufacturing sector on total employment depends on the proportion
of the state's employment in manufacturing. Thus the component fm. is
weighted by E m/ET
A second component of a state's recession depends upon the loss
in employment in the residentiary sector which, according to export-base
theory, is a function of the change in employment in manufacturing.
Thus the multiplier, y, measures the impact of a change in manufacturing,
weighted by the size of the manufacturing sector, on services. This
change in services is weighted by E s/ET to get the magnitude of the
impact on total employment.
The greater the magnitude of the short-run multiplier, the
recession in manufacturing, or the size of the manufacturing sector,
the greater the severity of the recession in the service sector. The
larger the service sector the greater the impact of s on total employment.
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Thus, a state's recession is explained by the loss in employment in
the manufacturing sector, weighted by the importance of manufacturing
in the state economy, and by a second round of employment declines in
services, caused by the decline in income and output in the manufactur-
ing sector, and weighted by the size of the residentiary sector. Equation
3-26 was estimated with non-linear least squares, using data for all in-
dustries in each state for the five recessions 1953-54, 1957-58, 1960-61,
1969-70, and 1973-75.
An attempt was made to estimate equation 3-26 using non-linear
squares. The model was tested on data for each recession, as well as
for all recessions combined. Allowing 50 iterations and a number of
starting valuesonly two recession-specific equations would converge.
Those were the equations representing the 1953-54 recession and the equa-
tions representing the 1969-70 recession. The equation for the combined
cross-section time series also converged to a solution.
The failure of the 1956-57, 1960-61 and 1973-75 recession-specific
equations to converge is most likely due to the flatness of the maximum
likelihood surface. When the coefficients on the independent variables
are statistically insignificant, the maximum likelihood surface is rela-
tively flat. The least squares program searches over this likelihood
surface for maximum values, or peaks. When no peaks are found the pro-
gram continues to search, and convergence does not occur.
Although the parameters for the combined cross-section time-
series equation could be estimated using non-linear least squares,
without estimating the recession specific equations it was not possible
to test whether pooling of the data was justified. In other words, the
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question of whether each of the five samples were drawn from the same
sample could not be answered.
In order to estimate equations for each of the five recessions,
as well as the pooled recession data, the model was simplified and re-
estimated with linear least squares. The simplified model is:
E+ @ ( A. + A + U + UE. +
r ET mjr mjr 1 jr 2 jr 3 jr 4 ar
E E (3-27)
5UI)) + p( ($T T ir
Equation 3-27 assumes that only the expected recession, based on
industry composition, has repercussions on the residentiary sector. The
capital-labor ratio, age-of-the-capital stock, unionization, unemployment
rates, and unemployment insurance benefits are assumed to have an affect
on the severity of the recession in the export sector, but the second
round impact of these factors on the residentiary sector are not mea-
sured in the simplified all-industry model.
Disaggregate Model
A model similar to the all-industry equation is used to test the
hypotheses with data from machinery manufacturing (SIC 35) and textile
manufacturing (SIC 22). The industry-specific models differ slightly
from the all-industry model (Eq. 3-26) in form and in theoretical impli-
cations.
The disaggregated model, as in the case of the all-industry model,
divides the cycle into a national and local component. The national
component explains the state's 2-digit industry recession in terms of
fluctuations in national demand for the products of 3-digit industries.
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The local component, again, tests the hypothesis that local economic
and institutional conditions dampen or aggravate the effects of the
national component. These local conditions include the capital-labor
ratio, age-of-capital, unionization, peak-year unemployment, and unem-
ployment insurance benefits.
.= E + E' (3-28)jr jr L
9
'= f ($ ' t) (3-29)
E= E ( KL' + + f3 U' + 4 UE + 5 UI ) (3-30)
where the variables are the same as described above except that:
superscript i = 1 ... , 9 3-digit SIC code level industries.
superscript ' = Data specific to the textile or machinery industry.
E = 4 (KL + 2A' + 3U' + 64UE + 5Ujr (3-31)jr jr Jr 1 jr 2 Jr 3 Jr 4 r 5 r) (-1
Whereas the all-industry model measures the macroeconomic all-
industry relationships, the industry-specific model tests microeconomic
relationships. For example, the level of a state's unemployment insur-
ance benefits may have a stabilizing affect on employment, when all-indus-
tries are included in the model. High benefits act as an automatic sta-
bilizer, maintaining incomes and employment in the residentiary sector.
On the other hand, the relationship between unemployment insurance and
severity of the cycle may be reversed at the microeconomic or industry-
specific level. That is, high unemployment benefits are expected to have
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a destabilizing affect at the industry-specific level, because high
benefits encourage layoffs. This argument is made in more detail
earlier in this chapter. Another obvious difference between the macro-
economic all-industry model and microeconomic industry-specific model
is the exclusion of the multiplier from the second model. A multiplier
is a macro concept and is not relevant to a particular export industry's
cycle.
Another reason for the disaggregate model is that it permits a
more precise test of several of the hypotheses included in the local
component. It is suspected that, in the all-industry model, heterogen-
eity within the 2-digit SIC categories of the expected recession may
cloud the measurement of the local components. In the all-industry
model, disaggregating the national component or expected recession to
the 3-digit rather than 2-digit level would have been difficult.
Calculating the expected recession for the all-industry equation
required weighting the recessions of twenty 2-digit national industries
by the i composition in forty-eight states, in five recessions. To
disaggregate the expected recession to the 3-digit SIC code level would
have required calculating the severity of the cycle in nearly two
hundred national industries, for five recessions, as well as calculating
two hundred weights for forty-eight states, for all five recessions.
Clearly the mechanics of such computations would be exceedingly expensive
in computer costs and time.
It did, however, seem important to attempt a further disaggrega-
tion of the data. As is well known, there are large differences in the
manufacturing industries that fall within the 2-digit SIC code category.
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For example, aircraft, tractors, and autos all fall into SIC code 37,
each of which respond very differently to the business cycle.
In order to get a more refined expected recession, and therefore
a better test of the remaining independent variables, the two 2-digit
industries of machinery and textile manufacturing were selected for
further disaggregation. The national component or expected recessions
for these two industries were calculated from the nine 3-digit level
industries within each 2-digit industry.
Machinery manufacturing and textile manufacturing were selected
for three reasons. First, it was believed that a comparison of the
results of a durable and a non-durable goods industry may yield inter-
esting results. For example, durable-goods production is typically more
cyclically sensitive, and therefore should exhibit more variation in
the dependent variable. The greater the variation in the dependent
variable the better the test of the independent variables; it is pos-
sible, therefore, that the model would explain fluctuations in the
durable goods industry better than in nondurable goods, implying that
the fits for the all-industry equation were poorer due to the averaging
of durable and nondurable goods.
Aside from the constraint of selecting one durable and one non-
durable goods industry, the choice was based on maximizing the availa-
bility of data, and finding industries that were as widely dispersed
geographically as possible.
The machinery industry analysis includes 34 states and two reces-
sions, 1970-71 and 1973-74. The textile data were available for 24
states and the 1970-71 and 1973-75 recessions. The data, their sources
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and the calculation of the variables for the all-industry, machinery
and textile industries are described in detail in the following chapter.
Summary
To summarize, this study will test the extent to which national
fluctuations in demand for a state's exports, local economic and
institutional factors, and fluctuations in a residentiary sector
explain the recessionary phase of a state's employment cycle. The
local economic and institutional factors include capital-labor ratio,
age-of-the-capital stock, peak-year employment rates, the size of
unemployment insurance benefits, and unionization.
The fact that a state's industrial mix influences a state's
recession has been well documented. However, all findings concur that
industrial composition does not explain all cross-state differences in
cyclical amplitude. It is the purpose of this thesis to identify other
factors. States with cyclically sensitive industries and large export
base multipliers are expected to have more severe fluctuations in basic
industries than the straight industry-mix hypothesis would suggest.
States with a high average-age capital stock, and a low capital-labor
ratio are expected to bear disproportionate declines in aggregate demand
due to higher marginal and average costs. Tight peak-year labor markets
and low unemployment insurance benefits of the industry level are
expected to make rehiring during an economic recovery problematic and,
therefore, hinder layoffs during a downturn, and finally, union collec-
tive bargaining may lead to contracts that favor layoffs to other labor
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demand adjustments.
In addition to the all-industry model, an industry-specific
model, to be tested with data on machinery manufacturing and textile
manufacturing, is laid out. The purpose of this thesis is to test the
importance of each of the variables proposed to influence a state's
cyclical sensitivity. This test will be carried out at a macroeconomic
level with data on all-industries as well as at a microeconomic industry-
specific level.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA SOURCES AND VARIABLE CALCULATIONS
Chapter Four describes the variables used to estimate
equation 3-26 of Chapter Three. First, the data, their sources, and
their limitations will be described; and second, the procedure used to
transform the data into variables will be documented. In most cases
these two steps will be completed for one variable before proceding
to the next. The variables used in equation 3-26, are the severity of
the state recession, expected recession based on industry composition,
capital-labor ratio, age of the capital stock, extent of unionization,
unemployment insurance benefits, and peak-year unemployment rate.
Before proceeding, the direction of this chapter will be clearer
if the study's organization is briefly restated. In order to explain
cross-state differences in cyclical variability, the empirical work is
divided into three sections. First, an all-industry equation is tested,
using data on forty-eight states and five post World War II recessions.
A second analysis focuses on the machinery industry, using thirty-four
states and three post World War II recessions, and the final analysis
includes data on the textile industry from twenty-four states and two
post World War II recessions. Each variable was, therefore, calculated,
in most cases, three times, once for each of the three industry break-
downs described. The calculation of the dependent variable, the severity
of the recession will be described first.
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Severity of the State Recessions
The severity of the states' recessions are measured as percent-
age declines in non-agricultural employment, from the peak to the trough
of the business cycle. In the section that follows the basic data,
their limitations, the seasonal adjustment process, and the final calcu-
lations of the severity measures will be described.
The dependent variables were calculated from state and state-by-
industry monthly employment data obtained from the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics (BLS). The dependent variable for the all-industry equation was
calculated from all non-agricultural employment, while the dependent
variables for the machinery and textile equations were calculated from
manufacturing employment at the 2-digit Standard Industrial Code (SIC)
Level for those industries. These monthly employment series span various
time periods, but in most cases the all-industry series extend from 1950
to 1979 and the state-by-industry data extend from 1968 to 1976.
The employment data represent the total number of persons employed
either full-time or part-time during a specified payroll period, and are
collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) each month from a sample
of business establishments in all non-agricultural activities. The bus-
iness establishments participating in the survey extract the data from
their payroll records. In 48 states, participation in the survey is vol-
unatry. In California and North Carolina participation is required by
state law.
The BLS's method of sample selection is known as the "sampling
proportionate to average size of establishment" technique. This procedure
involves stratifying the establishment population by industry and then
100
within each industry by size of establishment, in terms of employment.
For each industry the number of sample units is distributed among the
size class cells. Under this type of design, large establishments within
an industry fall into the sample with certainty. Thus, in a manufacturing
industry in which a high proportion of total employment is concentrated
in a few establishments, a large percentage of the industry's total employ-
ment is included in the sample. On the other hand, in an industry
which a large proportion of total employment is in small establishments,
it is necessary to accept samples with a smaller proportion of universe
empl oyment.
In March of each year, a complete count of total employment in each
industry and state is collected and used as an employment benchmark. The
employment benchmark information is, in most cases, compiled by the State
Offices of Employment Security, because of their role in administering
unemployment insurance programs. For the few industries exempt from un-
employment insurance, the BLS uses alternative sources of data. Employ-
ment data on non-office insurance sales workers and private educational
services are collected by the Bureau of the Census and published in the
County Business Patterns; data for interstate railroad workers employ-
ment are obtained from the Interstate Commerce Commission; data on pri-
vate elementary and secondary school employees are derived from the U.S.
Office of Education and the National Catholic Welfare Association; and
government employment numbers are acquired from the U.S. Civil Service
Commission and the Census and Survey of Governments conducted by the
Bureau of the Census.
A procedure known as the benchmark and link-relative technique is
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used for estimating monthly employment. This method takes advantage of
the complete annual count of employment and the monthly sample of employ-
ment levels in successive months in identical establishments. For example,
if total count employment for a given series (e.g., employment in electri-
cal components in Maine)was 50,000 employees in March, while the sample
count was 25,000 employees in March and 26,000 in April, the April estimate
would be derived from the following calculation:
50,000 x 26,000 = 52,00025,000
Any discrepancies between two annual employment benchmarks are spread
evenly across all intervening months.
There are several potential shortcomings of the data. One is that
anyone working part-time or full-time is counted as employed. As the
economy moves through the recessionary phase of the business cycle it is
likely that many workers move from full-time to half-time employment.
In such cases growing underemployment will not show up in the statistics,
underestimating the employment impact of the business cycle. This problem
may well influence the results of the study when there are cross-state dif-
ferences in the proportion of workers that are laid off versus shifted
from full-time to part-time work. Such cross state differences are expec-
ted to occur. For example, Medoff found that unionized work forces tended
to favor lay offs to part-time work. Medoff suggests that this finding
may be due to the seniority system within unions, where senior union
members prefer lay offs to across-the-board cuts in hours worked (Medoff,
1979). Thus, it is possible that in non-unionized states, the data tend to
disguise more underemployment than in unionized states.
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A second problem with the data is estimation error in the sample
data. In order to insure promptness in publishing survey results, the
sample size is kept at approximately 130,000 to 150,000 establishments.
While this reflects about 42 percent of total non-agricultural employ-
ment, the coverage within industry categories, as mentioned earlier, de-
pends upon the industry (Employment and Earnings, May 1973: 163-164).
A small sample is most accurate for cyclically stable and concen-
trated industries. In industries composed of many small, cyclically vola-
tile firms, a relatively larger sample size is necessary to insure the
same estimation error. For example, estimation errors are greater for
the construction industry than durable goods industries, even though both
are cyclically volatile. Since durable goods industries are characterized
by a relatively few large firms, a small sample can capture a large propor-
tion of their total employment. In contrast, the construction industry is
comprised of a large number of relatively small economic units. Thus, a
small sample less accurately captures cyclical employment fluctuations in
construction. The problem of measurement error in the construction indus-
try is further aggravated by the fact that construction firms enter and
leave the industry more frequently than the larger firms of durable goods
industries. Therefore, it is more difficult for the BLS to sustain a
consistent sample over time.
How do these sampling errors affect the data for the machinery and
textile industries? Typically, the machinery industry is more cyclically
sensitive than the textile industry; however, the 1973-74 recession was an
exception. In the 1969-71 recession, the textile industry's employment
declined from its trend by 1.8 percent, while the same figure for the
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machinery industry was 3.7 percent. However, in the 1973-75 recession
the trend-adjusted severity of the textile industry was 11.1 percent.
This was larger than the 4.6 percent decline in machinery employment.
The relative cyclical variability of the machinery industry is due to
its durability. As mentioned earlier durable goods tend to be more cyc-
lically sensitive than nondurables. Textile's relative cyclical sensitiv-
ity in the 1973-75 may be due to its use of petroleum in the production
of synthetics.
Also, there are slight differences in the industry structures of
textiles and machinery production, with the textile industry being slightly
more concentrated. In 1972, 0.1 percent of the establishments producing
textiles and 0.2 percent of the establishments producing machinery had
more than 2,500 employees. In the same year 41 percent of the machinery
establishments had 1 to 4 employees, while only 15 percent of the textile
establishments fell into this category. Thus, there may be some reason
to expect somewhat larger sampling errors in the machinery than in the
textile industry (Census of Manufactures, 1972: 22-23 and 35-3 ).
A third problem with the data in addition to sampling error, is
that the data are susceptible to reporting errors. These may include
undocumented workers, accounting mistakes on the part of business estab-
lishments, or a refusal on the part of businesses to participate fully in
the survey.
A fourth problem is that establishments are classified according
to their major product. Many plants make more than one product. Therefore,
employment in secondary product production is underestimated in the employ-
ment statistics, while the number of employees producing the primary product
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is overstated. Moreover, when the composition of a firm's output changes
so that what was once a secondary product becomes a primary one, the
establishment is reclassified under another industry. This reclassifi-
cation as well as the overestimation of employees producing the primary
products should have little systematic effect on the measurement of the
state's business cycles.
A fifth problem is self-employed agricultural workers, domestic
workers, and the military are not included in the employment totals.
This does not appear to be a serious problem. Agricultural workers would
have been excluded from the study anyway, because the hypotheses stated
earlier only refer to manufacturing and service industries. The total
employment in the remaining omitted occupational categories is quite
small and therefore does not create significant gaps in information.
One advantage of the BLS data collection method should be noted.
For purposes of the employment survey, an establishment is defined as a
single physical location where business is conducted, or a unit for which
separate inventory and monthly payroll records are maintained. When a
company has several plants or establishments, the BLS attempts to obtain
separate reports for each establishment. This procedure avoids the prob-
lem of overestimating employment in the states with the firm's headquar-
ters and understating employment in areas with its branch plants.
As has been made clear, employment, rather than unemployment, was
selected to measure the severity of the state recessions. Historical
unemployment data by state are substantially less reliable than monthly
employment data by state for two reasons. First, the definitions of who
is unemployed for purposes of Unemployment Insurance benefits (UI) varies
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by state. State unemployment rates are estimated from the numbers of
individuals collecting UI. However, both eligibility and size of UI
vary by state, and thus the base for calculating unemployment rates is
regionally inconsistent. For example, a worker is counted as unemployed
for UI purposes as long as earnings from part-time work do not exceed the
"disregard point"--that is, the point where a portion of the claimant's
weekly benefit is withheld due to his or her earnings in part-time employ-
ment. This disregard point varies by state: in Alabama ($6), Minnesota
($25), and West Virginia ($15) the disregard point is a flat rate; in
Colorado (one-fourth), Louisiana (one-half), and New Hampshire (one-fifth)
the disregard point is a portion of the weekly UI benefit. Other states
such as Delaware, Indiana, and Vermont have even more complicated formulas
(Wetzel and Ziegler, 1974: 43). The implication for state unemployment
rates is that the base from which they are calculated varies by state,
leading to problems in the comparability of state unemployment rates.
Secondly, even if the base numbers of insured unemployed were con-
sistent across states, there are biases created by the formula used to
adjust these base numbers upwards to equal state unemployment rates. The
adjustment formula relies on assumptions of seasonality of local indus-
tries, the demographic structure of the work force, the ratio of workers
covered by UI benefits to those not covered, and the rate of employment
growth. Since these factors vary by state, the formula inevitably biases
state rates. These biases in the adjustment formula also reduce the
comparability of unemployment rates across states (Wetzel and Ziegler,
1974: 40-43).
To summarize, because the focus of this thesis is cross-state
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variations in cyclical employment, it is especially important that the
data be comparable across states. The non-agricultural employment data
are judged to be superior, in this respect, to the state-level unemploy-
ment data.
We now turn to the seasonal adjustment process of the monthly
employment series. The original state BLS monthly employment data are
unseasonalized. Seasonal movements in the data are caused by climatic
conditions, vacation practices, holidays and similar factors and are often
large enough to mask or accentuate the cyclical movement in data. There-
fore, before the severity of recessions could be calculated, these annually
repetitive or seasonal movements in the data had to be eliminated.
This was done with Shiskin's seasonal-adjustment procedure. Shis-
kin's method was selected because it was the only seasonal adjustment pack-
age available on the Univac Computer, where the empirical work of this
thesis was conducted.
Shiskin's procedure involves several steps. Let T., i = 1,
N be the original monthly employment series. First T. was smoothed using
a combined moving average and fitted polynomial method. During this step
of the procedure, 12 items, (T-6, ... , TO, ... , T +6) in the time series
were selected, a polynomial of degree 3 was fitted to data for these 12
months using a least squares regression method, and the equation was
solved for TO. The solved polynomial at T0 was the smoothed value. This
process was continued throughout the series so that T1 became TO, etc.
Next, the ratio of the smoothed to the original series gave the
first approximation to the seasonal factors. Let U , i = 1, ... , N be
the smoothed series obtained from T . The first approximations to the
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seasonal factors were then T /U . These factors were normalized so that
the sum of their values for each year equalled 12.0.
Using these seasonal factors, T. was deseasonalized by dividing
T. by the normalized first approximation of the seasonal factors. This
deseasonalized series was smoothed again. The same process described
above was used again, except this time a wider smoothing formula was
used to produce a smoother, deseasonalized series. The ratio of the
above series to the original series (T ) was taken and again normalized
to produce the final seasonality factors. The original series (T.) was
divided by these final seasonal factors. ( Univac , 1973: 10-1, 10-10.)
This procedure was carried out for the 105 employment series.
First, the monthly employment series for each of the 48 states was ad-
justed. Second, the monthly machinery industry employment data for each
of the 34 states that had a machinery industry were adjusted. And finally,
the textile data for 23 states with a textile industry were seasonally ad-
justed.
The severity of the regional recessions was calculated from these
seasonally adjusted monthly employment series. The actual calculations
were carried out in the following way. There are two possible measures
of the severity of the state recessions, including an absolute severity
measure and a trend-adjusted measure. The absolute severity measure in-
cludes the secular trend, whereas the secular trend is removed from the
trend-adjusted measure. Figure 4.1 clarifies the computation of each.
The first measure of the severity of the state recessions is
called the absolute severity. It is the percentage decline from peak
to trough in the seasonally adjusted smoothed data series. In the
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Figure 4.1
Methods of Calculating Absolute and
Trend-Adjusted Measures of Severity
diagram above, it is equivalent to (a - c)/c.
The second, trend-adjusted severity, measure requires both the
seasonally-adjusted series and a five-year moving average of the same
original series. This measure is equivalent to the percent deviation
of the seasonally adjusted data from the five year moving average at
the trough of the recession, or (b - c)/b in Figure 4.1.
The trend-adjusted variable is the superior measure of the sev-
erity of state recessions. By removing the secular trend from the cycle,
distortions caused by the influence of long-term growth and decline on
cyclical activity are eliminated. For example, if a region is experienc-
ing strong secular growth in employment, then the absolute severity
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Comparison of Non Trend-Adjusted Measures for the Severity of
Recessions When Region is Growing and When
Region is Declining
Employment
Five year
moving average
me
Absolute Severity for Growing Region
Figure 4.2
Employment
c
a
b Five year
moving average
Time
Absolute Severity Measure for Declining Region
Figure 3.4
a
c
b
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measure of (c - b)/c will be less by definition than a region exper-
iencing secular decline. The trend-adjusted measure circumvents this
problem, as can be seen by comparing figure 4.2 with figure 4.3. It
is the state cycle, not the cycle plus long term growth, that is of
interest in this study. Therefore the trend-adjusted measure is the
preferred measure of cyclical variation.
Both measures were calculated for each state for all recessions
for total employment and machinery and textile employment. The two
measures are compared in Chapter Five.
In all cases the timing of the recessions was allowed to vary
across states and industries, so that, for example, the date of the
trough in New Jersey may differ from the date of the trough in Indiana.
In other words, all calculations were made at each state's individual
trough and/or peak. The idiosyncracies of each set of severity variables
are discussed in the following sections.
All Industries
Total state employment data are not available for all states for
the total time span studied here. The states and time periods for which
data are not available include Arkansas, 1950-58; Connecticut, 1950-71;
Louisiana, 1950-59; Maine, 1950-71; Massachusetts, 1950-71; Michigan,
1950-71; New Hampshire, 1950-71; New Jersey, 1950-71; Oklahoma, 1950-57;
and Texas, 1950-58. The observation for these states within these years
were, therefore, eliminated from the all-industry analysis.
Machinery Industry
The severity of the recessions for the machinery industry--SIC 35--
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were calculated in the manner described above. Unfortunately these
dependent variables could not be computed for all states and all five
recessions. One reason is that many states have insignificant numbers
of employees in the machinery industry. This is the case for Alabama,
Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming. A more pervasive reason, however,
for the elimination of many observations is that in 1972 the SIC codes
were revised. While each state is required to update its industry data
in order to provide a consistant historical industry series, most states,
such as California, Illinois, and New Jersey, had not completed the
task at the time of the study. Therefore, there are no data, prior to
1972, for many states with large machinery industries. The states and
years included in the machinery industry recessions are noted in Table
4.1. The states excluded for reasons other than the lack of employment
data are coded by reasons for exclusion.
When computing the trend-adjusted dependent variable, four obser-
vations are lost, due to the calculation of the five-year moving average.
When computing a five-year moving average, 30 months of data are lost
at the beginning and end of the series. For this reason, observations
for Maryland for the 1970-71 recession and Indiana, Kentucky, and
Oklahoma for the 1960-61 recession could not be calculated. As mentioned
above the actual timing of the recessions was allowed to vary across states.
Textile Industry
For the textile industry as well, employment data are not availa-
ble for the states with a negligible textile industry. The states elim-
inated from the analysis because of an insignificant textile industry
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Table 4.1
State Included in Analysis of Machinery Industry
Recession V
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Florida
Georgia
Idahoa
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippia
Missouri
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Recession IV
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Arkansas
Florida
Indiana
Kentucky
Marylandb
New York
Ohio
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Virginia
West Virginia
Recession III
Indianab
Kentuckyb
New Yorkc
Ohioc
Oklahomab
aEliminated
culated
from all equations because capital-stock data can not be cal-
bEliminated from trend-adjusted equations because five-year moving average
data are not available.
cEliminated from trend-adjusted equations because the sample is too small.
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Table 4.2
States Included in Analysis of Textile Industry
Recession V Recession IV
Alabama
Arkansas
Delaware
Georgia
Kentuckya
Maryland
Mississippi
New York
Ohio
South Carolina
Texasb
Virginia
Alabama
Arkansas
Californiaa
Connecticut
Delaware
Georgia
Illinois
Kentuckya
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Mississippi
Missouri
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oregona
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Vermont
Virginia
Wisconsin
bEliminated because five-year moving average data are not available.
aElminated because capital stock cannot be calculated.
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and therefore a lack of data, are Vermont, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Iowa, Nebraska, West Virgina, Florida, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Idaho,
Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Washington.
For 1972 through 1979, monthly employment data are available for
25 states. For the 1968-71 recession data are only available for nine
states, and for earlier recessions data are only available for six states.
Monthly employment data for 1972-79 are available for three states
that could not be included in the analysis. They are California, Oregon,
and Kentucky. In the case of California and Oregon, data on capital
investment in their textile industries are withheld due to confidentiality
regulations. In the case of Kentucky, the base-year gross book value of
depreciable assets is not available. Therefore, for these three states
the capital stock values cannot be calculated, and they are eliminated
from the analysis. The states included in the textile equations are
listed in Table 4.2. This table also notes excluded observations by reason
of exclusion. The severity of the state's recessions in the textile in-
dustry was calculated in the same trend-adjusted manner described above.
The textile industry is in economic decline. Thus, there are
a number of states for which troughs cannot be located due to continuous
employment declines, and other states where the magnitude of the recessions
appears unusually high. The anticipation and reason for these problems
were discussed earlier, and have led to the elimination of the absolute
severity measure for the textile industry.
Expected Recession
The second variable is the independent variable, expected recession
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based on industry composition. Again, this variable was calculated for
each state for all recessions, as well as for the textile and machinery
industries separately. To capture an expected recession based on industry
composition, a statistical standardization technique was used to test the
null hypothesis that the cyclical behavior of each industry was indepen-
dent of its location. Thus, if a state had the same industrial composi-
tion as the nation, the state would be expected to experience the same
cyclical behavior as the nation. This standardization technique involved
calculating the percentage decline in employment in each of the national
industries, then weighting these percentage declines by the importance of
the industries in a single state.
In order calculate the severity of the national recessions in
each industry, the national, seasonally-adjusted monthly employment data
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics national industry tapes were adjusted
for secular trends. The secular trends were eliminated from the data by
converting the original series into five-year moving averages.
Rather than attempt to discuss the calculation of the expec-
ted recessions in general terms, the presentation will be made clearer if
we turn to specifics of constructing the expected recession for the all-
industry equations.
All Industries
To calculate the expected recession for the all-industry
equation, the manufacturing sector was subdivided into twenty 2-digit
industries. As explained above, only manufacturing industries are in-
cluded in the all-industry expected recession because the export-base
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model is the adopted framework. Demand for
is assumed to be determined nationally, while demand for residentiary
goods and services to determined locally.
The expected recessions were calculated, as explained in Chapter
Three, with the following equation.
20 . .
Er = (0 -r) (4-1)
where
E = Expected recession
E = Trend- adjusted severity in national industry i0
W = Proportion of employment in industry i
i = Industries 1, ... , 20
r =States 1, ..., 48
j = Recessions 1, ... , 5
The severity of the recessions in each national industry was cal-
culated from the national BLS data. These data are collected in the same
manner as the state statistics described earlier, and the same short-
comings hold for them as well.
The national data, at the 2-digit SIC code level and major industry
division are seasonally adjusted. The BLS seasonally adjusts their series
using the X-11 Census Bureau method, a method similar to the Shiskin
method described earlier in that it employs a ratio-to-moving-average
technique.
The data used to calculate the industry composition weights (w)
were taken from the Census of Manufactures (CM) and the Annual Survey of
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Manufactures (ASM). The 1953-54 recession is weighted by the state's
industry composition in manufacturing in 1951 taken from the ASM, Table
2, 1951. The 1957-58 recession is weighted by state s industry compo-
sition in 1956, which was obtained from the ASM, Volume III, Table 3,
1956. The 1958, 1968, and 1972 weights were taken from the CM, Volume
III, Table 4, 1958; the ASM Volume III, Table 3, 1968-69; and the CM,
Volume III, Table 5, 1972; respectively.
A problem was encountered during the computation of all manufac-
turing weights. In many states the total percent of employment in the
sum of the twenty 2-digit manufacturing categories does not equal 100
percent of the state's employment in manufacturing. Due to inadequacies
in the state-by-industry data, total employment in a state is often not
accounted for in the 2-digit manufacturing industry breakdown. The ser-
iousness of this discrepancy varies across states and time. For example,
in the 1952 data there are thirty-four states in which the percent of
employment in all of the 2-digit manufacturing industries is less than
90 percent of total state manufacturing employment. In 1972 there are
only five states in which this occurs. Ninety percent or more of the
state's employment can be accounted for in the twenty 2-digit categories
in all five peak years for the largest employment states, such as Cali-
fornia, New York, New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. In states such
as Delaware and Utah, the total percent of employment in the 2-digit in-
dustries never reaches 90 percent of the state's total manufacturing
employment.
In order to keep this problem from biasing the data on the expected
recessions downwards, the percentages were adjusted upwards. This was
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accomplished by locating all of the states and years in which manufactur-
ing employment in the sum of the 2-digit industries is less than 90
percent of the total and then distributing the missing employees evenly
across all of the manufacturing industry categories.
An additional and uncorrectable shortcoming of the expected reces-
sion data is that state economies are not homogeneous within 2-digit
SIC categories. Thus, not all of the state's industry structure can be
controlled. This failure to control for total industry composition
effects is expected to show up in the error term and unexplained residual.
Machinery and Textile Industries
A similar procedure was followed in calculating the expected reces-
sions for the industry-specific equations. Although computed separately,
the computation of the expected recessions for the machinery and textile
industries are described together to avoid repetition.
In the case of the machinery manufacturing industry, employment
in SIC code 35 is subdivided into nine 3-digit SIC code categories.
These categories include
Industry SIC Code
Machinery, except Electrical 35
Engines and Turbines 351
Farm and Garden Machinery 352
Construction and Related Machinery 353
Metal Working Machinery 354
Special Industry Machinery 355
General Industrial Machinery 356
Office and Computing Machines 357
Service Industry Machines 358
Miscellaneous Machines 359
In the case of the textile industry, SIC category 22 is further
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divided into the following 3-digit SIC code categories
Textile Mill Products 22
Cotton Weaving Mills 221
Synthetic Weaving Mills 222
Wool Weaving and Finishing Mills 223
Narrow Fabric Mills 224
Knitting Mills 225
Textile Finishing Mills, Wool 226
Floor Covering Mills 227
Yarn and Thread Mills 228
Miscellaneous Textile Mills 229
Two data sets are necessary to compute the expected industry-
specific recessions. The first is national monthly employment data at
the 3-digit industry level and the second is the total annual employment
in each 3-digit industry in each state.
The severity of the national recessions was calculated from the
monthly 3-digit employment series for 1960-61, 1969-70 and 1973-75 for
the machinery industry and for 1969-70 and 1973-75 for the textile in-
dustry. For example, the percentage decline in the nation's employment
in Engines and Turbines was calculated for the 1960-61, 1970-71, and
the 1973-74 recession. The same was done for farm and garden machinery,
construction, and related machinery, as well as the remaining six machin-
ery industries at the 3-digit level.
The national monthly employment data for machinery and textiles
are available from the BLS, and required seasonal adjustment prior to
calculating the severity of the national recessions in each 3-digit indus-
try.
The recessions in the 3-digit machinery and textile industries
are those that generally coincide with the national recessions already
identified. However, the specific timing of the peaks and troughs varies
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across industries. In other words, the peaks and troughs are the actual
ones for each industry series, rather than a peak or trough at a date
imposed by the timing of the national average of all industries.
The next step was to weight each national machinery and textile
industry recession by the importance of each 3-digit industry in each
state. The state weights are the percent of each state's annual total
2-digit industry employment in each 3-digit category. For example, in
Arkansas in 1972, 9 percent of the machinery industry employment was in
Farm and Garden Machinery production, 16 percent in construction and
related machinery production, 10 percent in metal working machinery pro-
duction, etc. The employment totals, from which these percentages were
calculated, can be found in the CM, Volume III, Area Statistics, Table
5, 1972, and the CM, Volume III, Area Statistics, Table 5, 1967.
It may be noticed that in the all-industry expected recession and
elsewhere throughout the study, 1968 is identified as the peak year.
However, 3-digit data, by state, are only available in the CM, which was
not published in 1968. Therefore data from the 1967 CM replaces 1968
data. Since 1967 was a non-recession year and it is unlikely that indus-
try structure varies significantly across a one-year time span, it is
doubtful that this switch in data distorts the results.
There are several shortcomings of the machinery and textile indus-
try expected recessions. One problem is that composition within the 3-
digit categories is not homogeneous across states. Consequently cross-
state differences within 3-digit SIC industries are not controlled. It
is expected that the unexplained residual in the regression equations
will, in part, be due to this inability to completely control for or
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eliminate the effects of industry composition on the severity of regional
recessions.
There are several additional problems with these data. In a
number of states the weights do not total 100 percent. This discrepan-
cy ranges from 48 percent of employment accounted for in Kentucky in the
machinery industry in 1967 to 100 percent in most all states in 1972.
No adjustments were made in these data. Also, for a number of states and
industries the CM reports a range of numbers in place of one actual employ-
ment value. In such cases the midpoint of the range was selected as the
actual value. Third, in several states there is no 3-digit SIC code cat-
egory, but only a 4-digit SIC subcategory. In such cases, the 4-digit
sub-category replaces the 3-digit category. Finally, the weighted machin-
ery and textile industry recessions were only calculated for states for
which there are data for dependent variables. These observations are
listed in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
Capital Stock
The value of the capital stock was calculated for each state for
all-manufacturing industries and for each state for the machinery industry
and the textile industry. These newly-calculated capital-stock series
span the years 1952 to 1976 for all-manufacturing industries and for vary-
ing years for the specific industries. Each of the three sets of capital
stock series are described in more detail below. However, first the gen-
eral method of calculating the series as well as the sources of data are
presented.
Each capital-stock series was calculated using the perpetual
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inventory model, a real investment series, the value of the capital
stock in a single base year, and a rate of depreciation. These general
procedures and the source of data are described in turn.
The formula for the perpetual inventory model is shown in Equation
4-2.
Kt =t + (1-6)Kt-1  (4-2)
where Kt = end-of-the-year capital stock; It= gross real investment in
the current period; 6 = the annual rate of depreciation or replacement.
Data on the gross book value of depreciable assets in manufactur-
ing industries were used as the base-year capital stock values (Kt-1)
and to calculate the rates of depreciation. Data on the book value of
depreciable assets are the best available measures of a state's capital
stock. They measure the end-of-the-year value of all depreciable assets
on the books of manufacturing establishments in a state. The numbers
represent the actual cost of the assets at the time they acquired, in-
cluding all costs incurred in making the assets usable, such as trans-
portation and installation. Included in the values are buildings, struc-
tures, machinery and equipment for which depreciation reserves are main-
tained. Depletable assets, such as timber and minerals, are excluded as
are non-depreciable assets such as inventories.
The 1957, 1962, and 1964 book values of depreciable assets (capital
stock) were obtained from the ASM, "Special Geographical Supplement to
1962-64 Data on Book Value of Fixed Assets and Rental Payments for Build-
ings and Equipment," 1972. The 1970-71 data on book values on depreciable
assets, which are only available at the state, all-manufacturing level,
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were taken from ASM, 1970-71, Table 2, page 131. Because these data
are only available at the state level for the years 1957, 1962-64, and
1967-71, and the state-by-industry level for the years 1962-64
these data cannot be used as the capital stock series. Rather, they
must be combined with a real investment series (I), an estimated annual
rate of depreciation (6) and the perpetual inventory equation to generate
a continuous capital stock series for each state for all-manufacturing
and the machinery and textile industries.
The values of gross investment (It) used in calculating the
capital stock series were extracted from the CM and ASM. These data
are described as new expenditures for plant and equipment or capital
expenditures new, respectively by the CM and the ASM. These statistics
include manufacturers investment in capital equipment and physical struc-
tures. They exclude maintenance and repairs charged as part of current
operating expenses, and expenditures for land. The sources of the
investment data for all-manufacturing, the textile, and the machinery
industries are displayed in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.
In the 1951 ASM, the data on capital expenditures relate only to
manufacturing establishments in operation during that year. They do not
include expenditures incurred during the year for constructing and equip-
ping new plants not yet in operation. After 1951, the census collected
data for plants under construction. This study uses the total of capital
expenditures for operating and non-operating plants as the definition of
investment for all years, except, of course, 1951, when only investment
in operating plants is available.
The reason that this study uses the total of capital expenditures
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for operating and non-operating plants is that for several years after
1951 the two categories are not reported separately. Thus the total
of investment in operating and non-operating plants was selected because
of the most consistent series over time.
The investment series was converted from nominal values into real
numbers with an implicit price deflator. This deflator is the ratio of
total gross domestic fixed non-residential expenditures in the current
period to gross domestic fixed non-residential expenditures in constant
1958 prices. Fixed non-residential expenditures includes producer's
durable equipment as well as structures. This implicit price deflator
was taken from the Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial
times to 1970, Part I, House Document No. 93-78, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1975 for the years 1950 to 1970. In
order to deflate the 1971 to 1974 investment series, a base-year 1958
implicit price deflator was taken from a later year of the original
source, the Survey of Current Business, Vol. 54, No. 7, 1974, Table 8.1.
The implicit price deflators used in this study can be found in Appendix
Ix.
In order to calculate the capital stock series for each state,
an "implied" depreciation rate was estimated by solving the perpetual
inventory formula, equation 4-2, for 6 as shown below.
Kt ~ I
- K t (4-3)
t-1
The preceding description of the calculation of the capital stock series
applies to the all-manufacturing calculations, as well as to those for
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Table 4.3
Sources of Investment Data
All Manufacturing
ASM* Table
ASM, Table
ASM, Table
CM, Vol. I
ASM, Table
ASM, Table
ASM, Table
CM, Volume
ASM, Table
ASM, Table
CM, Volume
ASM, Table
CM, Volume
2, 1951
2, 1952
2, 1953
Summary Statistics, Table 5, 1954
2, 1955
3, 1956
3, 1957
III, Area Statistics, Table 4, 1958
I, 1959-60
A, 1966
III, Table 5, 1967
3, 1970-71
III, Area Statistics, Table 5, 1972
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959-60
1961-66
1967
1970-71
1972
ASM: A
CM: C
nnual Survey of Manufactures
ensus of Manufactures
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Table 4.4
Sources of Investment Data
Machinery and Textile Industries
ASM, Table
CM, Volume
ASM, Table
ASM, Table
ASM, Table
ASM, Table
CM, Volume
ASM, Table
ASM, Table
CM, Volume
ASM, Table
ASM, Table
CM, Volume
3, 1957
III, Area Statistics, Table 4, 1958
2, 1959
2, 1960
2, 1961
2, 1962
III, Area Studies, Table 5, 1963
3, 1964-65
3, 1966
III, Area Statistics
3, 1968-69
3, 1970-71
III, Area Statistics, Table 5, 1972
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964-65
1966
1967
1968-69
1970-71
1972
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the textile and machinery industries. Before proceding with the general
discussion we will now consider each of these separately.
All Manufacturing
The first step in calculating the capital-stock series for each
state for all-manufacturing was to estimate a depreciation rate. For
the all-manufacturing series two depreciation rates were calculated, in
order to see whether the final results were sensitive to different
assumptions about the rate at which a state's capital stock depreciated.
The two sets of depreciation rates were based on data from different
years. First, the gross book value of depreciable assets in the years
1957 and 1962 were used as Kt-1 and Kt respectively in equation 4-3.
Nominal expenditures on plant and equipment in the years 1958 to 1962
were summed to get I. The results of the equation's solution were then
divided by 5 to get an annual average rate of depreciation for the years
1958 and 1962. The results of this calculation are displayed in Table
4.5, column I.
As can be seen from this table, eleven of the forty-eight depre-
ciation rates are negative numbers. This implies that the value
of a state's capital stock at the end of 1957 plus the total investment
in the state's capital stock for the years 1958 to 1962 is less than
the total value of the state's depreciable assets at the end of 1962.
Thus the value of the capital stock appears to have appreciated rather
than depreciated.
There are two possible explanations for these results. One is
that the data are inadequate. Depreciable assets in 1957 may be under-
valued, investment in the years 1958 to 1962 may be undervalued and/or
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the book value of depreciable assets in 1962 may be overvalued. Another
possible explanation is that the depreciable assets in some states,
those with the wrong sign, changed hands more frequently than did the
states with positive rates of depreciation. As explained earlier, the
capital stock figures used in this study reflect the purchase price of
fixed assets. Therefore, if plant and equipment changed hands it may
have been revalued upwards. This appreciation of depreciable assets
does not show up in new capital investment, only in the capital-stock
figures for the years following the purchase. Discussions with Leonard
Pomeroy and Milt Eisen at the CM suggest that the first explanation is
more plausible than the second.
Assuming that inadequacies in the data are the most likely causes
of negative rates, two approaches were taken. First, a new set of depre-
ciation rates were calculated, using data from later years for Kt and
Kt-1, and secondly the unrealistic rates of depreciation were adjusted
to be more believable.
The second series of depreciation rates were calculated using
1970 and 1971 depreciable assets as Kt-1 and Kt respectively and new
capital expenditures in 1971 as I The results of this calculation
are displayed in Table 4.5, Column 2. As can be seen from Table 4.5,
when the "implied" depreciation rate for 1971 is calculated, only one
depreciation rate for Missouri turns up with the wrong sign.
The rates of depreciation were then used, in conjunction with a
1957 base-year figure for capital assets and a 1952-to-1976 real invest-
ment series, to generate a 1952-to-1976 capital-stock series for each
state. But in order to avoid unreasonable estimates of the final
129
Table 4.5
Depreciation Rates, All Manufacturing,
By State
1
Depreciation Rate
State =(K1962 - 11958-62K1957
Al abama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Kentucky
2
Depreciation Rate
_1971 1- 971)
K1970
-. 027
-. 053
.026
.022
.001
.037
.015
.001
-. 008
.037
.026
.014
.033
-. 024
-. 027
.002
.008
.041
.030
.025
-. 015
.020
.005
.020
-. 037
.016
.017
-. 083
.037
.010
-. 084
.018
.011
.023
.022
.040
-. 016
.006
.039
.008
.036
.048
.054
.037
.022
.051
.044
.063
.048
.033
.048
.047
.086
.017
.043
.055
.040
.060
.043
-. 006
.035
.023
.075
.009
.061
.038
.063
.035
.055
.043
.046
.021
.041
.062
.038
.051
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Table 4.5. (Cont.)
1 2
South Dakota .071 .132
Tennessee .016 .036
Texas -.017 .008
Utah .001 .027
Vermont .055 .621
Virginia .015 .029
Washington .021 .042
West Virginia .005 .030
Wisconsin .033 .045
Wyoming .048 .034
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capital-stock series, all of the depreciation rates of the wrong sign
were adjusted. In the case of the 1958-62 rates, the signs on the rates
were merely reversed when the reversed rate appeared consistent with
other states. When the reversed sign yielded unusually high rates of
depreciation (greater than .040) the rate was replaced with a depreciation
rate of .010.
In several cases the low depreciation rate of .010 does not lead
to reasonable capital-stock series. For example, with a depreciation
rate of .010 up to .080, the series for the state of New Mexico yields
negative or extraordinarily low capital stock values in the early years
of the series. Therefore, a depreciation rate of .083 is used because
it is the smallest depreciation rate that generates believable capital
stock values. The situation for North Dakota is similar, and its 1958-62
depreciation rate was changed from .010 to .030.
It may at first glance appear counterintuitive that larger depre-
ciation rates lead to smaller capital stock values in the early years.
This can be explained as follows. Additions to the capital stock in the
years 1952 to 1957, minus depreciation, must be equal to the 1957 base-
line capital-stock value. In the perpetual inventory method, the in-
vestment series, the depreciation rate, and the 1957 value of the state's
capital stock are given. If the depreciation rate is low, capital stock
values must be low because very little of the capital stock depreciated.
In 1970-71 only one depreciation rate was negative, the sign on this
rate was simply reversed.
As mentioned above, the capital stock value used as the base
year (Kt-1) in equation 4-2 was 1957. This year was selected for the
w IwW
Table 4.6
Capital Stock, By State, For All Manufacturing, 1952-1976
($000's)
Al abama Arkansas Arizona California Colorado
379230.1
449156.4
483358.2
526857.0
562473.5
629395.0
654963.8
683964.3
727746.9
769613.7
814365.8
855271.6
894121.4
958560.0
1034492
1152215
1234310
1336948
1450723
1524469
1605691
1707651
1881909
2035257
2257425
129594.9
137128.4
152304.9
169310*3
183130.0
202094.0
228175.2
259958.5
291585.3
354271.0
389087.2
433296.0
466957.4
511627.3
578753.0
672794*1
758645.8
848836.8
931523.9
1028400
1162294
1304410
1458708
1 63600p
1737418
4961823
5393074
5831128
6226573
6762582
7323528
7725162
8063857
8-429784
8698904
9157605
9660733
10173756
10784447
11601802
12417872
13129304
13898203
14434929
14781598
15253313
15844274
16806148
17659324
18603614
365726.0
377623.2
392751.6
410404.6
458223.3
487420.0
511812.3
528055.1
558212.6
585221.9
633429.7
664321.2
688691 .9
730227.2
809171.5
854899.9
925841.7
1001944
1119,037
1233444
1330735
1473230
1632342
1779679
1924327
Source: Census of Manufactures (CM) and Annual Survey
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
19t2
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968,
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1297274
1364026
1407820
1462837
1664932
1907537
1998287
20681 86
2184091.
2260104
2295979
2347484
2522904
2770424
3046850
3268210
3436154
3613363
3792872
3905772
4007816
4183327
4627443
5127231
5647207
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
19.73
1974
1975
1976
res (ASM).-of Manufactu
Table 4.6 (Cont.)
Capital Stock, By State, For All Manufacturing,
($000' s)
1952-76
Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Idaho
1952 1613233 339047.4 852801.3 811764.1 162477.3 1952
1953 1713488 363759.7 932171.5 947315.6 172262.7 1953
1954 1802908 383321.9 1008543 1109721 185734.4 1954
1955 1909111 400994.9 1049776 1287146 212878.6 1955
1956 2044644 554944.7 1122865 1481611 232508.4 1956
1957 2198326 602979.0 1251234 1616369 237415.0 1957
1958 2312429 617639.5 1339724 1715120 241653.9 1958
1959 2392566 628590.5 1424326 1811250 249374.9 1959
1960 2496434 645692.5 1500656 1899801 270049.1 1960
1961 2569647 687816.1' 1642065 1959703 278178.2 1961
1962 2689754 728196.2 1742419 2057188 286167.8 1962
1963 2795598 797157.6 1835964 2160129 295283.7 1963
1964 2902375 8-48392.2 1900109 2289584 319644.0 1964
1965 3046060 895151.7 2080141 2476164 375101.8 1965
19C6 3299626 957855.8 2252439 2702888 403772.5 1966
1967 3577701 1040841 2407541 2964011 430139.5 1967
1968 3786858 1098538 2525693 3186105 439296.0 1966
1969 3955200 1136566 2651273 3463803 453815.5 1969
1970 4072452 1163405 28Q6227 3659552 466085.3 1970
1971 4159996 1195183 2969052 3871532 476487.2 1971
1972 4243612 1234433 3149292 4194666 500121.8 1972
1973 4331387 1286020 3347478 4472213 520512.0 1973
1974 4490526 1355661 3667423 4883569 576119.7 1974
1975 4700248 1435320 4008900 5111917 632082.2 1975
1976 4826276 1503555 4346321 5420056 692198.6 1976
Source: CM and ASM.
w
(13
Capital Stock, By
Table 4.6 (Cont.)
State, For All Man
($000' s)
ufacturing, 1952-76
Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky
19S2 5949841 3363590 78568.4 506490.6 791594.7 1952
1953 6380984 . 3759790 827638.5 552583.3 860202.1 1953 -
1954 6753038 3990962 879499.1 589132.0 1014794 1954i
1955 7077507 4376915 925246.3 635881.1 1072134 1955
1956 7627754 4866786 1023334 702755.5 1145707 1956
1957 8204858 5371731 1087147 760869.0 1243233 1957
1958 8541753 5709759 1138157 824067.2 1291110 1958
1959 8783195 5902412 1192298 860596.3 1324517 1959
1900 9060153 6241361 1269609 878030.7 1366935 1960
1961 9304452 6402769 1329257 891633.6 1413906 1961
1962 9596083 6558372 1370213 919929.5 1475191 1962
1963 9877066 6873282 1425928 978436.4 1612415 1963
1964 102o8584 7505782 1520397 1028349 1682916 1964
1965 10t43624 -8234900 1618743 1067800 1803787 1965
1966 11636059 8939382 1742297 1120492 1972873 1966
1967 12418344 9546160 1865795 1207800 2174018 1967
1968 13093923 10080073 1967471 1264821 2375863 1968
1969 13678829 10697349 2090431 1304887 2525082 1969
1970 14186147 11124828 2206296 1350085 2630798 1970
1971 14588337 11379205 2293057 1383843 2702360 1971
1972 15008512 11653620 2418950 1461496 2834044 1972
1973 15460499 12033164 2528306 1577209 3034776 1973
1974 16154728 12571002 2748748 1706680 3243434 1974
1975 16817043 13127643 3061453 1833756 3387356 1975
1976 17469325 13616368 3357941 1952757 3537214 1976
Source: CM and ASM. -P.
Capital Stock, By
Table 4.6 (Cont.)
State, For All Manufacturing, 1952-76
($000's)
Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan
345381.6
385454.2
448400.3
503445.3
549185.4
600265.0
634389.5
664426.8
706351.2
746703.0
780636.3
827163.6
879946.6
970568.0
1075410
1145833
1223545
1286973
1372775
1438065
1513117
1564620
1653488
1828217
2114262
1270607
1353989
1406508
1550906
1830563
2028426
2069289
2097133
2181021
2276316
2393545
2459337
'2501722
2603004
2736614
2844833
2933058
3059701
3223372
3313307
3393113
3466049
3609409
3751301
3853121
2416651
2470893
2548081
2632854
2735677
2834399
2907020
3011183
3126093
2980947
3092854
3183975
3300262
3437609
3692963
3933107
4091935
4271188
4511004
4596207
4728444
4930078
5168590
5284576
5482424
4949771
5595001
6397693
7071202
7886681
8280819
8414859
8600896
8894250
9083061
9253608
9612471
10203013
11146442
1'2 051916
12791064
13303506
13886488
14330030
14638927
15537181
16294507
17543193
18301659
19046530
01
Source: CM and ASM.
952
953
054
955
56
957
958
4059
Q60
961
q62
963
964
965
066
967
96 P
969
970
971
I72
973
974
975
976
1872001
2002973
2036373
1967958
1975531
2112740
2104427
2060495
2018255
2004811
1973843
2005850
2051107
2195013
2448589
290.3660
3171051
3354520
3427475
3526329
3630085
3803957
4108950
4506613
5094544
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Capital Stock, By
Table 4.6 (Cont.)
State, For All Manufacturin
($000's)
g, 1952-76
Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska
339379.4
362469.6
390887.3
412647.7
433201.8
465231.0
513356.3
554319.8
570748.8
584787.0
665053.0
762672.0
828781.6
903233.3
1035568
1240054
1310270
1405970
1557902
1631135
1731610
1823824
1960357
2045312
2169971
1233050
1359990
1498521
1656073
1826170
1993169
2167089
2325885
2467126
2617476
2799889
2985061
3182395
3422269
3689785
3979013
4218543
4436565
4701343
4939680
5193637
5463097
5795118
6153186
6489704
75115.8
110440.4
130836.7
201319.7
284811.4
295270.0
304833.6
309866.9
316239.3
322743.4
333897.0
359135.9,
386164.1
401733.9
416053.4
463351.9
477687.7
482350.8
497957.0
517505.7
553691.0
580067.5
626298.5
653603.9
684227.7
215374.2
253314.6
290429.4
307843.0
334614.3
403195.0
443827.5
468375.9
490448.7
51P435 .3
548355.7
579843.0
613987.2
653156.7
706665.8
754517.4
795206.0
853989.5
898095.8
940902.5
992542.6
1044593
1116101
1194173
1271394
Source: CM and ASM.
1211274
1253018
1274757
1289767
1319154
1344070
1371947
1392247
1422290
1472153
1517746
1578892
1642401
1692788
1782267
1952
1953
1a54
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1 076
1
1
2
2
2
2
882999
990104
119641
222877
309607
389870
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
2474566
2651892
2e07359
2948230
Table 4.6 (Cont.)
Capital Stock, By State, For All Manufacturing, 1952-76
($000's)
Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York
55624.1
57159.4
58501 .8
60150*1
60962.4
65330.0
65585.2
66057.7
66387.2
64870.4
65720.8
69069.3
71662.0
82267.8
.81842.7
89531.1
94901.4
101198.4
103593.1
111744.4
120197.4
119947.3
127151.2
136002.0
158926.8
185493.5
201182.4
221178.3
243442.6
280021.1
303456.0
325089.9
346653.3
369135.,0
393486.9,
419890.7
445095.4
479451.0
512181.5
573344.1
636059.7
676292.7
753458.1
802898.1
854146.0
917447.2
979583.6
1040101
1093449
1169608
4347402
4478567.
4668086
4810947
5049639
5280411
5408040
5499105
5619669
5729132
5891270
6034300
6141334
6341206
6658896
6992782
7216861
7535331
7768687
7880564
8073273
8240086
8539574
8792983
9016798
5098.6
9330.8,
16275.0
30494.5
42195.2
58862.0
78227.1
89670.9
100638.0
102463.7
102249.0
103162.1
103577.7
106288.9
107386.5
107453.4
108210.3
114297.5
113609.5
135820.3
145931.1
173806.9
254645.2
347010.7
391161.2
7393704
7539967
7.750187
7895035
8147846
8378556
8642908
8778345
8949407
9044971
9203309
9373314
9671944
,10084350
10525457
11038776
11485972
12058290
12465285
12730375
13007158
13322076
13948252
14470866
14999014
Source: CM and ASM.
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1Q61
1962
1963
1 964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1Q76
1952
1953
1954
1955
1950
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
mw 1w
Capital
Table 4.6 (Cont.)
Stock, By State, For All Manufacturing, 1952-76
($000's)
North Carolina North Dakota Ohio - Oklahoma Oregon
56959.2
55382.4
54251.9
52874.1
51529.9
52420.0
58678.9
5P062 .1
57216.6
57674.2
57272.5
61839.2
74531.8
80841.8
82798.4
85606.7
90004.7
90420.3
94894.2
99579.6
108501.0
124824.7
138426.0
154361.0
176371.1
7017112
7590882
8173208
8605538
9375706
10207008
10563880
10773376
11093538
11344045
11602166
11914566
12428746
13133361
14007603
14926285
15779689
16706935
17298598
17516020
17977301
18542648
19427714
19086193
20464599
427767.1
482963.6
521761.5
55'0218.4
579629.1
613530.0
647234.6
700750.5
7324.10.0
742004.5
752530.3
778738.8
801549.7
826749.1
852766.8
886173.7
916984*2
981225.7
1048301
1116294
1225259
1343846
1508162
1669948
1849755
648443.2
710274.7
775324.8
852318.6
934168.8
1021347
1123238
1202797
1293948
1376853
1452233
1 548066
1649453
1829244
2048637
2215887
2338204
2496907
2618127
2733580
2867650
3036967
3248324
3463529
3627169
Source: CM and ASM.
1952
1953
1 954
1955
156
1957
11958
1959
1960
1961
1 962
1963
1 9t,4
1965
1966
1067
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1 973
1074
1975
1 Q76
1635144
1739118
1831105
1965014
2106778
2232466
2734 5622
2493890
2650342
2777386
2962782
3159972
3382907
3740404
4274185
4721284
5098677
.5535020
5889682
6278114
6765256
7255594
7801049
8325883
8 '43602
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
North Carolina
Table 4.6 (Cont.)
Capital Stock, By State, For All Manufacturing, 1952-76
($000' s)
Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee
1952 8033196 4F6858.0 1108125 89223.8 1131687 1952
1q53 P626411 496724.0 1136087 81339.1 1277182 1953
1Q04 9019245 498558.0 1167049 746'63.7 1415234 1954
1Q55 9416112 503008.4 1218688 68847.3 1503768 1955
1P56 9956834 513191.0 1282735 63668.5 1670066 1956
1957 10525659 517367.0 1351223 57822.0 1833335 1957
1918 10910427 515185.2 1375494 55400.5 1977047 1958
1959 11133185 515648.9 1416903 56777.5 2066347 1959
1960 11495293 518953.6 1503324 56600.6 2198753 1960
1961 11742066 529768.9 1600002 59025.9 2306091 1961
1962 11997074 544405.4 1697829 66428.5 2409695 1962
1463 12249385 551903.0 1805403 64682.9 2557297 1963
1964 12532284 562331.2 1952525 65407.8 2749228 1964
1965 13018387 577889.0 2141472 66923.7 3012811 1965
1966 13776359 610156.0 2423244 65067.1 3367750 1966
1967 14678040 639483.8 2705196 63840.4 3616775 1967
1968 15431133 677708.2 2943675 64519.9 3896188 1968
1969 16056424 701462.6 31J3604 61369.1 4181535 1969
1970 16606099 713809.1 3289469 62715.4 4420939 1970
1971 17016884 728247.0 3530794 64341.6 4650413 1971
1Q72 17378862 755087.1 3759661 70246.8 4869817 .1972
1Q73 177L9283 769486.3 4028043 83265.4 5159307 1973
1074 1P384895 799444.8 4440711 92741.1 5597172 1974
1975 18918598 826976.0 4792609 104047.6 5928642 1975
1976 19393248 865328.5 5152990 120813.3 6203523 1976
Source: CM and ASM. (A)
Capital Stock, By
Table 4.6 (Cont.)
State, For All Manufacturing, 1952-76
($000' s)
Texas Utah Vermont Virginia . Washington
281e236
3396509
3934607
4344487
4908625
5698598
6264081
6636323
7083265
7651872
8155378
8632972
9269318
10131121
.11153304
12328937
13498561
14602199
15728929
16708234
17538536
18456889
20333167
22625083
25424145
298000.5
307822.3
327087.8
360331.4
400827.5
424377.0
444229.8
461089.8
481445.1
503201.4
528026.1
542095.7
549253.8
557799.7
590966.9
628162.2
644393.3
668214.2
694949.6
728937.3
757894.9
786293.1
861596.5
923236.6
986996.7
152599.7
154480.2
155369.4
157201.3
160081.4
172281.0
173197.6
178890.8
181364.2
188318.9
195826.6
198688.2
205983.5
226761.4
243639.6
260047.7
277711.9
302119.8
334924.5
350622.8
355245.3
362550.6
386272.5
411742.9
445964.9
977048.5
1109278
1206693
1348804
1499888
1675727
1773594
1839528
1933048
2050028
2166282
2325264
2518305
2750497
3010803
3235036
3427858
3644629
3841853
4049809
4351992
4650284
5038425
5325859
5738534
Source: CM and ASM.
952
954
955
Q56
957
95 9
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
96E
Q69
970
971
972
973
974
975Q76 5
1095195
1198105
1321287
1496803
1674902
1846183
1929088
1961599
2019148
2070825
2162962
2209357
2284355
2414757
2692800
2996922
3189860
3304748
3404812
3529234
3634373
3789735
4003900
,4357026
4587906
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Capital Stock, By
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Table 4.6 (Cont.)
State, For All Manufacturing, 1952-76
($000's)
West Virginia
863118.3
972672.4
1060100
1184575
1362669
1590870
1715081
1764929
1834745
1889766
1994105
2099834
2207462
.2325976
2482462
2649504
2749253
2827751
2936390
.3025334
3089302
3155836
3260894
3397842
3476406
Wisconsin
2264593
2365942
2459265
2548747
2676511
2873446
2947888
3011857
3145639
3224503
3324647
3443617
3577964
3746093
4009899
4284293
4484606
4667514
4817000
4898401
5061425
5321170
5676984
5989519
6290679
Wyoming
152401
164389
166936
167121
174619
179332
180219
178286
183370
187267
184964
192044
199056
201032
209342
209048
209515
209709
206188
203800
213633
217135
221220
227375
238707
Source: CM and ASM.
.2
.8
.1
.9
.4
.0
.7
.0
.0
.9
.2
.8
.5
.7
.8
.6
.4
.0
.7
.5
.4
.9
.0
.9
.6
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
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following reasons. The book value of depreciable assets is the total
purchaseprice of the capital stock. One shortcoming is that the value
of the capital stock varies according to when the capital was purchased.
Older capital stock producing the same level of output as new capital
stock is valued at less, because it was purchased at lower nominal prices.
Since inflation was lower in the 1950's than any decade since 1959 capi-
tal stock values should reflect a more homogenous combination of capital
stock values. In addition since the investment series was converted
into real 1958 dollars, the 1957 nominal capital stock value was most
consistent with the real investment series.
Both sets of capital stock values, generated from the perpetual
inventory method, are presented. Table 4.6 presents the capital stock
series for each state, when the depreciation rate over the period is
assumed to be the annual average depreciation rate for the year 1971.
The result of the capital stock series when the 1958-62 depreciation
rate is assumed to prevail throughout the period is displayed in Appen-
dix VIB. The investment series used in calculating the values in Table
4.6 and Appendix VI.B can be found in Appendix VI.A. A sensitivity
analysis was carried out by conducting all of the empirical work twice,
once with each capital-stock series.
Machinery Industry
The same perpetual inventory method described above was used to
calculate the value of capital-stock series for the machinery industry,
by state. The machinery industry, as defined here, is equivalent to
the manufacturing activities included in SIC code 35.
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The depreciation rates for each state were calculated from the
gross book values of depreciable assets in 1962 and 1963. These statis-
tics are available in the ASM, "Special Geographic Supplement to 1962-64
Data," Table 2, 1972. The 1963 value of capital expenditures (investment)
was taken from the ASM, Table 5, 1963. The results of the solution of
equation 4-3, using these data, are presented in Table 4.7.
Based on the assumption that the 1963 "implied" depreciation rate
prevailed over the period 1957 to 1962, the 1963 gross book value on
depreciable assets (capital), and the real investment series, the machin-
ery industry capital stocks were estimated. The specific data sources
for new capital expenditures (investment) are listed in Table 4.4. The
nominal values were converted to real values with the fixed-investment
non-residential price deflator described above. The real investment
series are displayed in Appendix VII.
The final capital-stock figures for the machinery industry are
displayed in Table 4.8 As can be seen in this table, the span of years
for which the capital-stock series were calculated varies from state to
state. The reason is that the capital stock values for peak years are
to be used in conjunction with a dependent variable. There is no reason
to calculate the independent variables if the data on the dependent vari-
able are missing, and for reasons discussed earlier, data on the severity
of the recessions in the machinery industry are not available for every
state for every post World War II recession.
Textile Industry
The third set of capital stock series was calculated for the
textile industry, SIC code 22. Except for the following differences,
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Table 4.7
Depreciation Rates,
Machinery Industry, By State
Arkansas .017
California .026
Colorado .019
Connecticut .011
Florida .042
Georgia .023
Illinois .013
Indiana .016
Iowa .021
Kentucky .035
Louisiana .033
Maryland .002
Massachusetts .037
Michigan .014
Minnesota .015
Missouri .016
Nebraska .004
New Hampshire .023
New Jersey .015
New York .039
North Carolina .030
Ohio .022
Oklahoma .029
Oregon .048
Pennsylvania .014
Rhode Island .063
South Carolina .014
Tennessee .020
Texas .025
Vermont .009
Virginia .023
Washington .013
West Virginia .007
Wisconsin .035
Table 4.8
Capital Stock, Machinery Industry, By
for States Included in Machinery Industry($000' s)
Year
Analysis
Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut
1963 16361.0 585037.0 31403.0 490316.0 1963
1964 17427.9 622179.4 32552.5 514923.2 1964
1965 18650.6 673442.4 41901.9 547399.1 1965
1966 22649.4 751122.2,. 71044.4 603372.9 1966
1967 24960.1 870712.3 80910.3 659791.3 1967
1966 26751.0 965186.0 95024.5 710907.9 196b
1969 30526.6 1064039. 103534.7 753697.9 1969
1970 33313.3 1169259 114767.7 783508.2 1970
1971 37959.4 1253149 127542.6 803776.5 1971
1972 4118&.1 1331759 137042.3 823983.0 1972
Florida Georgia Illinois Indiana Iowa
1963 38073.0 49216.0 157449.0 394567.0 295337.0 1963
1964 42880.7 50580.9 273964.1 419727.6 317898.0 1964
1965 45263.7 ,53954.5 445166.3 463353.5 348237.6 1965
1966 51428.9 55120.3 605878.2 511726.7 381087,3 1966
1967 63264.7 60294.8. 759610.7 565181.1 435497.0 1967
1968 77105.6 63990.3 898671.9 604279.9 464817.7 1968
1969 91494.0. 69484.8 1027640 641501.1 484150.5 1969
1970 109061.5 72697.6 1163896 680072.4 515284.4 1970
1971 121773.9 81561.4 1289044 710418.4 533193.8 1971
1972 130388.6 88535.4 1410181 755426.5 569024.8 1972
Source: Census of Manufactures and Annual Survey of Manufactures.
W
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Table 4.8 (Cont.)
Capital Stock, Machinery Industry, By Year
for States Included in Machinery Industry Analysis
($000' s)
Kentucky Louisiana Maryland Massachusetts Michigan
1958 .161893.1
1959 161803.5
1960 162257.0
1961 164408.5
1962 170051.5
1963 175798.0 17546.0 79496.0 397452.0 981991.0 1963
1964 186142.9 18888.7 84210.2 412891.9 1047468 1964
1965 195640.9 20365.-1 95091.1 431082.3 1136909 1965
1966 216765.7 22779.4 106960.8 4o9224.8 1249543 1966
1967 231380.0 . 25720.2 118239.1 500248.3 1386113 1967
1968 247127.1 27182.2 128215.4 526049.6 1489613 1968
1969 259948.3 29388.2 136983.3 558082.7 1593081 1969
1970 275272.9 35038.3 154067.3 606795.6 1668041 1970
1971 293582.1 38446.3 153832.5 629369.3 1709573 1971
1972 322831.9 43287.6 166920.3 661040.1 176506 1972
Source: CM and ASM.
o.
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Table 4.8 (Cont.)
Capital Stock, Machinery Industry, By Year
for States Included in Machinery Industry Analysis
($000's)
Minnesota Missouri Nebraska New Hampshire New Jersey
1963 266595.0 157101.0 24159.0 56616.0 440995.0 1963
1904 284677.4 167h87.5 24714.1 59411.3 466171.4 1964
1965 310933.8 178819.0 28497.7 60831.2 497258.3 1965
1966 340457.6 189287.7 32583.1 67801.2 526423.0 1966
1967 374047.1 217541.4 38731.1 77381.6 575480.0 196?
1968 401457.7 229423.4 47930.1 81141.4 610056.7 1968
1969 440801.7 .239944.8 60005.2 84811.8 -653588.9 1969
1970 474819.4 258657.5 70659.5 90550.1 681757.7 1970
1971 505774.9 268730.7 79020.1 9962b.3 703205.3 1971
1972 533790.0 7974?.6 88143.6 111616.8 741076.1 1972
Source: CM and ASM.
Table 4.8 (Cont.)
Capital Stock, Machinery Industry, By Year
for States Included in Machinery Industry Analysis
($000's)
New York North Carolina Ohio Oklahoma Oregon
1957 824018.5 1046350 62302.9
195b 861633.2 1106141 63791.2
1959 886679.0 1150397 64032.2
1960 929930.4 1213555 65099.1
1961 969816.3 1255040 64810.0
1962 998373.1 1300459 66417.5
1963 1030708 64703.0 1351756 69795.0 37317.0 1963
1964 1079567 70834.1 1430300 79265.3 37657.4 1964
195 1160641 76455.9 1527824 84391.6 41269.3 1965
1966 1229451 77228.6 1651511 93705.4 44976.5 1966
1967 1299973 99137.6 1777117 100647.0 49178.7 1967
1968 1347478 138016.0 1891567 108071.0 49356.6 1968
1969 1434793 136043.0 2010331 117007.5 49980.8 1969
1970 1482026 136696.4 2103833 124012.9 55554.4 1970
1971 1514683 157880.0 2171029 128364.0 56906.4 1971
1972 1568687 188642.1 22.55649 156108.8 58169.3 1972
Source: CM and ASM.
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Table 4.8 (Cont.)
Capital Stock, Machinery Industry, By Year
for States Included in Machinery Industry Analysis
($000's)
Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina Tennessee Texas
1963 920594.0 62851.0 61537.0 69108.0 307602.O 1963
1964 981903.1 67348.5 64972.5 72439.3 327269.6 1964
1965 1047621 68507.6 73241.6 78960.4 348639.4 1965
1966 1110412 78715.9 73883.0 87329.3 375337.3 1966
1967 1223324 80260.5 81453.0 106475.9 407074.3 1967
1968 1322586 83840.0 88381.5 127208.1 444727.2 1968
1969 1440929 84860.2 94606.2 138934.7 445722.9 1969
1970 1528677 82475.0 114153.7 148940.8 487268.0 1970
1971 1596484 80255.0 165724.2. 165873.2 524902.9 1971
1972 1652126 7Q178.9 1R9660.3 180U?.7 5610640 1972-
Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin
1963 39364.0 35307.0 36473.0 20008.0 642197.0 1963
1964 41355.5 38296.9 38473.1 20989.9 662078.9 1964
1965 43734.6 42572.9 ,40785.7 21945.0 697967.2 1965
1966 46639.2 42103.2 44256.8 23038.8 776324.3 1966
1967 50963.9 48518.1 50616.9 25478.9 854312.9 1967
1968 54149.5 54830.7 55175.6 28021.4 902283.6 1968
1969 60637.8 66198.6 58388.4 30017.6 950441.9 1969
1Q70 63914.1 73388.1 61729.2 30956.5, 967984.8 1970
1971 65520.7 81054.5 63305.3 34918.7 984021.8 1971
1972 , 69209.4 88399.9 66382.2 37392.8 1006619 1972
Source: CM and ASM.
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these series were calculated in the same manner as the earlier capital
stock series.
The rates of depreciation were calculated for the year 1963.
That means that depreciable assets for 1962 and 1963 were used as Kt
and Kt-1 respectively, in equation 4-3. New capital expenditures on
investment in 1963 was set equal to It. The depreciable assets data
came from the ASM, "Special Geographical Supplement to 1962-64 Data,"
1972, and the figures on 1963 investment in textile industries were
taken from the ASM, 1963.
The 1963 depreciation rates, which are assumed to prevail through-
out the period, are shown in Table 4.9. As can be seen from this table,
there are only twenty-five states for which depreciation rates were cal-
culated. This is either because not all states have a textile industry,
or because data are missing and the capital stock series did not need
to be or could not be calculated.
In computing calculating the textile industry's capital stock
series for each state, the 1963 book values of depreciable assets were
used as the base period capital stock values. The nominal investment
series were deflated by the non-residential fixed-assets price deflator
described earlier to calculate real investment. The real investment
series are displayed in Appendix VIII while the final capital stock series
are displayed in Table 4.10.
Limitations of Capital Stock Data
The book value of depreciable assets is the total purchase price
of the capital stock. While this measure is a satisfactory measure of
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Table 4.9
Depreciation Rates,
Textile Industry, By State
Alabama .017
Arkansas .017
Connecticut .012
Delaware .055
Georgia .043
Illinois .029
Indiana .069
Maine .082
Maryland .007
Massachusetts .056
Michigan .006
Mississippi .007
Missouri .010
New Hampshire .011
New Jersey .011
New York .008
North Carolina .008
Ohio .026
Pennsylvania .030
Rhode Island .003
South Carolina .015
Tennessee .024
Texas .004
Virginia .015
Wisconsin .003
w 1w1
Table 4.10
Textile Industry, Capital Stock, By Year,
for States Included in Textile Industry Analysis
($000' s)
Alabama Arkansas Connecticut Delaware Georgia
1956 189632.3 579566.0 1956
1957 199131.1 589673.3 1957
1958 202739.4 592112.4 1958
1959 209532.5 18441.9 7370.6 601555.6 1959
1960 .221378.7 18961.2 7798.1 612298.1 1960
1961 235040.8 19747.2 8477.5 625233.3 1961
1962 ?37494.6 21046.5 9646.2 646567.3 1962
19o3 250170.0 22778.0 90808.0 11205,0 654323.0 1963
1964 268506.6 24467.3 93904.9 12665.3 703012.0 1964
1965 301547.5 26432.7 98765.7 14350.0 749605.5 1965
190b 332727.9 28001.4 104215.8 15578.9 822074.9 1966
1967 36630o.5 30667.5 110776.3 17864.4 892399.9 1967
1968 391228.3 32614.5 114808.7 19350.0 951728.8 1968
1969 413195.3 37263.4 120341.5 23489.0 1028040 1969
1970 434619.2 40162.9 126424.3 25730.1 1078151 1970
1971 453326.0 46376.7 135912.4 31211.5 1100756 1971
1972 475562.2 49384.8 142447.6 33291.4 1143037 1972
Source: Census of Manufactures and Annual Survey of Manufactures.
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Table 4.10 (Cont.)
Textile Industry, Capital Stock, By Year ,
for States Included in Textile Industry Analysis
($000' s)
Maryl and
57321.3
59516.3
61627.6
66596.3
70526.1
74211.1
78691 .7
81793.3
84628.6
Massachusetts
16 ed r90 0 U
170008.2
180146.4
192119.9
204204.8
21564 .8
232405.4
249973.8
276307.5
305278.0
Michigan Mississippi Missouri New Hampshire New Jersey
196t3 33595.0 4886.0 65214.0 18867.0 244807.0 1963
1964 34453.3 4991.9 67113.3 19442.1 242606.9 1964
1965 34681.8 4996.6 70427.0 21465.9 245698.3 1965
1966 35606.7 4962.2 73643.9 21665.0 252173.3 1966
1967 36563.9 4799..3 76915.4 22860.1 248646.0 1967
1968 36950.4 4893.7 80300.1 23721.3 250040.9 1968
1969 39130.9 4881.3 83641.5 24530.9 252542.7 1969
1970 41145.1 5005.3 87657.4- 25o64.9 249921.1 1970
1971 43106.7 6053.9 94072.8 26585.7 238053.1 1971
1972 44B65. 5922.?7 100125.4 27044.3 244636.2 1972
Source: CM and ASM.
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964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
Illinoi s
26745.0
28535.7
31616.1
38154.3
41247.3
43553.0
46543.8
48875.9
50490.2
51619.9
Indiana
39805.3
41672.8
46873.0
51134.7
52752. 0
54255.1
58021.7
65065.6
69966.0
74204.0
Maine
9835.3
0298.0
0748.5
1090.0
1574.8
2922.5
3330.9
3417.7
3426.8
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1964
1965
1966
1967
1966
1969
1970
1971
1972
1--A
Table 4.10 (Cont.)
Textile Industry, Capital Stock, By Year,
in Textile
($000's)
for States Included Industry Analysis
New York North Carolina Ohio Pennsylvania Rhode Island
1956 164504.2 39324.7
1957 176451.7 41769.1
1956 19364b.1 43288 .1
1959 205709.5, 45096.0
19bO 216729.5 46840.9
1961 231932.3 49715.9
1962 243466.0 50596.2
1963 2569t1.3 1475693 54761..0 345285.0 126869.0 1963
19L4 270623.7 1596961 56720.0 358012.o 132623.3 1Y64
1965 290714.2 1766624 62384.3 374287.3 143447.h 1965
1966 311402.1 2032771 71463.8 391748.4 151972.0 1966
1967 334588.7 2216455 75800.7 405314.6 161033.0 1967
19t8 355571.6 2376343 77319.3 421921.2 177571.2 1968
1969 371914.9 2555541 80593.5 448125.3 198095.4 1969
1970 387371.9 2713361' 6 3183.2 4o7707.7 2342t0.0 1970
1971 423377.8 2890407 84101.9 488819.5 211350.8 1971
1972 462899.1 3144074 68646.8 510687.9 221246.8 1972
Source: CM and ASM.
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Table 4.10 (Cont.)
Textile Industry, Capital Stock, By Year,
for States Included in Textile Industry Analysis
($000' s)
South Carolina Tennessee Texas Virginia Wisconsin
1956 931042.5 207131.5
1957 961947.1 216755.8
1958 977866.9 220537.5
1959 1009589 227891.9
1.60 1057096 238078.0
1961 1093542 248914.0
1962 1153553 260451.2
1963 1220411 165811.0 47957.0 27218b.0 28796.0 19y6.
1964 1311573 174640.4 50207.4 290644.9 30694.3 1964
1965 1417914 16363o.5 54636.7 319854.8 32643.8 1965
1966 1571481 197488.5 62257.7 347189.4 35593.1 1966
1Y67 1685726 207670.7 66649.9 364966.0 38628.7 1967
1968 1728525 229362.3 79981.8 389363.b 41236.2 1968
19Y69 1798207 252948.8 82506.1 410352.6 44852.4 1969
1t70 1875612 268021.9 83794..7 423859.4 50094.1 1970
1q71. 1944323 286729.0 89486.1 442079.6 52511.7 1971
1972 2031060 296180.1 92083.0 492325.2 54145.0 1972
Source: CM and ASM.
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capital services, there are at least two important shortcomings of the
data. One is that the value of the capital stock varies according to
when the capital was purchased. Older capital stock producing the same
level of output as new capital stock is valued at less because it was
purchased at lower nominal prices. Because inflation was low during the
1950's, this problem should only begin to seriously affect the data in
the 1960's and 1970's. The expected bias for the last three recessions
is that the capital stock will be overestimated in the rapidly growing
states where the capital is relatively new. Counteracting the overestim-
ation of the new capital stock is the fact that newer capital embodies
more capital, because it is more productive and efficient. It is too
much to hope that these effects will exactly cancel each other.
The second shortcoming of the data is that there are bound to be
sampling errors in the original base year capital stock values. The data
on gross book value of depreciable assets are derived from a sampling of
individual establishments. Thus there are bound to be differences between
the estimates and the values obtained if a total census is taken. CM
notes the probability of the true estimates falling outside of a two
percent range on either side of the published value in two out of ever-
three cases. The number in brackets represents a percent range around
the estimated book value. The probability that the true value will fall
within this percentage range is 66%. Thus the higher the number in
brackets, the less reliable the 1957 base-year value of the capital stock.
The states are listed in declining order of the unreliability of the
estimates: Wyoming (40), North Dakota (12), Oregon (12), Utah (10),
Vermont (10), South Dakota (9), Tennessee (9), New Mexico (9), Nevada (6),
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Maine (6), Idaho (5), Montana (5), Pennsylvania (5), Nebraska (5),
California (5), Rhode Island (4), and Washington (4) (CM, 1958: 9-46 -
9-29).
A third problem is that the capital stock data should be adjusted
for utilization rates. Since the capital-stock value is the numerator
of the capital-labor ratio, the failure to adjust for utilization will
interject a bias. For example, in states where capital utilization is
high, the capital-labor ratio will be underestimated because the pro-
portion of labor applied to the capital stock will be overestimated.
Because capital-intensive operations tend to have higher capital utiliza-
tion rates, high capital-labor ratio states will have a downwardly biased
ratio, while low capital-labor ratio states will have an upwardly biased
ratio.
The capital-stock values described here were used in the calcula-
tion of two variables, the age of the capital stock and capital-labor
ratios. We turn now to them.
Capital-Labor Ratios
Capital-labor ratios were calculated for each peak year. The denom-
inator of the ratio is the total number of employees in each state in
all-manufacturing for the all-industry equation, in the machinery industry
for the machinery equations, and the textile industry for the textile
equations.
The employment data for the peak years 1952, 1956, 1969, 1968,
and 1972 were taken from ASM and the CM. The total manufacturing employ-
ment for each state for 1952 and 1956 are from the ASM, Table 3, 1952
and the ASM, Table 3, 1956 respectively. The total number of manufacturing
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employees for 1959 and 1968 from the ASM, Table A, 1968-69, and the 1972
data is from the CM, Volume III, Area Statistics, Table 5, 1972.
The total number of employees in machinery and textile manufactur-
ing in each state were taken from the following sources: the 1956 data
was from the ASM, Table 3, 1956; the 1959 data from the ASM, Table 2,
1959-60; the 1968 data from the ASM, Table 3, 1968; and the 1972 data
from the CM, Volume III, Area Statistics, Table 5, 1972.
The numerators of the capital-labor ratios are the capital-stock
values taken from series described earlier. The final capital-labor
ratios represent the capital stock in thousands of dollars per employee.
The original 1957 estimate of the gross book value of depreciable
assets is highly unreliable for the state of Wyoming. The probability
that the true value falls within a 40 percent range above or below the
estimated value is 66 percent. Consequently the results of the capital-
labor ratio calculations, which indicate Wyoming has the highest ratio of
any other state for all five peak years are highly suspect, and Wyoming was,
therefore, eliminated from the sample.
Age of the Capital Stock
The age of the capital stock was calculated for each state for all
industries, the machinery industry and the textile industry. The age-of-
capital variable is roughly equivalent to the proportion of a state's
capital stock put into place within the last two or three years. The data
sources and specific procedure for calculating this variable are described
below.
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All Manufacturing
The age of the capital stock for the all-industry equations were
calculated in two ways.
(It-2 + It-1 + It
Kt
where I = real investment, K = capital stock, t = a peak year, and
K t)(4-5)
t
The peak years are 1952, 1956, 1959, 1968, and 1972.
While equation 4-4 is the preferred measurement of the capital
stock's age, one piece of information is missing for the first recession.
Not until 1951 did the CM or ASM begin to collect state data on new capi-
tal expenditures. Therefore, 1950 investment figures are not available
to calculate equation 4-4 for the 1953-55 recession. In order to permit
a combined cross-section time-series for all five recessions, 4-5 is the
equation used to calculate the all-industry age-of-capital-stock variable.
The investment data are the same as those used to calculate the
original capital-stock values. The sources can be found for the corres-
ponding year in Table 4.3. The nominal investment data were converted
into real 1958 values using the GNP fixed investment price deflator
cited earlier.
Machinery and Textile Industry
Equation 4-4 was used to calculate the ages of the machinery and
textile industries' capital stocks. As mentioned earlier the absence
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of monthly employment data from which to calculate the dependent vari-
ables for the 1952-55 and 1956-53 recessions meant that the age variables
were only required for the last three recessions. Thus, it was possible
to use 3 years of investment in the numerator. The sources of invest-
ment data for the textile and machinery industries can be found in Table
4.4.
Unionization
All Manufacturing
Data on the percent of the labor force unionized by state and
by state-by-industry are needed to test the hypothesis that union
membership has an impact on the severity of a state's recession. Un-
fortunately, these data are not published on a regular basis. The
of available data and the manner in which these data were adjusted to
get the percent of the labor force unionized in peak years will now be
described.
The percent of the non-agricultural labor force unionized by
state is available for the years 1939, 1953, 1958, 1960, 1964, 1966,
1968, 1970, and 1972. The 1953 data were obtained from the Statistical
Abstract of the United States, 1957, Table No. 277, p. 31, and adjusted
to a 1952 level by subtracting .3 percent from the total 1953 percentage
for each state. The adjustment of .3 percent was chosen because statis-
tics show that union membership showed slow but steady gains until 1956
(Cohany, 1961: 1302). Therefore, it is assumed that union membership
in 1952 was slightly lower than that of 1953. The trend of unionization
from 1939 to 1953 shows an .8 percent annual increase in the percent of
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non-agricultural unionized labor (Statistical Abstract, 1957: 231).
Since the growth in labor movements was substantially greater in the
period 1939 to 1945 (Cohany, 1961: 1302), the figure of .8 percent has
to be an upper bound. The number of .3 percent was selected on an ad
hoc basis as the annual percent addition to the unionized labor force
from 1952 to 1953.
The percent of the labor force unionized in 1956 and 1959 was
obtained by extrapolating between 1953 and 1960. The 1960 data on union-
ization by state were taken from the Statistical Abstract, 1962, Table
No. 322, page 242. Unfortunately, these data include only estimated
membership in the AFL-CIO, rather than the percent of non-agricultural
employment. Therefore, before the data could be extrapolated between
1953 and 1960, the 1960 data had to be adjusted upwards.
The 1960 data were adjusted by estimating the total proportion
of the unionized labor force in the AFL-CIO for 1968. The percentage
of the total unionized labor force in the AFL-CIO in 1968 was assumed
to prevail in 1960. The extrapolation between the 1953 and the 1960
data was straightforward except that an adjustment was made for the
knowledge that 1956 was the peak year for union membership.
The 1968 data on all non-agricultural employee and AFL-CIO
union membership by state were taken from pages 76 and 77 of the Directory
of National and International Labor Unions in the U.S., 1969, Bureau of
Labor Statistics Bulletin 1665, Department of Labor, 1970. The 1972
percent of the non-agricultural labor force that is unionized was taken
from the Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations, 1973,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, 1974, page 84.
162
Machinery Industry
Most workers in the machinery industry covered by bargaining
agreements are represented by the Machinists (IAM), Auto Workers (UAW),
or the Steel Workers (USA). Unfortunately, data on the membership in
these and other smaller unions, by state, are scant. However, some
usable data are available. Data on the proportion of machinery estab-
lishments with collective bargaining agreements covering a majority of
their plant workers can be found in the publications Industry Wage
Survey--Machinery Manufacturing for Winter 1970-71, B.L.S. Bulletin
1754, U.S. Department of Labor, 1972, and Industry Wage Survey--Manu-
facturing for September-November 1968, B.L.S. Bulletin 1664, U.S.
Department of Labor, 1970. These sources present the results of two
surveys taken in approximately twenty-two metropolitan areas. The
union membership for these SMSA's were applied to the corresponding
state, for the years 1967 and 1972. For five states there are two
SMSA's included in the study. They are New York City and Buffalo for
New York, San Francisco-Oakland and Los Angeles-Orange County for
California, Boston and Worcester for Massachusetts, Dallas and Houston
for Texas, and Pittsburgh and Philadelphia for Pennsylvania. For these
states a weighted average of the two SMSA's was used as the state level
unionization rate. Because these data are only available for areas in
16 states in 1972, one regression equation was run using only the obser-
vations for which these unionized data are available. The regression
included the following states in 1972: California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota, New
York, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
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Wisconsin.
In 1968, the data are available only for New York and Ohio.
Because of the inadequacies of these data, the state-level union rates,
described in the all-industry section, are also used in the machinery
equation in place of the SMSA data.
Textiles
The major unions in the textile industry are the Textile Workers
Union of America and the United Textile Workers of America, both AFL-CIO
affiliates. Approximately two fifths of the workers in New England and
the Middle Atlantic states and one-eighth of the workers in the South-
east were covered by union contracts in 1971 (Industry Wage Survey,
1974: 2). Unfortunately, no more specific textile industry union data
by state could be located. As a second-best strategy, the state union
totals described in the section on all manufacturing are used in the
machinery and textile industry equations.
Unemployment Insurance Benefits
The unemployment insurance benefits are included in the equation
to test the impact of unemployment insurance on cyclical employment.
The measure of benefits used in this study is the ratio of average weekly
benefit amount to the average weekly total wage. These figures were
obtained for all states for the peak years of 1952, 1956, 1954, 1968,
and 1972.
More specifically, the variable was calculated in the following
manner. The numerator is equivalent to the benefits paid for total
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unemployment during the year divided by the number of weeks for which
benefits were paid. Payments for partial unemployment are excluded
altogether.
The denominator of the ratio was derived as follows. The total
wages paid, on a one-year period, to all private, public, and non-profit
organization employees covered by unemployment insurance. This figure
includes cash bonuses, the cash value of meals, lodging, tips, and any
other gratuities. Deferred compensation, such as retirement, stock
bonus plans, and life or health insurance benefits, is not included.
This figure is divided by the twelve-month average of covered employees
times 52 weeks.
The source of these data for all of the five peak years for all
states is the Handbook of Unemployment Insurance, Financial Data 1938-76,
United States Department of Labor, 1978. The state rates were used in
the machinery, textile, and all industry equations.
Unemployment Rates
The sixth variable used in the equations is the insured unemployed
for the peak years for each state. This variable measures the extent
to which a shortage or surplus of labor in boom periods influences lay-
off patterns during periods of economic slowdown.
The insured unemployment rates were taken from the Manpower Report
of the President. The 1952, 1956, and 1959 data came from Table D-5,
page 236 of the 1964 publication. The 1968 and 1972 data were obtained
from Table D-5, page 208 of the 1973 edition. The total state rates
were used in all-industry equation as well as the two industry-specific
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equations.
The data sources and the manner in which they were calculated
have been documented. Before turning to the test of the formal model,
empirical regularities in the data will be explored in Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES
There are a number of interesting preliminary empirical findings
from the data that deserve attention before proceeding to the results of
the formal model. The purpose of this chapter is to present these note-
worthy results. The first section of Chapter Five focuses on the all-
industry data. In this section the questions of whether state cycles
are becoming more alike with time and whether a cyclically sensitive
state is always volatile while a cyclically stable state is always stable
will be considered. Finally, cross-regional comparisons of the business
cycle, capital-labor ratios, and age of the capital stocks will be made.
These data will be summarized, as well as checked for consistency with
other data on regional trends.
The second and third sections of this chapter will describe the
preliminary findings for the machinery and textile industries, respec-
tively. Again, the regions that tend to have cyclically sensitive indus-
tries will be identified and the capital-labor ratios and age-of-capital-
stock data will be analyzed by region. We now turn to the all-industry
data.
All Industries
The trend-adjusted and absolute measures of the severity of state
recessions were averaged for each recession. These mean measures of
cyclical amplitude, as well as standard deviations provide some basis
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with which to compare the severity of the five post World War II reces-
sions as well as an opportunity to check the data used in this thesis
for consistency with other empirical findings.
Table 5.1 and 5.2 display the mean state severity measures for
each recession. The values of Table 5.1 are trend-adjusted, while those
of Table 5.2 are not. Calculation of the trend-adjusted and absolute
measures of cyclical severity were discussed in some detail in Chapter
Four, and therefore will not be reiterated here. In addition to the
mean values, the standard deviations and minimum and maximum values
are also displayed.
Two observations are worth noting from Tables 5.1 and 5.2. First,
the difference between the trend-adjusted and unadjusted results are sub-
stantial. Not only are the mean amplitudes and standard deviations dif-
ferent, but the states identified as hard hit and moderately affected
vary depending on which severity indicator is used. For example, in
the 1953-54 recession the trend-adjusted data suggest that Oregon was hit
hardest with a 6.6 percent deviation from its employment trend. However,
when the data are not adjusted for secular trends Indiana appears to have
been hardest hit with an absolute amplitude of 10.3. When the data are
not adjusted for trend the severity of the recessions in the fast-growing
states is underestimated while the measures for the slow-growth states
are overestimated. The failure to distinguish between the two measures
has, at times, led to faulty conclusions.
For example, there was a great deal of consternation about the
harshness with which the 1973-75 recession affected the Northeast, and,
in terms of absolute severity, it was true. New England experienced
168
the greatest percentage decline in employment. As shown in Table 5.8,
the percentage decline for the Northeast was 4.6. The next most severe
recession was felt in the Southern states with a percentage decline of
3.8.
However, if the data are adjusted for trend as shown in Table 5.7,
the rankings change dramatically. The South now appears to have suffered
the greatest employment loss, with the North second and the Northeast
ranking third. Thus, from looking at the trend adjusted data we might
conclude that the Northeast was relatively resilient in the 1973-75
recession.
A second point of interest from Tables 5.1 and 5.2 is that the
1973-75 recession appears to have been milder than the 1953-54 and
1957-58 recessions. This finding is in accordance with national data.
Although the 1973-75 downturn was the most severe post-World War II
recession in terms of GNP losses, it was much more moderate than earlier
recessions in terms of employment declines. Employment declined by only
1.3 percent nationally during the 1973-75 recession, whereas declines
in employment during the recessions of the early 1950's ranged from 3.1
to 4.2 percent nationally. The small employment increases during the
1975-76 economic recovery suggests that "labor hoarding" may have been
responsible for the uncharacteristically moderate employment decline
during the downturn (McNees, 1978: 53). Further exploration of the
reasons for relatively mild employment reductions during the 1973-75
recession are beyond the scope of this thesis.
The severity measures are carried out to the two digit level in
Tables 5.1, 5.2, and elsewhere in this chapter. This captures
wTable 5.1
Average Trend-Adjusted Severity for Each Recession
(Percentages)
Recession 1953-54 1957-58 1960-61 1969-70 1973-75
Mean 2.48 2.47 1.48 .87 2.16
S.D. 1.424 .864 .817 .801 .967
Minimum .0 1.19 .0 .0 .12
(Florida, Nevada, (South (Nevada, South (Arizona, Florida (Washington)
North Dakota) Carolina) Dakota) Idaho, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland,
Montana, Nevada,
North Carolina,
North Dakota)
Maximum 6.64 4.72 3.00 3.09 
4.28
(Oregon) (Ohio) (Nebraska) (Virginia) (South Carolina)
n = 33 n = 35 n = 37 n = 40 n = 47
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Data. See Chapter 4 for computations.
Table 5.2
Average Absolute Severity for
(Percentages)
Each Recession
Recession 1953-54 1957-58 1960-61 1969-70 1973-75
Mean 3.74 4.01 2.02 1.14 3.36
S.D. 2.265 2.560 1.426 1.504 2.135
.00 .00 .00 .00 .04
Minimum (Arizona) (Arizona) (Arizona) (Arizona, Colorado, (North Dakota)
Kentucky, New Mexico,
South Carolina)
Maximum 10.26 10.28 5.29 7.13 7.64
(Indiana) (West Virginia) (Ohio) (Washington) (Rhode Island)
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Data. See Chapter 4 for computations.
I.
0
1W
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subtle differences cross-state differences in the severity of reces-
sions, and while the numbers are small, it should be remembered that
a small percentage change in employment is a large change in the total
number of jobs.
One question of interest to regional economists has been: Are
the regions' cycles becoming more alike with time? Borts addressed
this question in his study of manufacturing employment cycles. His
results, using data on five recessions over the period 1914 to 1953,
suggested that the variation in state cycles was diminishing with time.
Borts attributed this diminishing variation to the observation that
states formerly specializing in highly cyclical industries were diver-
sifying (Borts, 1960: 174). Thus Borts suggests that a growing simi-
larity in state's industry structure was leading to a similarity in
business cycles. Borts also notes that the decline in the variation
of state's cycles may have been due to the mildness of the later reces-
sions of his study (Borts, 1960: 152).
The question of whether states' cycles are becoming alike with
time was also addressed by Dick Syron (1978). Syron's results contra-
dicted those of Borts. In a 1978 paper in the New England Economic
Review, Syron examined the question of whether regional responses to
national economic fluctuations were becoming more or less alike over
time. Syron hypothesized that regional cycles would become more similar
because advances in communications and transportation were resulting
in increased integration of regional economies.
Using both trend-adjusted and unadjusted data for the five re-
cessions between 1948 and 1973, Syron calculated indices of amplitude
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for nine regions and five recessions. An index number greater that 100
meant that an area suffered a more severe employment loss during a re-
cession than the nation as a whole. A number less than 100 signified
a more moderate employment loss. He then calculated standard deviations
of these regional indices for each recession. Comparing the statistics
of variation over time, Syron concluded that there has been no converg-
ence in the pattern of regional cycles. The most variation among regions
occurred in the 1970-71 recession and the least in the 1948-49 recession
(Syron, 1978: 25-34).l
The hypothesis tested by Syron was repeated in this study with
three exceptions. First, state-level data was used, in contrast to
Syron's nine region geographical breakdown. Second, this study included
data on five recessions between 1950 and 1975, whereas Syron's study
included the five recessions between 1948 and 1973, and finally, this
study calculated the standard deviations of actual trend-adjusted
severity measures, whereas Syron calculated the standard deviations of
indices.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 contain the results of the mean amplitudes
and standard deviations calculated from state data. To review, the
amplitudes in Table 5.1 were adjusted for secular trends while the
data in Table 5.2 were not.
The more the states' recessions are alike, the smaller the
standard deviation will be. Therefore, if cycles were becoming more
1The same test was done at the 9 census region level in Howland
(1979), "The Regional Business Cycle and Long Run Regional Growth."
The findings were similar to Syron's.
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similar with time we would expect the standard deviations to decrease
with time. As indicated in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, this is not the case.
Looking at the trend-adjusted data we see that the greatest variation
was in the 1953-54 recession and the second largest deviation was in
the 1973-75 recession. While these statistics do not match Syron's for
the smallest and largest variations, the conclusion is the same. There
is no tendency for states to become more alike in their recessions.
In contrast to Borts hypothesis that mild natural recessions
are associated with small differences in regional cycles. The data
in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 indicate that there is no clear relationship.
Although the most severe national recession, in terms of employment
loss, was in 1953-54 and the state recessions showed the least similar-
ity in that year, the second most severe national recession, in terms
of employment loss, was in 1957-58 where the standard deviation ranked
third largest. However the remaining standard deviations do seem to
be positively associated with the severity of the national recessions
that is, as the lower the severity, the lower the standard deviations
for the 1960-61 and 1969-70 recessions.
This chapter now turns to the question of whether there is a con-
sistent pattern of states' cyclical sensitivity, that is, is a state's
amplitude of a constant ranking relative to all other states in each
recession. For example, is Michigan's employment loss among the most
severe in every recession and is Arizona relatively stable in all reces-
sions?
This question was posed for several reasons. First of all, one
of the purposes of this study is to inform countercyclic policy. If
states' relative amplitudes are similar in all recessions then the
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targeting of money to the most needy areas is a simpler matter. The
states with a relatively severe fluctuation in the next recession. In
such a case, a more sophisticated theory of regional business cycles is
not crucial for policy-making.
The second reason for exploring this question was to delve deeper
into the hypothesis put forward in Chapter Three. State rankings of
relative amplitudes may remain constant because both industry compositions
within states and the relative amplitudes of national industries are con-
stant over time. Or a similar ranking of state recessions may occur be-
cause the rankings of other significant explanatory variables have varied
little over the period under study.
The hypothesis was put forward that the probability of a state
experiencing a severe, an above average, a below average, or a mild re-
cession was independent of the state's performance in the previous re-
cession. In order to test this hypothesis, the states were given ordinal
rankings for each recession. These rankings were then divided into four
equal sized categories, withanyodd numbers distributed evenly among the
top categories first. The top quartile of the ranked states was classi-
fied as having experienced a relatively severe recession, and the states
in second, third, and fourth quartiles were characterized as having ex-
perienced an above-average, below-average, or a mild recession, respec-
tively.
The states were then further categorized by the percent of the
recessions in which they fell in each category. The results are dis-
played in Table 5.3. So that, for example, Indiana only appears in
the table once because in all five recessions, or 100 percent of the
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cases, Indiana experienced a severe recession. The greater the number
of states in all four column categories, in the 100th or 80 percent
rows, the more consistent are states' behavior across recessions.
As noted in Table 5.3, data were missing for several states.
The states with less than five observations are noted by putting in
parentheses the number of available observations.
Table 5.4 is a contingency table and the figure within each cell
represents the number of states that would be expected to fall in each
category if the probability of falling into any of the four severity
categories was equally likely and the pattern of state rankings were
independent of the pattern in preceding recessions. It should be noted
that the states for which there were less than five observations were
eliminated from the contingency table and the statistical test. The
inclusion of these states posed major complications in calculating the
contingency table and did not seem justified by the small number of addi-
tional observations.
A log likelihood ratio test2 was used to test whether the
actual frequencies displayed in rows 1 and 2 of Table 5.3 (minus the
noted observations) were significantly different from the expected
frequencies displayed in rows 1 and 2 of Table 5.4. The test included
only the first two rows, because if a state falls into the 100 percent or
2Namboodiri, N.K., et al., Applied Multivariate Analysis and
Experimental Designs, p. 387-390. The log likelihood test statistic
is equivalent to Obs..
Q = Y Y 2 Obs.. ln lx
ii 1a Exp.
where i = rows, j = columns,
Obs = observed frequencies, Exp = expected frequencies.
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Table 5.3
Trend-Adjusted Severity for All States
The percent of times a state fell into each category.
Above Average Below Average
Maine (1)
Massachusetts (1
New Hampshire (1
New Jersey (1)
))
Connecticut (1) Oklahoma (3)
Washington (1)
Ohio Illinois Alabama Nevada
New Mexico (4)
Delaware Maryland Minnesota Arizona
Kentucky Missouri North Dakota Florida
Rhode Island Pennsylvania Iowa
Vermont Montana
New York
Arkansas (2) Louisiana (2) Arkansas (2) Louisiana (2)
Texas (2) Texas (2)
Oregon
West Virginia
Wisconsin
40%
Delaware
Georgia
Oregon
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Virginia
Georgia
Kansas
Mississippi
North Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Wisconsin
25%
Alabama
Arizona
California
Colorado
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Kansas
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
North Carolina
20%
California
Colorado
Florida
Idaho
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Minnesota
Nebraska
New York
Ohio
South Dakota
Utah
West Virginia
Arizona
Cal ifornia
Colorado
Florida
Idaho
Iowa
Maryland
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New York
Oregon
California
Colorado
Idaho
Mississippi
Nebraska
North Carolina
North Dakota
South Carolina
Tennessee
Utah
New Mexico (4)
Kansas
Kentucky
Maryland
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
100%
Severe
Indiana
Michigan (1)*
Mild
80%
75%
60%
50%
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Table 5.3 (Cont.)
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Utah
Virginia
Wisconsin Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Source: Calculated from Bureau of Labor Statistics Data.
*Values in parentheses signify the number of times that a state
was captured in the sample.
20%
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Table 5.4
Contingency Table for Table 5.3
Number of states expected if each severity category were
equally likely and states' behavior was independent of
behavior in previous recessions.
Above Below
Severe Average Average Mild
.0 100% .03 .03 .03 .03 .13
W 80% .48 .48 .48 .48 1.93
60% 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 11.59
0 40% 8.70 8.70 8.70 8.70 34.80
a- 20% 13.05 13.05 13.05 13.05 52.21
S.-
0 7.83 7.83 7.83 7.83 31.32
33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 132.00
n = 33
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80 percent categories they have demonstrated a consistent ranking across
recessions. The log likelihood ratio then tests whether the number of
states with a consistent pattern of severity is significantly different
than would be experienced under the assumptions of randomness and inde-
pendence described above.
The resultant log likelihood ratio was 8.87. This statistic is
distributed X2 , thus the critical value at the 5% level is 12.59 and we
6
cannot reject the hypothesis of randomness and independence.
This result indicates that the same states do not always exper-
ience and same severity ranking relative to all other states. A state
hit severely in one recession, is equally likely to be mildly, moder-
ately, or severely hit in the next recession.
This result is somewhat surprising. One likely reason for this
apparent non-uniformity in severity rankings across recessions could be
that national recessions are different in nature. As a consequence
national industries may exhibit different relative severities across
recessions. To test whether this non-uniformity in the cyclical sensi-
tivity of national industries is the case, a similar test was conducted
on twenty-seven national industries.
Table 5.5 lists the number of recessions that an industry fell in
each category. Lumber and primary metals ranked among the top most
severely hit industries in all five recessions. Wholesale and retail
trade, government, food and kindred products, etc. ranked among the nine
most mildly hit industries in all five recessions.
The hypothesis to be tested was that the probability of the
relative severity of an industry's recession was independent of the
Table 5.5
Severity of Trend-Adjusted Recession
The number of recessions in which an industry fell in the high, medium, or low
category of severity of recessions.
Number of
Recessions High Medium Low
lumber, primary metals misc. manufacturing wholesale & retail trade,
government, food & kin-
5 dred products, newspapers,
services, finances
transportation (manuf.), apparel, textiles, petroleum
4 furniture, machinery (exc. transportation & public
elec.), fabricated metals utilities
electrical machines, instruments, stone & clay, chemicals
rubber & plastics tobacco
instruments, construction, mining, electrical mining, paper
stone & clay, paper machinery, construction, leather & leather
2 leather & leather products, products
chemicals
mining, apparel, tobacco, transportation (manu.), construction, rubber &
leather & leather products, machinery (exc. elec.), plastics, transportation
1 textiles fabricated metals, rubber & public utilities
& plastics, furniture,
paper, petroleum, tobacco
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Data.
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same industry's relative behavior in the previous recession. The Con-
tingency Table 5.6 notes the number of industries expected in each
cell if all twenty-seven industries are equally likely to experience
a severe, average, or mild recession and if' an industry's behavior
is independent of its behavior in previous recessions.
A log-likelihood ratio was calculated to determine whether the
actual number of observed states with the same behavior over four or
all five recessions was substantially different from the expected num-
ber of states in that category under the assumption of independence.
The log-likelihood ratio was 31.83. This statistic is distributed X2-
Because the critical value is 18.47 at the .001 percent level, we can
comfortably reject the hypothesis of independence. Industries that
are cyclically sensitive in one recession tend to be cyclically sensi-
tive in all recessions.
Thus, we have observed dissimilar rankings of state's ampli-
tudes across recessions, while there are similar rankings of national
industries across recessions. These findings suggest three explana-
tions about cross-state differences in business cycles. First, industry
compositions within states may vary over time. Second, within industries
there may be irregular patterns of output cutbacks and layoffs across
states, or third, unionization, unemployment rates, and unemployment
insurance benefits may change in relative importance across recessions.
These issues will be considered again in Chapter Six.
We now turn to a review of the data, subdivided into four regional
catagories. First, regional cycles will be compared .
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Table 5.6
Contingency Table for Table 5.5
The expected number of industries in each
if severity of recessions were random.
category
Number of
Recessions Severe Average Mild Total
5 .11 .11 .11 .33
4 1.11 1.11 1.11 3.33
3 4.44 4.44 4.44 13.33
2 8.89 8.89 8.89 26.67
1 8.89 8.89 8.89 26.67
0 3.56 3.56 3.56 10.67
27 27Total 27 81
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Comparison of the Severity of Regional Recessions
The forty-eight states of the contiguous United States are
divided into four regions, the Northeast, North Central, South, and
West. The average percentage decline in employment in each region is
calculated for all five recessions. The results for both the trend-
adjusted and unadjusted recessions are presented in Tables 5.7 and
5.8, respectively.
The data presented in these tables are consistent with those of
other authors such as Syron (1978), Friedenburg and Bretzfelder (1980)
and Gellner(1974). When employment data are adjusted for secular trends,
the North Central region has been, on the average, the most cyclically
sensitive region. When the secular trend is not removed from the data,
the Northeast appears to be substantially more cyclically sensitive
because the impact of the recession is compounded by the slow long-run
growth trend in the Mid-Atlantic and New England. This result is shown
by the sum of the rankings in Tables 5.7 and 5.9.
Even though the North Central region has been the most cyclically
sensitive region more often than any other region when the data are ad-
justed for trend, it should be noted it is not always the most sensitive.
For example, as indicated in Table 5.7 the Northeast was hit hardest by
the 1970-71 recession. This same observation was made by Gellner (1974:
19-21) using unemployment rates.
The Western region was the most stable region, independent of
whether the data are adjusted for trend or not. In both cases, the
total ranking for the Western states is highest. The Southern region
ranks second to the West as the most cyclically stable region over the
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Table 5.7
Trend-Adjusted Severity for Five
by Four Major Regions
(Percentages)
Recessions
Northeast North Central
2.24
(4)
2.82
(1)
1.83
(1)
1.26
(2)
2.16
(2)
10
South
2.42
(3)
2.31
(3)
1.35
(3)
West
2.62
(2)
2.37
(2)
1.20
(4)
.67
(3)
.53
(4)
2.58
(1)
1.55
(4)
13 16
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Data.
*Data were not available for all states and all years. The
missing observations are noted on pages of Chapter Four.
**Rankings are in parentheses.
1953-54
1957-58
1960-61
1970-71
1973-75
2.65
(1 )**
2.18
(4)
1.60
(2)
1.30
(1)
2.10
(3)
Total of
Ranks 11
185
Table 5.8
Absolute Severity for Five Recessions
by Four Major Regions
(Percentages)
North Central
3.78
(2)
4.22
(2)
2.19
(2)
1.84
(2)
3.22
(3)
1953-54
1957-58
1960-61
1970-71
1973-75
Total of
Ranks
South
3.31
(3)
3.48
(3)
1.67
(4)
.27
(4)
3.78
(2)
16
West
2.38
(4)
3.43
(4)
1.67
(3)
.67
(3)
1.70
(4)
18
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Data.
*Data were not available for all states and
missing observations are noted on page
all years. The
of Chapter Four.
**Rankings are in parentheses.
Northeast
11
5.30
5.91
(1)
2.86
(1)
2.58
(1)
4.62
(1)
5
Northeast North Central
186
past five recessions.
Two points should be kept in mind when comparing the results of
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 with the results of other authors. First, some
states are excluded from the early estimates. For example, Michigan
did not enter the sample until the 1973-75 recession.
Second, these are averages of state severities; thus, the reces-
sions of small states are weighted the same as recessions of populous
states. The consistency of the severity measures with other studies
does, however, suggest the data are reliable and consequently will
provide an adequate test of the formal model.
Comparison of Regional Capital-Labor Ratios
Table 9.5 presents the capital labor ratios for each of the
four major regions for the peak years of 1952, 1956, 1959, 1968, and
1972. The tables show that the highest capital labor ratios are to
be found in the Western states, while the lowest ratios are exhibited
in the Northeast. The Southern and North Central states rank second
and third respectively. This ranking holds for all five points in
time. For example, in 1972, an average employee in the Western states
worked with an average of $13,390 worth of capital whereas an average
employee in the Northeast worked with an average of $9,950 worth of
capital. As stated in Chapter Four, the capital stock is valued in 1958
dollars. The depreciation rates used in estimating the numerator of
the ratios displayed in Table 5.9 are the 1971 depreciation rates for
each state.
In order to test the sensitivity of the results to variations
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in depreciation rates, the tables were recalculated, assuming that
the average of the 1958-62 depreciation rate in each state prevailed
over the period 1952-72. A second set of capital stock figures were
calculated based on this alternative assumption and used to recreate
the numerators of the capital-labor ratios. The results, which are
presented in Appendix VI.B., again indicate that the Western states
had the highest capital-labor ratios, followed by the Southern and
North Central regions. The Northeast exhibited the lowest ratio. As
with the case of the 1971 depreciation rate assumption, this ranking
prevailed over all five periods covered in the study.
The North Central region is further subdivided into two cate-
gories, the East North Central and West North Central states. As
expected in both cases manufacturing production in the East North Central
states was more capital-intensive than in the West North Central states.
The capital-labor ratio of the East North Central appears to be similar
to that of the South, while the capital-labor ratio of the West North
Central ranks just above that of the Northeast in all cases.
In addition to an across regional comparison of capital-labor
ratios, the upward trends in the standard deviations of the capital-
labor ratios are worth noting. As discussed earlier it has been hypoth-
esized by regional economists that the composition of state economies
are becoming more homoegeneous over time. However, as Table 5.9 indi-
cates the standard deviations on the capital-labor ratios have increased
with time, suggesting less cross-state homogeneity in the production
process. For example, in the Northeast the standard deviation increased
from 1.0 to 2.7 from 1952 to 1972. In the West the standard deviation
w w 1
Table 5.9
Capital-Labor Ratios and Age-of-Capital Stock
for All-Manufacturing, By State
1952
(6 = 1971)
Capital-Labor Ratios ($000's)
Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Age-of-Capi tal Stockb
Standard
Mean Deviation
Northeast
North Central
East
West
South
Westa
Source: Census of Manufactures (CM) and
discussion of calculations.
Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM). See Chapter Four for
aExcluding Wyoming.
bProportion of capital stock put in place in the previous two years.
Mean
3.82
5.33
5.00
5.56
5.77
6.62
1.003
1.779
.360
2.359
2.498
4.242
2.19
(NH)
3.26
(MO)
2.76
(GA)
.33
(NM)
5.49
(NJ)
9.66
(ND)
13.82
(LA)
16.67
(NJ)
.22
.24
.26
.23
.26
.47
.045
.081
.036
.104
.079
.673
00
WTable 5.9 (Cont.)
Capital-Labor Ratios and Age of the Capital Stock
for All-Manufacturing, By Region
1956
(6 = 1971)
Capital-Labor Ratios ($000's) Age-of-Capital Stockb
Standard Standard
Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation
Northeast 4.60 .992 3.47 6.36 .18 .026
(NH) (PA)
North Central 6.21 1.180 4.64 8.65 .19 .056
(MO (ND)
East 6.65 .978 .21 .035
West 5.90 1.283 .17 .062
South 7.21 2.650 4.27 13.86 .23 .057
(MS) (LA)
Westa 8.05 3.221 5.20 13.29 .32 .182
(AZ) (MT)
Source: CM and ASM.
aExcluding Wyoming.
bProportion of capital
00
stock put in place in previous two years.
w ~W 1W
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Table 5.9 (Cont.)
Capital-Labor Ratios and Age of the Capital Stock
for All-Manufacturing, By Region
1959
(6 = 1971)
Capital-Labor Ratios ($000's) Age-of-Capital Stockb
Standard Standard
Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation
Northeast 5.46 1.377 4.01 7.83 .5 .017
(NH) (PA)
North Central 7.42 1.681 4.27 10.16 .17 .036
(SD) (IN)
East 8.30 1.505 .14 .017
West 6.79 1.60 .19 .032
South 8.56 3.319 4.99 15.22 .16 .038
(MS) (LA)
Westa 9.19 3.528 5.82 15.97 .20 .108
(AZ) (MT)
Source: CM and ASM.
aExcluding Wyoming.
bProportion of capi
t.
tal stock put into place in previous two years.
1W
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Table 5.9 (Cont.)
Capital-Labor Ratios and Age of the Capital Stock
for All-Manufacturing, By Region
1968
(6 = 1971)
Capital-Labor Ratios ($000's) Age-of-Capital Stockb
Standard Standard
Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation
Northeast 7.59 1.889 5.43 10.90 .19 .024
(RI) (ME)
North Central 9.43 2.594 3.89 14.09 .19 .031
(SD) (IN)
East 10.99 2.101 .18 .013
West 8.40 2.477 .19 .040
South 11.40 4.785 7.43 22.30 .21 .058
Westa 11.99 4.485 6.60 22.53 .21 .041
(NM) (MT)
Source: CM and ASM.
aExcluding Wyoming.
bProportion of capital stock put in place in previous two years.
1W 1W
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Table 5.9 (Cont.)
Capital-Labor Ratios and Age of the Capital
for All-Manufacturing, By Region
1972
(6 = 1971)
Stock
Capital-Labor Ratios ($000's) Age-of-Capital Stockb
Standard Standard
Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation
Northeast 9.95 2.666 6.39 15.21 .15 .023
(RI) (ME)
North Central 11.17 3.146 4.04 16.57 .17 .066
(SD) (IN)
East 13.19 2.520 .13 .018
West 9.73 2.842 .19 .078
South 13.17 5.618 8.59 25.60 .17 .040
(OK) (WV)
Westa 13.39 5.344 6.08 25.00 .20 .078
(NM) (MT)
Source: CM and ASM.
aExcluding Wyoming.
bProportion of Capital s tock put in place in previous two years.
N)
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rose from 4.2 to 5.3. The trends are similar for all regions independent
of the assumption made about depreciation rates. The reason for the diver-
gence in capital-labor ratios is not obvious. It cannot be simply explain-
ed by identifying persistently lagging states, because the minimum capital-
labor ratios have increased over time. For example, in the Northeast in
1952, the minimum capital-labor ratios was 2.2 for New Hampshire, whereas
in 1972 the minimum was 6.4 for the state of Rhode Island, an increase of
66 percent over the period. In 1952, Georgia had the lowest capital-labor
ratio of any other Southern state: 2.8. Yet in 1972 Oklahoma's ratio of
8.6 was the lowest among the Southern states. This minimum in the Southern
region increased by 67 percent. Rather than lagging growth in capital-
labor ratios in selected states, the growing divergence in ratios appears
to be due primarily to a rapid increase in the growth of the capital
stock relative to labor in several states, such as West Virginia, North
Carolina, Texas, and Louisiana in the South; Montana in the West; and
Main and New Hampshire in the Northeast.
The maximum capital-labor ratio in the Northeast grew by 64 percent
from 5.5 for New Jersey in 1952 to 16.2 in 1972 for Maine. The ratio
in the West grew from 16.7 for Nevada in 1952 to 26.0 for Montana in 1972,
an increase of 36 percent. The increase in the South was similar.
In contrast to the West, South, and Northeast, the divergence
in state capital-labor ratios within the North Central region appears
to be due to the slow to no growth in capital-labor ratios in a number
of North Central states. As shown in Table 5.9, the minimum capital-
labor ratio in the North was 3.3 in 1952, for the state of Missouri.
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In 1972, the minimum had increased to 4.0 for the state of South Dakota,
only a 19 percent increase. The data show a decline in the capital-
labor ratio for South Dakota from 7.7 in 1952 to 4.0 in 1972. In 1952
Minnesota's capital-labor ratio was 5.7. By 1972, the ratio had only
increased to 7.9, an increase of 28 percent. The state of Missouri's
capital stock did grow, however, from 3.3 in 1952 to 12.0 in 1972.
Thus, as capital-labor ratios increased in every region over
the twenty-year period, the standard deviations also increased. In
the North this divergence is best explained by lagging growth in South
Dakota and Minnesota relative to other states in the region, whereas in
the South, West, and Northeast the divergence is best explained by a
rapid growth in the ratios of Texas, Louisiana, West Virginia, North
Carolina, Maine, and New Hampshire relative to other states in the
region.
There are three factors that should be kept in mind as causes
of bias in these results. First of all, as discussed earlier, the
1957 base capital-stock value, used in calculating the capital stock
series, measures the value of the plant and equipment at the time of
purchase. Thus, the values of two machines with the same productive
capacity may differ solely because they were purchased at different
nominal prices; the machine purchased later would carry the higher
value. Thus, it is expected that the base-year capital-stock value
in states with a more recently purchased capital stock in 1957
overvalued relative to states with an older capital stock in that year.
This relatively overvalued capital-stock figure was then carried back-
ward to earlier years and forward to later years when the total series
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was estimated, overvaluing all capital stock values in the series. It
is expected this overvaluing of the capital-stock numbers in fast-growth
stats relative to slow-growth states has biased the capital-labor ratios
in the Western and Southern states upwards. In particular, it is sus-
pected that the capital-labor ratios of Alabama, Arizona, Louisiana,
West Virginia, Texas, and Oregon many have been overestimated.
This overestimation will be counterbalanced by the fact that new
capital stock is in a sense more capital because it embodies more ef-
ficient production. It is too much to expect that these two effects
will cancel each other out and produce unbiased state capital stock
values, however the two effects do counteract each other.
As mentioned earlier in Chapter Four, a second factor that prob-
ably lead to biases in the capital-labor ratios is. errors in the base-
year capital-stock figures. The Census of Manufactures (1958: 9-46 to
9-29) notes high standard errors for the following states: Wyoming (40),
North Dakota (12), Oregon (12), Utah (10), Vermont (10), South Dakota
(9), Tennessee (9), New Mexico (9), Maine (6), and Nevada (6). The
capital-stock estimates will differ from actual values by less than
the percentage shown in brackets in two out of three samples.
These errors probably explain the unusually high capital-labor
ratios of Wyoming, which are estimated as the highest capital-labor
ratios in the United States. Wyoming's ratio is estimated to be 27.9
in 1952 and 30.1 in 1972. Because these ratios are unbelievably high,
Wyoming was dropped from the analysis. A large sampling error probably
also explains the ratios in North Dakota, which was 9.7 in 1952, the
seventh largest capital-labor ratio in the United States in that year,
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and Utah, which appeared to have the fourth largest ratio in the United
States in 1952.
A third factor suspected of causing bias in the results is the
relatively large estimation errors in the labor force statistics for
several states. For the years 1952, 1956, 1959, and 1968 the denomin-
ators of the capital-labor ratios were extracted from the Annual Survey
of Manufactures (ASM). Because these data are obtained by a sample
survey, the numbers are apt to differ from those obtained by a com-
plete census. A guide to the sampling error is provided by the ASM
indicating large sampling errors for New Mexico, North Dakota, and
Nevada for 1968 as well as earlier years (ASM, 1968: 12-25). In 1952,
the estimated capital-labor ratio for Nevada was 16.7, the highest
ratio, after Wyoming, for any state. The third highest ratio, 9.7,
belonged to North Dakota. These unexpectedly high ratios may well be
due to underestimated employment totals.
Underestimation probably also occurs in areas with large numbers
of undocumented workers and migrant workers. Such states as Arizona,
New Mexico, Texas, and California may well be susceptible to this
bias.
Comparison of the Age of the Regional Capital Stocks
The age-of-capital-stock variable is measured as the proportion
of the capital stock in a peak year that was put in place in the pre-
vious two years. Thusthe higher the ratio, the newer the capital
stock.
As mentioned in Chapter Four the preferable measure would have
been the proportion of the capital stock put in place in the previous
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three or four years. However, since manufacturing investment by state
was not available for 1950, the 1952 value could only be estimated
with two years of investment in the numerator. To permit comparability
for all five recessions, the remaining variables were calculated with
two years of investment in the numerator as well.
To test whether the use of a two-year rather than three-year
numerator made a significant difference to the analysis, the simple
correlations between the results of equations 4-4 and equation 4-5 in
Chapter Four were computed. The results show that little is lost by
using two rather than three years of investment in the numerator. The
correlation coefficients for the two equations for the peak years of
1956, 1959, 1968 and 1972 were .97, .94, .96, and .97 respectively.
The results of the age-of-capital-stock ratios are displayed,
by region, in Table 5.9 and Appendix IV. The data in Table 5.9 is
based on the 1971 depreciation rate, whereas the data in Appendix IV
is based on the 1958-62 depreciation rate. The results of both tables
are similar, so they will be discussed in reference to Table 5.9, only.
In all of the peak years except 1968, the data in Table 5.9 show
that the Western region had the newest capital stock. The exception
was 1968, when the age-of-the-capital stock was lowest in both the
West and South. In 1952 and 1956 the Southern capital stock appears
to rank second, whereas in 1959 the capital stock in the North Central
region ranked second to the Western region. In 1972 the age of the
capital stock in the North Central and in the South appear to be equiva-
lent. In all five periods the Northeast appears to either be tied for
or to have the oldest capital stock of the four major regions.
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When the North Central region is divided into the East North
Central and West North Central regions, the data indicate that, on
the average, the capital stock of Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana,
and Wisconsin was newer than that of Minnesota, Missouri, Iowa, Kansas,
South Dakota, North Dakota and Nebraska during the early fifties.
From 1959 to 1972 however, the data suggest that the average age
of the capital stock in the East North Central states began to increase,
while that of the West North Central states began to decline.
From 1959 to 1972 the capital stock in the East North Central
region appears to have been older than that of the Northeast. For
example, in 1972 the age ratio for the Northeast was .15 whereas the
ratio was .13 in the East North Central region.
For the reason described earlier it is suspected that the capital
stock of the states growing rapidly in 1957 was overestimated, under-
estimating the age-of-capital-stock variable. Since the Western and
Southern regions were the higher growth areas in the mid-1950's, the
age-of-capital-stock ratios for these regions may be low relative to
the ratios of the North Central and Northeast.
The age-of-capital-stock results presented in Table 5.9 are
consistent with our current understanding of regional growth trends.
That is, the higher a state's economic growth, the lower the age of
that state's capital stock. For example, the slowest annual rate of
employment growth from 1952 to 1972 was in the Northeast region, a
fact consistent with the figures in Table 5.9. Moreover, in the decade
of the 1950's the annual average rate of employment growth in New England
and Middle Atlantic states was .95 percent. During the 1960's the annual
rate of growth rose to approximately 2.00 percent and then again dropped to
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around .3 percent in the early 1970's. The Northeast's age ratios of
Table 5.9 and Appendix IV exhibit the expected concurrent changes.
The age of the Northeast's capital stock appears to have increased dur-
ing the fifties, with an age ratio of .22 in 1952 decreasing to .15 in
1959. During the growth period of the 1960's in Northeast's capital
stock appears to have declined in age, with the age ratio increasing
to .19. In the early 1970's the trend again reversed and the North-
east's capital stock began to age, with its ratio decreasing to .15.
The annual rate of employment growth in the North Central
states was above that of the Northeast, but slower than that of the
Western and Southern region. This relationship is also consistent
with the age-of-the-capital stock data presented in Table 5.9 and
Appendix IV, Table 5.9 indicates that the age ratios for the North
Central states range from .24 in 1952 to .17 in 1972. These ratios
are greater than those of the Northeast, .22 in 1952 and .15 in 1972;
both lower than the ratios of the Western and Southern regions.
Again, the age-of-capital-stock variable moves in a direction
consistent with the data on employment growth. The North Central re-
gion's employment grew at an approximate 1.3 percent annual rate in
the 1950's, increasing to an annual 2.3 percent rate of growth in the
1960's and decreasing to a 1.5 percent annual rate of growth in the
first half of the 1970's. The age-of-capital-stock variable shows the
same trend, declining from .24 to .17 from 1952 to 1959, increasing to
.19 in 1958 and declining to .17 again in 1972.
The most rapid rate of economic growth throughout the twenty-five
year period from 1950 to 1975 was in the Western states. As expected
200
Table 5.10
Average Annual Rates of Growth of Nonagricultural
Employment, Selected Periods, 1950-75
Rate of Growth
(Percentages)
Region 1950-60 1960-70 1970-75
United States 1.80 2.69 1.69
New England .95 2.08 .65
Mideast .95 1.85 -.05
Great Lakes 1.12 2.25 .65
Plains 1.47 2.46 2.08
Southeast 2.58 3.69 3.00
Southwest 3.04 3.55 4.00
Rocky Mountain 2.72 3.00 4.74
Far West 4.07 3.54 2.58
Source: Advisory Commission Intergovernmental Relations, Regional
Growth Historic Perspective, p. 22.
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the age-of-capital-stock variable is highest in this region throughout
the same period. For example, in 1972, the age variable was .20 for
the West, .17 for the South and North Central, and .15 for the Northeast.
The annual rates of employment growth by region are displayed in Table
5.10.
To summarize, widely available data on regional economic trends
corroborate the regional cycle measures, capital-labor ratios and age
of the capital stock variables calculated for this study. The substan-
tiation of these statistics allow us to put more confidence in the data
used to test the formal model of this study as well as permit a contri-
bution to our understanding of regional economies.
We now turn to consideration of the machinery industry. First,
the regions with cyclically sensitive industries will be identified,
followed by a discussion of the capital-labor ratios and age-of-Th-
capital stocks.
Machinery Industry
In 1972, 2.7 percent of all non-agricultural employees were
in the machinery industry. This percentage was down slightly from
the 3.0 percent of employees in the same category in 1952 (CM, 1972:
SR 3-70).
The machinery industry, SIC code 35, is more geographically
dispersed than the textile industry. The absolute numbers and dis-
tribution of employment across the nine census regions is shown in
Table 5.11. The largest proportion of employment for the industry is
202
Table 5.11
Machinery Industry Employees by Region
Proportion of
Employees
All Employees in Each Region
(000's) (Percent)
1967 1972 1967 1972
United States 1,864.5 1,827.7
New England 178.7 152.3 .10 .08
Middle Atlantic 359.5 320.1 .19 .18
East North Central 783.4 698.1 .42 .38
West North Central 153.1 165.4 .08 .09
South Atlantic 90.0 117.6 .05 .06
East South Central 54.5 75.9 .03 .04
West South Central 80.6 108.0 .04 .06
Mountain 31.2 34.4 .02 .02
Pacific 140.5 155.9 .08 .09
Source: Census of Manufactures, 1972: 35-3.
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found in the East North where 38 percent of total United States machin-
ery industry employment was located in 1972. The industrialized states
of Michigan, Ohio, and Illinois alone accounted for 29 percent of the
nation's machinery employment. Only 2 percent of the nation's employment
in the machinery industry was located in the mountain states.
As shown in Table 5.11, New England, the Middle Atlantic and East
North Central regions experienced a net loss in machinery industry jobs
over the period 1967 to 1972. New England's employment fell from 178.7
to 152.3 employees; employment in the Middle Atlantic states fell from
359.5 to 320.1 employees; and machinery industry employment in the East
North Central states fell from 783.4 to 698.1 employees. All of the re-
maining Western and Southern regions showed a net gain over the same
period. The largest gains were made in the West South Central states.
Two of the hypotheses stated in Chapter Three propose that multi-
plant firms have an effect on the cyclical variation of employment across
states. The reason being that managers can shift employment from plants
located in states with an old-capital stock and a low capital-labor
ratio to plants with a new, more efficient capital stock and a capital-
intensive operation located in another state. Thus, it is worth consid-
ering at this point whether the multiplant firm is a significant organ-
izational form in machinery production. Approximately 73 percent of
all machinery workers were employed in multiplant firms in 1972 (CM,
1972: SR 3-70). Unfortunately, there is no way to determine what pro-
portion of branches are located across state boundaries. With a sub-
stantial proportion of machinery workers holding jobs in multiplant
firms, the possibility of finding and measuring destabilizing effects
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of multiplant firms on state economies is still unresolved.
Tables 5.12 and 5.13 summarize the data for the machinery
industry by region. The data are only presented for the trend-adjusted
severity measures and only for the year 1972. The average trend-
adjusted severity by region is shown in Table 5.12. The percentage
decline in employment during the 1973-75 recession was greatest in
the Northern states, where the average state experienced a loss of
5.6 percent of employment from the peak to the trough of the recession.
The Southern states experienced, on the average, the second most severe
recession with a severity measure of 4.9. The Northeast and West ranked
third and fourth with losses in employment of 4.5 percent and 2.6 per-
cent, respectively.
The Northern states are further divided into the Eastern and
Western states. Surprisingly, the data showed that the recession in
the machinery industry hit the West North Central states harder than
the East North Central states. This was due to the inclusion of
Nebraska in the West North Central. Nebraska experienced a trend-
adjusted loss in machinery employment of 9.2 in the 1973-75 recession.
Based on industry composition alone, the Southern states should
have experienced the most severe recession. The expected recession,
based on industry compositionwas 4.5 percent for the South. The expec-
ted recession for the Northern states was lower at 4.1 percent. This
provides further evidence that industry composition alone does not
explain all of the variation in regional responses to national reces-
sions. We now turn to considering capital-labor ratios in the machinery
industry and the age-of-the-machinery capital stock, by region.
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Table 5.12
Actual and Expected Severity of Recessions by Region
Machinery Industry
1973-75
(Percentages)
Actual Trend-Adjusted Severity
of Recession Expected Recession a
Mean
4.52
5.55
Northeast
North Central
East
West
South 4.90
2.57West
Mean
3.97
4.06
4.52
6.84
3.96
4.17
4.50
3.29
Source: Census of Manufactures and Annual Survey of Manufactures,
and Bureau of Labor Statistics Data. See Chapter Four
for computations.
a The expected recession is equivalent to the percentage decline
in employment that a state would experience if that state's
machinery industries behaved like the national average.
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The machinery industry, according to these data, was more
labor-intensive in 1972 than the national average of all manufactur-
ing. The average capital-labor ratio in the machinery industry was
9.4 as compared to 12.1 for all manufacturing. One possible explana-
tion for the machinery industry's relative labor-intensiveness is that
machinery firms produce unique products designed to customer specifica-
tions. This inhibits automation of the production process. During
interviews with New England metal working firms, Glynnis Trainer (1979:
137-138) found this to be ture for the metalworking industry.
In contrast to the regional pattern of capital-labor ratios
for all manufacturing, the most capital-intensive production processes
in machinery manufacturing were located in the Northeast. On the average,
the capital-labor ratio in the Northeast was 12.0. The capital-labor
ratio in the South was the lowest at 7.6, while the ratios of the North
Central and West ranked second and third, respectively. The average
capital-labor ratio in the North Central states was 10.4, and the ratio
in the West was 7.9.
It is interesting to consider the age-of-the-capital-stock
figures, in relation to the capital-labor ratios. The age-of-capital-
stock values are also shown in Table 5.13. The table shows that regions
with high capital-labor ratios tendto have an older capital stock. For
example, the South with the lowest machinery industry capital-labor
ratio appears to have the newest capital stock. The Northeast has the
oldest capital stock in conjunction with the highest capital-labor
ratios. The proportion of the South's machinery capital to be put in
place in the two years prior to and including 1972 was .32. The ratios
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Table 5.13
Capital-Labor Ratios and Age-of-Capital Stock
by Region
Machinery Industry
1972
Capital-Labor Ratios Age of Capital Stockb
($000's)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Northeast 11.98 2.43 .18 .064
North Central 10.40 1.67 .21 .065
East 10.56 2.114 .19 .066
West 10.21 1.170 .23 .065
South 7.61 1.40 .32 .089
West 7.92 2.12 .25 .064
Source: Census of Manufactures and Annual Survey of Manufactures.
See Chapter Four for description of calculations.
bProportion of capital stock put in place in previous three
years.
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for the West, North Central, and Northeast were .25, .21 and .18.
respectively.
There are two possible explanations for the combination of
lower capital-labor ratios and new capital in the South. One possi-
bility is that labor-intensive machinery production has tended to
shift from the Northern states to the South. According to economic
theory this shift is consistent with Southern low wages. Out of a
1973 sampling of twenty-three cities across the nation, relative pay
levels in the non-electrical machinery industry were lowest in
Atlanta, Dallas, and Tulsa. For example, class A machine tool
operators averaged a 1973 wage of $6.01. an hour in San Francisco
to $3.81 in Atlanta (Monthly Labor Review, 1974: 55-56). A
second possible explanation is that when machinery firms move to or
are established in the South they substitute labor for capital.
This second explanation is also consistent wiith observed low
Southern wages. The two explanations need not be mutually exclusive.
The lower age of the Southern and Western region's capital
stocks is consistent with observed economic trends. The combination
of the aforementioned 1973 study along with a previous 1970 study
of twenty-two common cities, found that there were major regional
employment shifts amidst steady state growth in the machinery industry
from 1970 to 1973. Machinery industry employment rose most strongly
in Dallas, 29 percent, and Denver, 21 percent. Declines were found
in eight areas, ranging from 16 percent in Philadelphia to 3 percent
in Detroit and Pittsburgh (Monthly Labor Review, 1974: 55). These
trends are consistent with relatively new machinery capital in the South and
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West, and older capital stocks in the Northeast.
Textile Industry
The textile industry is located primarily in the Eastern states
of the United States. The largest producers are North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Georgia. Together, these three states comprised 56 percent
of the national textile employment in 1972.
Nationally, employment growth in textiles has been slow. Textile
employment rose by .03 percent from 929 thousand employees in 1967 and
952 thousand employees in 1972 (CM, 1972: 22-23). As as been well docu-
mented and discussed, this slow growth in the textile industry has been
accompanied by a regional redistribution of textile employment. The
New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, and West North Central
states have been net losers, while the Southern and Western states have
been net gainers. These trends are shown in Table 5.14.
In order to discern the importance of the multiplant firm in the
textile industry, the percent of all employees working in multiplant
firms was calculated. In 1972, 77 percent of all textile employees
worked in single-plant firms (CM, 1972: SR 3-14). This proportion
was equivalent to the percent of workers in multiplant firms in the
machinery industry.
In the 1973-75 recession the Northeast experienced the most
severe decline in textile employment. This is shown in Table 5.15.
The trend-adjusted percentage loss in this region was 10.1. The
North Central states experienced the recession least severely with a
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trend-adjusted severity of 6.9. The expected recessions, based on in-
dustry composition, move concurrently with the actual recessions. The
greater the actual recession, the larger the expected recession. Thus,
this cursory look at the data suggests that the surprisingly
moderate recession in the Northern states is due to the location of
textile industries in the North that are cyclically stable, nationally.
The data (Bureau of Labor Statistics Data) show the textile
industry to be less capital-intensive than the all-manufacturing average.
The average capital-labor ratio of all manufacturing industries for
47 states was 12.1 in 1972. This was higher than the ratio of 10.4
for the textile industry.
Textile production in the South is more capital-intensive than
textile manufacturing in the North Central and Northeast, a relation-
ship consistent with casual empirical observation. However, the find-
ing of an equivalent capital stock in the South and Northeast is sur-
prising. A cursory look at the state data indicates that Delaware was
estimated to be .05, indicating that Delaware had the oldest textile
capital stock in the country. While this ratio may be accurate, (Dela-
ware is subject to large error due to its small size), it is not indica-
tive of Southern trends. Thus, Delaware was removed from the sample.
Without Delaware, the data shown in Table 5.16 are more in ac-
cordance with other regional data on the textile industry. First of
all, the newer capital stock tends to be associated with higher capital-
labor ratios. The South now has the newest capital stock with a ratio
equal to .19 and a capital-labor ratio of 12.4. The Northeast has the
next highest capital-labor ratio, of 9.0 and an age ratio of .18.
3Excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and Wyoming.
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Table 5.14
Textile Industry Employees by Region
All Employees Proportion of Employees
(000's) in Each Region
(Percent)
1967 1972 1967 1972
United States 929.0 952.0 100. 100.
New England 92.0 76.1 .10 .08
Mid-Atlantic 149.1 146.7 .16 .15
East North Central 25.2 23.4 .03 .02
West North Central 4.9 4.3 .01 .01
South Atlantic 550.5 582.0 .59 .61
East South Central 83.6 89.9 .09 .09
West South Central 12.2 13.8 .01 .01
Mountain .4 1.7 .00 .00
Pacific 6.07 14.6 .01 .02
Source: Census of Manufactures, 1972: 22-23.
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Table 5.15
Actual and Expected Severity of Recessions by Region
Textile Industry
1973-75
Actual Trend Adjusted
Severity of Recession
(Percentage)
Expected Recessions
(Percentage)
Northeast 10.12 8.36
North Central 6.85 7.38
South 9.39 8.18
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Data. See Chapter Four for
computations.
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The North Central has the lowest capital-labor ratio of 8.8 and the
oldest capital stock with an age ratio of .16.
These results are consistent with our knowledge of the textile
industry. The textile industry is still labor-intensive relative to
other manufacturing industries. In the ten years ending in 1971, the
ratio of payroll to value added, a measure of labor intensity, averaged
.54 in textiles compared to .48 in all manufacturing. With the exception
of the furniture and leather industries, textiles had, in 1971, the
highest payroll-value added ratio of the 20 major manufacturing indus-
tries (Monthly Labor Review, 1973: 18).
Consistent with concern about low rates of investment in the
textile industry, the capital stock in that industry is older than in
the all-manufacturing or machinery industry. A booming economy in the
1960's spread to the textile industry. Revised depreciation laws,
trade agreements, and investment tax adjustments encouraged investment
and the replacement of older capital equipment. Expenditures for plant
and equipment rose from $330 million in 1961 to a peak of $820 million
in 1966.
However, in the mid 1960's capacity utilization in the textile
industry fell. This excess capacity was due to slower domestic economic
growth, strong competition from European and Asian textile producers,
an increased competition from paper and plastic materials (Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 1578, 1968: 7). This unutilized capacity discouraged
both investment and technological change.
The age ratios calculated for the textile industry confirm these
observations. First, the ratios are low relative to the machinery
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Table 5.16
Capital-Labor Ratios and Age of the Capital Stock
Textile Industry
1972
Capital-Labor Ratios Age of Capital Stocka
($000's)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Northeast 8.97 3.523 .18 .048
North Central 8.81 1.584 .16 .061
South 12.00 4.236 .18 .068
South,
(exc. Delaware) 12.41 3.761 .19 .052
Source: Census of Manufactures and Annual
See Chapter Four for computations.
Survey of Manufactures.
aProportion of the capital stock put in place in previous three
years.
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industry and the all-industry average. In 1972 the all-state average
ratio was .25 for all-manufacturing and .25 for the machinery industry.
Both indicate a newer capital stock than that of the textile industry
with an average ratio of .18 for 1972.
Moreover, within the textile industry the age ratios indicate
a slightly older capital stock in 1972 than 1968, a finding consistent
with more rapid investment in the early half of 1960 and slower invest-
ment thereafter. In 1968, the nine states for which data were availa-
ble had an average age ratio of .22 while in 1972 the ratio for the
same nine states fell to .19. For a listing of the nine states for
which data could be obtained for 1969-70, please see Table 4.2.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the estimates of the trend-adjusted and absolute
severity of state recessions, the capital-labor ratios, and the age-of-
the-capital stocks appear to be reliable and consistent with other data
on regional economic cycles and trends. The North Central region tends
to be the most cyclically sensitive region whereas the Western states
are the most stable. The age-of-the-capital stock in the textile
industry is older than that of the machinery industry and the all-
manufacturing average, and all of the age measures move in a direction
consistent with secular economic growth.
Moreover, in accordance with information on production processes,
the capital-labor ratios are lower in textiles and machinery manufactur-
ing than for the all-manufacturing average. There were several cases
where the capital-labor ratios are suspicious. These include Montana,
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North Dakota, Nevada, and Wyoming for the all-industry data and Delaware
for the textile industry. In spite of these "problem" states, the data
appears to be, on the whole, dependable, and we can be reasonably con-
fident that the data used to test the formal model will, in fact, pro-
vide an adequate test of the model formulated in Chapter Three.
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CHAPTER 6
FINAL RESULTS
Chapter Six presents the study's results. The chapter is organized
by industry. First the results for the all-industry equation will be
presented and discussed. The second and third sections of the chapter
discuss the results drawn from the industry-specific machinery and
textile models, and the final section summarizes the major conclusions.
All-Industry Results
The all-industry results were estimated with the model described in
Chapter Three. To review briefly, cross-state variations in business-
cycle activity are hypothesized to occur because of cross-state variations
in industry compostion, capital-labor ratios, age-of-the capital stock,
peak-level unemployment rates, insurance benefits, and multiplier impacts.
The first six variables described above are expected to influence the
amplitude of fluctuations in the manufacturing or export sector. Fluc-
tuations in this basic sector are expected to influence cyclical activity
in the non-basic or residentiary sector.
The strength of the relationship between the export sector and the
local service sector is measured by y of equation 3-20. When y = 0,
the local service sector is unaffected by fluctuations in export indus-
tries and when p = Em or the long-run export-base multiplier, the per-
ET
centage change in service employment is equivalent to the percentage loss
in export employment.
As derived in Chapter Three, the final equation to be estimated
is:
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E E
E. = (1 + y )[E (E + E ( IKLjr + 2 A + 3 U + 4 UE
+ 5 UIjr))] (6-1)
To restate:
E = Severity of the state recession
E = Severity of the expected recession based on industry
composition in manufacturing
KL Capital-labor ratio
A = Age of the capital stock
U Proportion of the labor force that is unionized
UE = Peak-level unemployment rate
UI = Ratio of weekly unemployment insurance benefits to
weekly wages
Em/ET Proportion of the labor force in manufacturing
Es/ET =Proportion of the labor force in non-basic industries
subscript j = Recessions 1, . . . 5
subscript r = States, 1, . . 48
subscript m = Basic industries
subscript s = Non-basic industries
The results that follow only apply to the trend-adjusted date unless
it is specifically mentioned otherwise. The capital-stock series used
to calculate the age of the capital stocks and capital-labor ratios rely
upon the assumption that the 1971 depreciation rate, in each state, pre-
vailed throughout the period 1952 to 1976. Calculating the results with
the alternative capital-stock series, based on an annual average of the
1958-62 depreciation rate, made little difference in the size of the
coefficients and the T statistics of the final equations.
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As explained in Chapter Three, the recession-specific equations for
the complete model, 6-1 would not converge. Consequently the model was
simplified to include only the second round impact of the national com-
ponent, E, on the residentiary sector. This simplified model is shown
in equation 3-27 of Chapter Three.
In order to justify pooling of the data, the recession-specific
equations had to be estimated. To accomplish this step the recession-
specific results were estimated using the simplified model. These results
are displayed in Table 6.1.
From Table 6.1 we can see that y is of the correct sign, of pre-
dictable magnitude and statistically significant in the pooled equation,
and the 1957-58 and 1973-75 equations. None of the other five coefficients
are consistently statistically significant from zero. Rather than discuss
these recession specific results in detail, it is the pooled equation
that is of major interest. But before discussing the pooled results it
is important to test whether pooling of the date is in fact justified.
An F-test', sometimes referred to as a Chow test, was conducted,
indicating that some degree of pooling is acceptable. The F-ratio was
calculated to test the hypothesis that the coefficients are stable
across recessions, and that, as a consequence, the pooling of data provides
more precise estimates of the coefficients. The calculated F ratio is
1.94, for the equations presented in Table 6.1 whereas the critical value
1 RSSR-URSS/K-1
The F ratio is equivalent to URSS/n-k where RSSR is equal to the
restricted sum of squared residuals; URSS is equal to the unrestricted
sum of squared residuals; and K is equal to the number of linear
restriction. See Maddala, 1977: 322-26.
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Table 6.1
Final Results, Recession Specific Equations
Simplified Model (Eq. 3-27)
F Stat
KL Age Un UE UI SSR
n
1953-54 Recession
-. 105
(.3596)
[-.292]
18.917
(7.4114)
[2. 5521 ([
.011
.0397)
.275] ([1
.268
.2196)
.213]
-15.192
(6.6060)
[-2.300] ([1
.967
.6203)
.559]
3.41
39.77
33
1957-58 Recession
([
.209
.2244)
.933]
-5.972
(6.8169)
[-.876] ([1
.023
.0219)
.043]
-. 145
(.1890)
[-.767]
-7.242
(3.3119)
[-2.187]
1.918
.449
[4.268]
.79
22.34
35
1960-61 Recession
([
.033
.1363)
.240]
-4.128
(11.6029)[-.356] ([1
.032
.0293)
.078]
-. 321
(.2341)
[-1 .372]
(4.
[.
713
6530)
153]
1
(
[1
.068
.7198)
.484]
1.94
18.3
37
1969-70 Recession
-. 003
(.0872)
[-.035]
-19.249
(8.6725)
[-2.231]
1973-75 Recession
(.
[-1.
064
0435)
470]
11.092
(5.4019)
[2.053]
All Recessions
-. 077
(.0334)
[-2.317]
6.466
(1.9676)
[3.286]
.026
.0366)
.715]([
-. 680
(.4629)
[-1 .469]
15.079
(7.1159)
[2.119]
-. 263
(.4171)[-.632]
6.60
12.69
40
.013
(.0222)
[.605]
-. 124
(.1681)
[-.738]
-4.846
(3.6803)
[-1 .317]
.713
(.2792)
[2.554]
10.472
18.88
47
.026
(.0100)
[2.589]
.011
(.0836)
[.134]
-5.906
(1.8593)
[-3.176]
.893
(.1988)
[4.493]
29.06
144.29
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for F24, 162 is 1.79 at the .01 level. We therefore must reject the
hypothesis of stability of coefficients. There are significant differ-
ences in, at least, some of the coefficients across recessions.
Using dummys for each variable for each recession, equation 3-27
was re-estimated with P as the only coefficient estimated jointly. The
stable coefficients were then combined and the less stable coefficients
allowed to vary across recessions. The parameters on unionization and
unemployment insurance benefits are stable across all recessions, when
uP is estimated with the combined data. The coefficients on the age-
of-capital stock vary depending on the severity of the recession as do
the coefficients on the capital-labor ratios. The unemployment rate
was stable for the last five recessions, but not the first. With this
semi-pooled equation, the F ratio was recalculated. The new F ratio is
1.57, while the critical value for F18, 168 is approximately 1.88 at the
1 percent level. Using the semi-pooled equation, we cannot reject the
hypothesis of stability in the pooled coefficients and the degree of
pooling shown in Table 6.2 is acceptable.
In Table 6.2, the roman numerals aside the acronyms represent the
recessions for which the coefficients were estimated. For example,
KLI specifies that this coefficient on the capital-labor ratio was
calculated with the data from the 1953-54 recession.
Table 6.2 includes four semi-pooled equations. The parameters in
the first and third columns were calculated from the simplified (Eq 3-27)
model and the complete (Eq 6-1) model, respectively. The second
and fourth columns are the results when the simplified and complete
equations are corrected for heteroscedasticity.
As is frequently the case with cross-section data on states, there
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Table 6.2
Final Results of Pooled Equations for the Simplified
Model (Eq.3-27) and the Complete Model
(Eq.6-1), Corrected and Uncorrected for Heteroscedasticity
Simplified Model Complete Model
Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected
I
KL
1
KL1
KL1
KL IV
KL V
A 1
A 1 1 1 VAIIIIV
U I5UI,V
UE1
-. 256
(.1440)
[-1 .777]
-. 184
(.0920)
[-2.004]
.153
(.0879)
[1.736]
-. 037
(.0765)
[- .477]
-. 084
(.0391)
[-2.150]
9.525
(2.9064)
[3.277]
-. 579
(4.4633)
[-.129]
.030
(.0119)
[2.528]
.049
(.1071)
[.452]
-. 454
(.1518)
[-2.994]
-. 169
(.0874)
[-1 .941]
.244
(.0816)
[2.991]
.013
(.0686)
[.193]
-. 054
(.0367)
[-1 .482]
13.603
(2.803)
[4.853]
1.334
(4.2825)
[.311]
(
[2
(
[
-. 157
(.0872)
[-1.794]
-. 109
(.0560)
[-1 .956]
(
[1
.094
.0552)
.706]
-. 024
(.0460)
[-.525]
.051
(.0226)
[-2.242]
5
(1
[2
(2
(
[2
.027
.0100)
.704]
.094
.1386)
.676] ([
.571
.9364)
.877]
.564
.6938)
.209]
.019
.0074)
.514]
.035
.0712)
.489]
-. 361
(.1293)
[-2.795]
-. 134
(.0715)
[-1 .867]
.196
(.0664)
[2.948]
.010
(.0541)
[.188]
(.
[-1.
043
0286)
510]
10.800
(2.6742)
[4.039]
1.039
(3.4171)
[.304]
.022
(.0083)
[2.608]
.074
(.1159)
[.639]
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Table 6.2 (Cont.)
-. 143
(.1072)
[-1 .333]
-5.644
(1.9050)
[-2.963]
.938
(.2012)
[4.664]
15.77
130.88
192
2.11
-. 237
(.0915)
[-2. 589]
-4.728
(1.8837)
[-2.510]
.397
(.1749)
[2.267]
48.37
344.000
192
1.99
-. 095
(.0657)
[-1 .444]
-3.561
(1.1223)
[-3.173]
1.026
(.2333)
[4.397]
15.97
130.06
192
2.13
-. 192
(.0731)
[-2.626]
-3.748
(1.4706)
[-2.548]
.402
(.1842)
[2.182]
48.45
344.000
192
1.99
) are standard errors in [
UE iV
uII-V
I 
Sta
F Stat
SSR
n
D.W.
] are T statistics.Statistics in (
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is evidence of heteroscedasticity in the error terms of the semi-pooled
equations. The test for heteroscedasticity suggested by Glejser (1969)
indicates that the absolute value of the error term is positively and
significantly associated with the inverse of the square root of the
state's population.2
Heteroscedasticity leads to estimates that are unbiased but in-
efficient. Thus the failure to correct for heteroscedasticity may lead
to rejection of statistically significant variables or acceptance of
variables whose coefficients are really zero.
To make the necessary corrections, the semi-pooled equations were
weighted by the square root of the population of each state. The
corrected coefficients are displayed in the second and fourth columns
of Table 6.2. The Durbin-Watson statistics of 1.99 indicate that
serial correlation is not a problem.
It is clear from comparing columns one and three, and columns two
and four that there is little difference between the results of the
complete and simplified models. The F-statistic on the complete model
is only slightly higher than that of the simplified model, and the sum-of-
squared-residuals is similar for both models as well.
The findings will be discussed in reference to the parameters of
column two of Table 6.2. Although there are no striking differences
among any of the four equations, the fact that this estimation has been
corrected for heteroscedasticity and has passed the F test makes it
the most easily defended equation of the four.
21el = Sp ; where p = population of state; e = 2546. With a T statistic
of 9.7 in the case of the simplified model.
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Capital-Labor Ratio
The capital-labor ratios of equation 2 of Table 6.2 indicate support
for several of the hypotheses presented in Chapter 3. For the three most
severe recessions during the period studied, the signs on the capital-labor
ratio coefficients are negative as hypothesized. The coefficients are
-.45, -.17 and -.05 for the 1953-54, the 1957-58 and 1973-75 recessions
respectively. In two of these three cases, the T-statistics indicate
the coefficient is statistically significant.
The coefficients on the relatively mild recessions of 1960-61 and
1969-70 are positive, and when corrected for heteroscedasticity the
coefficient of .24 for the 1960-61 recession is statistically different
from zero at the .05 level.
The coefficients on the capital-labor variable could not be pooled
without failing the Chow test. However as indicated in the pooled
equation Table 6.1, when all of the data are combined, the coefficient
on the capital-labor ratio is negative and statistically significant
at the .05 level.
While the results on the capital-labor ratio are far from over-
whelming, there is some evidence to support the hypothesis of a negative
relationship between cyclical sensitivity and a state's capital-labor
ratio. However this relationship only appears to hold when the severity
of the national recession is relatively high in terms of loss in real
GNP. The 1953-54, 1957-58 and 1973-75 recessions were the most severe.
Sachs ranked business cycles by their cyclical severity. Using as an
indicator of severity the difference between the GNP at the peak and
GNP at the trough of the recession, Sachs gave the five recessions
studied in this thesis the following ranking; 1973-75 (-15.8), 1957-58
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(-11.4), 1953-54 (-9.7), 1969-70 (-8.4), and 1960-61 (-3.9) (Sachs,1980:81).
Clearly the 1973-75 recession (V), the 1957-58 recession (II), and the
1953-54 recession: (I) were the most severe, in terms of loss in GNP.
It is not surprising that the coefficients are more consistent
with the hypotheses during the more severe national recessions (1953-54,
1957-58, and 1973-75). The capital-labor ratio is a proxy for the
ratio of fixed costs to variable costs. The argument for the association
between high fixed costs and stability, as stated in detail in Chapter Three
has two components. First, it is expected that multiplant firms dis-
tribute their cutbacks unevenly across plants, with low capital-labor
operations bearing the disproportionate burden. The more severe a
national recession, the more pervasive its effects on all sectors of
the economy and the greater the number of multiplant firms faced with
falling sales. The larger the number of multiplant firms affected by
the recession and shifting cutbacks to their labor-intensive operations,
the more likely these cutbacks are to show up at the macroeconomic
level.
Moreover, the more severe the reduction in a firm's sales, the
more likely managers are to adopt a lay-off policy. Economic decision
makers prefer, in general, to build up inventories, encourage employee
vacations, and leave vacated positions unfilled before laying off
workers. The milder the recession, the more likely firms are to find
these preliminary adjustments sufficient. It is possible that, in mild
recessions, too few labor-intensive multiplant firms reach the point
of laying off workers for the effects of the recession due to capital-
labor ratios to show up in aggregate data.
The second component of the capital-labor ratio hypothesis is that
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labor-intensive firms find it difficult to cover their high variable
costs during recessions, and therefore experience a higher rate of bank-
ruptcies and temporary shut downs than do capital-intensive plants.
During mild recessions, bankruptcy rates should be lower than during
more severe recessions. Again it is possible that bankruptcies, due
to high-variable costs, are so few during mild recessions, that they do
not show up in aggregate data.
As stated above, the parameters in the capital-labor ratios are
negative and statistically significant at the .05 level for the 1953-54
recession, statistically significant at the 10 percent level for the
1957-58 recession, and not statistically different from zero for the
1973-75 recession. The statistically significant coefficient for KLI
implies that, as hypothesized, states with higher capital-labor ratios,
will, holding all other variables constant, experience milder recessions
than states with low capital-labor ratios.
The relationship between the capital-labor ratio and the severity
of the expected recession, based on industry composition, is multi-
plicative. This implies that in a state with a high expected recession,
due to a large proportion of cyclically sensitive industries, the capital-
labor ratio will have a greater impact on the actual severity of a
state's recessions than in a state with a moderate expected recession.
For example, if a state had an expected recession of 3.4 percent in
1953-54, and a capital-labor ratio of 5.1 ($5,100 worth of capital per
manufacturing employee) in 1952, then the effect of the capital-labor
ratio on the severity of the recession in the manufacturing sector
would have been -7.9 (-.454 x 5.1 x 3.4). This suggests that, holding
all other variables constant, the effects of the capital-labor ratio
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dampened the severity of the recession in the export sector by 7.9 percent.
To estimate the total impact on the state's employment,-7.9 would have
to be weighed by the proportion of the state's total employment in manu-
facturing.
The model and results suggest that a state with the same capital-
labor ratio of 5.1, but an expected recession of 1.0 percent would
experience only a 2.3 percent decrease in the severity of the recession
in manufacturing due to the affects of capital-labor ratio. The result
assumes, of course, that the remaining variables are held constant. Thus,
there is some evidence to support the hypothesis that capital-labor ratios
influence the severity of states' recessions and that at least some of
the cross-state variations in cyclical employment can be explained by
differences in capital-labor ratios across states.
Age-of-Capital Stock
The age-of-capital stock coefficients are estimated with a mixed
degree of pooling. The coefficients for recessions I, II and V are
stable, consequently data from these periods are pooled, and the coeffi-
cients for recessions III and IV are similar, so these two data sets are
pooled. Similar to the case for the capital-labor ratio variable, the
coefficients on the age-of-capital stock is statistically significant
from zero at the .01 level for the more severe 1953-54, 1957-58, and
1973-75 recessions. The coefficient is insignificant for the milder
1960-61 and 1969-70 recessions.
In contrast to the hypothesized negative relationship, the co-
efficient on AI II and V is positive. A positive parameter suggests
that states with a newer manufacturing capital stock experience more
severe recessions than do states with a relatively old stock of capital.
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The coefficient of 13.66, and the multiplicative form of the model suggest
that a state with an age ratio of .10 (10 percent of a states manu-
facturing capital was put in place in the two years prior to the peak
year) and an expected recession of 3.4 would experience a 4.7 percent
(13.7 X .10 X 3.4) increase in the severity of the recession in manu-
facturing. Another state with the same age ratio, but an expected reces-
sion of 1.0 would experience a 1.4 percent increase in the severity of
its manufacturing sector's recession. To estimate the total impact on
the state, 4.7 or 1.4 would have to be weighted by the proportion of
the state's total employment in manufacturing.
Why might the coefficient on the age variable be positive when the
hypothesis discussed in Chapter 3 proposed a negative sign. One possible
explanation is that rather than measuring "efficiency" of production,
a new capital stock may measure age of the firm. New firms may be
susceptible to bankruptcy. To the extent that new firms are spatially
concentrated, these bankruptcies may show up as cross-state differences
in cyclical sensitivity.
It was argued in Chapter Three that areas with young capital tend
to be rapidly growing. By definition growth occurs where rates of
investment are high and the higher investment rates are, the lower the
average age of capital. Ongoing research at the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology (Birch, forthcoming) suggests that fast-growth areas
are growing because of a high birth rate of new firms rather than be-
cause of expansions in established firms. This implies that fast-
growth areas have a larger percentage of new firms than do the older-
capital regions.
New firms may be more susceptible to bankruptcy
because they operate with a small margin of
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error. They tend to borrow credit to the limit and make high risk
decisions to establish themselves in the market. When the economy
slows, therefore, these firms are highly susceptible to bankruptcy.
The difficulties of newly established firms are compounded by
the fact that they are limited in their access to capital. With
little in the way of retained earnings, they must rely almost solely
on private capital markets. During the upward swing of the credit
cycle, which precedes the employment cycle, these new firms are most
likely to be squeezed out. In tight credit markets, venture capital
is severely constrained and commercial lending by banks is reserved
for established long-term customers. Thus the newer firms experience
higher rates of bankruptcy.
A study by David Birch (forthcoming) found some evidence to
support this argument. During economic downturns the death rate of
firms does rise. His study, based on the Dun and Bradstreet data,
suggests that older and larger firms are more likely to contract during
recessions while new, small firms are more likely to close their doors.
To the extent that new capital-stock regions have a higher proportion
of new firms, and research cited above suggest they do, then these
new-capital-stock areas will tend to have greater cyclical fluctuations
due to a higher rate of firm bankruptcies.
The insignificance of the coefficient on the age-of-capital stock
variables for the pooled 1960-61 and 1969-70 recession can be explained
by the mildness of these two recessions. If high rates of bankruptcies
explain the positive relationship between age-of-capital stock and
severity of state recessions, then it is likely that most firms, in-
dependent of age and size, were able to weather these miled downturns.
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The insignificance of the 1960-61 and 1969-70 age coefficient, as
well as those of the capital-labor ratio for the same period, suggest
that there is a threshhold effect. During a relatively mild recession,
firms (independent of size, age, or labor-intensiveness) are likely to
survive the recession, through such mechanisms as extension of credit
terms by suppliers or banks, or through savings. Labor-intensive firms
faced with disproportionate reductions in sales are able to reduce
output to the appropriate level by building up inventories and reducing
labor productivity without layoffs. These factors may explain why the
age-of-capital stock as well as capital-labor ratios have little in-
fluence on the severity of states' cycles during moderate national
recessions.
The age of a state's capital stock does appear to influence the
severity of state recessions. In contrast to the negative relationship
hypothesized, the evidence, however, suggests that states with new
capital are more cyclically sensitive. This result may be explained
by the positive association between new capital, high economic growth
rates, birth rates of new firms, and new firms' vulnerability to
cyclical fluctuations.
Unionization
The coefficients on unionization (U) were extremely stable across
all recessions, and all five samples were pooled to estimate one co-
efficient. As expected, the coefficient is positive and statistically
different from zero and the .01 level.
The coefficient of .027 suggests that an increase in the proportion
of the state labor force belonging to unions will lead to greater
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amplitudes in the state's employment cycle. For example a state with
20 percent of its labor force unionized and an expected recession of
3.4 would experience an approximate 1.8 percent (.027 x 20. x 3.4)
increase in the severity of its manufacturing sector recession. A state
with 30 percent of its labor force unionized, and the same expected
recession would experience a 2.8 percent decline in employment (.027 x
30. x 3.4). Again, to get the total effect of unionization's impact
on the state's recession, 1.8 or 2.8 would have to be multiplied by the
ratio of manufacturing employment to total employment in the state.
The evidence does indicate that at least part of the cross-state
variation in employment cycles can be explained by the degree to which
the labor force is unionized. Unionization either limits other adjust-
ment options and forces employers to adopt a policy favoring layoffs,
or employers of union members favor layoffs, because workers are not
inclined to give up a union job making rehiring during the recovery
nearly costless.
The possibility that the causal relationship may move in the
opposite direction should also be noted. Workers in cyclical sensi-
tivity states may have tended to unionize in order to protect themselves
from the vagaries of the business cycle.
Peak-level Unemployment Rate
The coefficients on the peak-level unemployment rate (UE) are
stable for the four recessions between 1956 and 1975. Consequently
this coefficient is estimated jointly, while the coefficient for the
1953-54 data is estimated individually.
Contrary to the hypothesis, the coefficient on UEII-V is negative,
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-.24, and statistically significant at the .025 level. The coefficient
on UEI is not statistically different from zero. The hypothesis pro-
posed in Chapter 3 argues that a high peak-level unemployment rate
signals a surplus of labor. Employers considering layoffs during the
recession would expect low search costs during the recovery, due to
the surplus, and would, therefore, be more inclined to layoff workers
during the downturn, than would their counterparts in labor-short areas.
The negative, statistically significant sign on UEii-V is not
readily explained by economic theory, but may be explained by mis-
specification of the model. The peak-level unemployment rate is hypo-
thesized to explain the severity of the subsequent recession. It is,
however, possible that the unemployment rate is not independent of the
severity of the previous recession. For example, a state with a
cyclically volatile actual recession may not fully recover before the
next peak-level unemployment rate is registered. If the next recession
in the state is relatively severe, we might get a low rate of unemploy-
ment with a severe state recession.
The variable UE was dropped from the equation to determine whether
this misspecification was distorting other coefficients. Eliminating
UE made no noteworthy changes in the magnitude or statistical signifi-
cance of the remaining parameters.
The results indicate no evidence of a positive association between
labor-surplus regions and cyclical employment. The negative coefficient,
on this variable for the four recessions 1956 to 1975 may well be due
to misspecification of the model.
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Unemployment Insurance Benefits
The parameter on the variable UI ratio of average weekly unemploy-
ment insurance benefits to weekly wages is estimated with the pooled
data, after determining that the coefficiencies are stable across
recessions. As shown in Table 6.2, column 2, the pooled coefficient is
4.7, contrary to the hypothesis, and statistically significant at the
.02 level.
The hypotheses proposes that layoffs are more prevalent in states
with high UI than in states with low UT. The argument is that if
cusioned by high benefits, employees would be willing to accept layoffs.
Moreover, employers would readily lay off workers if high UI benefits
encouraged workers to wait out the recession and be available for re-
hiring during the recovery.
The results do not support these hypotheses, and there are two
possible explanations. First, the experience rating system, even though
not fully rated, discourages layoffs. In order to avoid unemployment
insurance taxes, firms prefer to hold on to employees during recessions.
The greater the unemployment insurance benefits in a state, the higher
the tax schedule, and the higher the tax schedule the greater the in-
centive for firms to keep down their tax ratingt. (Welch, 1977)
A second possible reason for the negative sign is that unemployment
insurance benefits act as an automatic stabilizer. The greater the
benefits, the more stable a state's income level, and the smaller the
effects of the recession on residentiary activities.
This study, therefore found no evidence to support the hypothesis
that a high ratio of unemployment insurance benefits to wages encourages
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layoffs. Rather, there is support for the hypotheses arguing that high
benefit levels promote stability. The experience rating system of
raising revenues for unemployment benefits may discourage layoffs and
high benefits may act as an automatic stabilizer.
Multiplier
The short-run multiplier is an average value for all states and it
measures the impact of the severity of the state recession, due to
fluctuation in the export sector, on the residentiary sector. As argued
in Chapter 3, the short-run multiplier should lie between zero and the
long run export base multiplier, which is equivalent to approximately
3.3 for most states. The model estimates y to be approximately .4 and
the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
This result is consistent with theory as well as empirical evidence.
As discussed in Chapter 3, P measures the effect of a short-run,
temporary and marginal change in export employment on residentiary
employment. The short-run, temporary, and marginal nature of this
multiplier implies that its magnitude should be substantially smaller
than the longer-run, permanent and average multipliers calculated by
other models, such as the Regional Industrial Multiplier System..
Several industries included in the residentiary sector have been
relatively stable or countercyclical at the national level, throughout
the period 1950 to 1975. For example, the construction industry remained
strong throughout the 1953-54 and the 1957-58 recessions. Low interest
as well as demand for residential construction in the expanding suburbs
offset any tendency for the recession to extend to construction. Demand
by state and local governments also remained strong throughout the
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recessions of the 1950s. Low interest rates and continuing demand for
schools and roads sustained employment in state and local government
as well as in spinoff sectors such as construction. Because of unemploy-
ment insurance benefits, corporate dividends, and other automatic
stabilizers, wholesale and retail trade, as well as services have tended
to be resilient during most of the five recessions.3 These observations
lend support to the reasonably small multiplier impact measured in this
study.
The short-run multiplier of .4 suggests that the severity of the
recession in the service sector is equivalent, on the average, to .4
times the severity of the state's recession due to fluctuations in
the export sector. So that for example, the severity of the recession
in exports, weighted by the ratio of manufacturing employment to total
state employment in Alabama in the 1960-70 recession was 1.35, the
results suggest that the severity of the recession in the residentiary
sector was approximately .54 (1.35 x .4).
The results indicate that multiplier impacts on residentiary
activities explain, in part, the severity of state recessions. As is
consistent with both theory and empirical evidence the short-run
multiplier is positive, greater than zero, but still relatively small.
Variation Explained by the Model
What proportion of the variation in states' recessions is explained
by the model? To permit the calculation of a legitimate R2, a constant
was added to the simplified and complete models. In addition, an equation
including only the constant and the expected recession:
3See Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion of this point.
236
E. = cons + E. (6-2)
and an equation including a constant, the expected recession and the
local component
E. = cons + E + E ( KL. + 2A + 43U + UE
+ 5UI. ). (6-3)
5 a
were estimated to determine the extent to which the local component and
ETthe esientiry ompoent ( Es), contribute to the model's explana-
tory power. The variables are the same as defined above, except cons =
a vector of l's.
The results indicate that the expected recession, or national
component, alone explains 36 percent of the variation in state cycles.
-2
In other words, the R for equation 6-2 is .36. The inclusion of the
local component explains an additional 14 percent of the variation, while
the addition of the residentiary sector in the form of the complete
model or the simplified model contributes .00 to the R 2. The model,
therefore, appears to explain 50 percent of the variation in the depen-
dent variable.
The unexplained variation may be due to the omitted variables discuss-
ed in Chapter Three, such as worker skill levels, state inventory taxes,
inter-industry multiplier effects, or heterogeneity within 2-digit SIC
industries. Recession-specific phenomenon not captured by a general
model, the imperfect measurement of the dependent and independent varia-
bles, and the unmeasured impacts of trade relationships among regions may
also be responsible for part of the unexplained residual.
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To estimate how much variation in the actual all-industry inde-
pendent variable was unexplained due to heterogeneity within 2-digit
SIC categories, the severity of the recession in the machinery and
textile equations were regressed against 3-digit industry expected
recessions for those industries. The results for both machinery and
textiles manufacturing are displayed in Table 6.3.
The equations suggest that the degree of heterogeneity depends upon
the industry. For example there appears to be a substantial degree of
variation in SIC 35 explained by industry composition at the 3-digit
level. The machinery equation of Table 6.3 suggests that 38 percent
of the variation in employment fluctuations in SIC 35 can be explained
by industry composition at the 3-digit SIC level.
According to the findings in the second equation of Table 6.3,
none of the cross-state variation in textile recessions is explained
by industry composition at the 3-digit level. The coefficient on the
expected recession is zero, and the R is .02. Clearly the degree of
heterogeneity with 2-digit industry classifications varies by industry.
These results suggest that at the all-industry level the expected
recession based on 2-digit industry composition explains approximately
33 percent of the cross-state variation in state recessions. Local
economic and institutional factors account for another 14 percent of
the variation, while the inclusion on the residentiary sector contri-
butes little to the model's explanatory power. Based on evidence from
the machinery and textile industries, -anywhere from 02 to 38 percent
of the variation in the all-industry dependent variable may be
explained by heterogeneity within 2-digit industries.
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Table 6.3
Results When Trend Adjusted Severity is Regressed
Against the Expected Recession, Machinery
and Textile Industries, for All Recessions
R- 2
F Statistic
Expected SSR
Constant Recession n
Machinery
Manufacturing -.623 .292 .38
(2.629) (.0630) 29.497
[-2.371] [4.636] 2.065
34
Textile
Manufacturing 1.895 -.000 .02
(.4190) (.0000) 1.37
[4.523] [-1.172] 56.97
23
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The next two sections summarize the results for the industry-specific
equations. First the results of the machinery industry, and second the
results of the textile industry model are presented.
Industry-Specific Results
The machinery (SIC 35) and textile (SIC 22) models are similar to
that of the all-industry model, without the multiplier. The hypotheses
propose that the severity of the recessions in machinery and textile
manufacturing are explained by capital-labor ratios, age-of capital
stock, and the proportion of the labor force belonging to unions in
those industries; as well as state level peak-year unemployment rates
and the ratio of states' average weekly unemployment insurance benefits
to average weekly wages. To restate from Chapter Three, the model is
as follows:
E. =E5. +E. (6 KL. + 6A. +6U. + 6UE. +S6UI. ) (6-4)Er jr jr 1 jr 2 Ar 3 jr 4 Jr 5 Jr
where
E' =Severity of the recession in either machinery or textile
manufacturing
E' =Expected recession based on industry composition at the
3-digit SIC level.
KL' =Capital-labor ratio
A' =Age-of-the capital stock
U' =Proportion of the labor force belonging to unions.
UE =Peak-year unemployment rate.
UI =Ratio of unemployment insurance benefits to weekly wages.
240
Subscript j=Recessions 1, --- , S
Subscript r=States 1, --- , n
Superscript ' =Data is industry-specific
Machinery Manufacturing
The results of the machinery industry model are presented in Table
6.4. In the recession-specific equation for 1969-70 and 1973-75, none
of the coefficients are statistically different from zero at the .05
level. The coefficient on the capital-labor ratios is negative as
hypothesized, with T statistics of -.7 and -1.4, respectively, The-para-
meter on unemployment benefits is positive as hypothesized, and in the
equation representing the 1973-75 recession, the coefficient has a T
statistic of 1.8, which is significant at the 10 percent level but not
at the 5 percent level.
The F-ratio is equivalent to 2.10, whereas the critical value of
F5,34 is 3.08. This indicates that the coefficients are stable across
recessions and that pooling of the data is justified. The coefficients
are more precisely estimated in the combined cross-section, time-series
result.
Combining the data for the two periods, the capital-labor ratio
becomes significant at the .05 level, with a T-statistic of 2.4. The
coefficient on UI is still positive and significant at the 10 percent
level, but not at the 5 percent level.
The machinery industry results therefore support the findings of
the all-industry model in the case of the capital-labor ratio. Again
a high capital-labor ratio appears to be associated with cyclical
stability.
241
Table 6.4
Final Results, Machinery Industry
(Eq. 6.4)
F Stat
KL A U UE UI SSR
n
1969-70 Recession
-.650 .242 .031 .496 11.838 2.70
(.3893) (4.7692) (.0579) (.5246) (9.2189) 49.82
[-1.670] [.051] [.531] [.894] [1.284] 10
1973-75 Recession
-.074 -1.179 -.001 -.044 3.722 3.932
(.0549) (1.2003) (.0137) (.1044) (2.1179) 194.41
[-1.351] [-.982] [-.103] [-.418] [1.758] 34
Combined 1969-70 and 1973-75 Recession
-.088 -.594 .007 .026 3.418 4.19
(.0374) (1.2463) (.0123) (.1073) (1.9107) 319.72
[-2.339] [-.476] [-.542] [.244] [1.789] 44
D.W. = 1.79
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It is relatively common with cross-section regressions on states
to find the variance of the error term associated with the size of the
state. Using the test for heteroscedasticity suggested by Glejser
(1969), there was no evidence that the absolute value of the error
term was related to the size of the industry or the state's total em-
ployment in machinery manufacturing.
What might explain the poor results for the machinery industry, in
light of the strong results for the all-industry equations? First of
all, the samples are relatively small. For the 1969-70 recession, only
ten observations could be calculated. For the 1973-75 recession data
are available for only 34 states. The small size of the samples may
explain, in part, the large standard errors on the coefficients.
Second, the variation in the independent variables is small. The
smaller this variance, the larger the standard of the coefficients
errors. The theoretical variance for b1 is equal to:
2
E; _(6-5)( - ~ )=(l - r2  X
where a 2 is the variance of the population that generated the error
terms, and r is the correlation between independent variable XI
and X2. (Rao and Miller, 1971:23) It is clear from equation 6-5 that
the smaller the variation in X1 , the larger the variance of s . The
small variance of several of the independe.nt variables used to estimate
the equations of Table 6.4 can be seen from Table 6.5.
The variance of age-of-capital and UI are particularly small. The
variance for age is .01, and for UI is .002. This may partially explain
the failure of these two variables to be statistically significant when
data on only one or two recessions are available.
243
Table 6.5
Mean Values and Standard Errors of the Capital-Labor ratio, Age
of Capital Stock, Unionization, Unemployment Rates, and Unemployment
Insurance Benefits for Machinery and Textile Manufacturing, 1972.
Expected
Recession
Capital-Labor
Ratio
Age-of-Capital
Stock
Unionization
Unemployment
UI
Machinery Textiles
Machinery-
Mean Variance
4.1 .49
9.4
.3
24.4
3.3
.4
6.47
.01
89.64
2.06
.002
Textiles
Mean Variance
8.1 1.31
10.4
.2
23.2
3.1
.4
14.93
.00
72.27
1.89
.002
Sources: The sources are described in Chapter 4.
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The fact that the pooled all-industry results support several of
the hypotheses, while the recession-specific equations do not, suggests
that the pattern may well be the same for the machinery industry. That
is, with the added variation in the variables, obtained from additional
observations on earlier recessions, the machinery industry coefficients
may have been more precisely measured and statistically significant.
The machinery industry equations explains approximately 18 percent
of the variation in the dependent variable, for the pooled equation.
Almost all of the explanatory power of the model is due to the inclu-
sion of the expected recession, E.
For the 1973-75 recession the model explains approximately 37
percent of the variation in state recessions, whereas 26 percent of
the total is due to the expected recession and 11 percent is due to
the local component.
These estimates were obtained by estimating equation 6-4 with
a constant, and reading the R2. A second equation, with only a constant
and the natural component was also estimated, to determine the con-
tribution of the local component to the R2. This equation is:
E = cons +E. (6-6)jr _ _jr
where the variables are the same as defined earlier.
The unexplained residual may be attributed to such factors as
heterogeneity with 3-digit SIC industries, and omitted variables such
as employee skill levels and cross-state differences in inventory tax
policies. Measurement errors in the dependent and independent
variables, interindustry multiplier impacts and the cyclical sensi-
tivity of trading patterns are all factors that should influence state
recessions, but which were not captured by this model.
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Textile Manufacturing
The estimated coefficients for the textile industry are estimated
with the same model described above. The results of the model applied
to the recession-specific 1969-70 and 1973-75 data, as well the results
for the pooled data are shown in Table 6.6. An F- test was conducted
to determine whether or not to pool the data. The results indicate
that combining the data does not yield more precise estimates of the
coefficients. The F ratio is 6.81, whereas the critical value for
F5,22 is 4.04 at the .01 level. Consequently the results for the
textile industry will be discussed in reference to the 1973-75 recession.
Because of the small sample size for the 1969-70 recession, the textile
industry results for this equation are not as reliable as that of the
1973-75 recession results.
The findings for the 1973-75 model again suggest that high capital-
labor ratio's dampen the cyclical variability of employment. The
coefficient is -.05 with a T-statistic of -2.4. It is interesting to
note that the magnitude of this coefficient is similar to that of the
coefficients on the capital-labor ratio for the 1973-75 all-industry
and machinery industry equations. The comparable parameter for the all-
industry and machinery industry equations are -.0.5 and -.06 respectively,
as compared to -.05 for the textile industry. Thus the magnitude of
the impact of capital-labor ratios on cyclical variability are remark-
ably constant across industries.
Contrary to the evidence of the all-industry model, but consistent
with the hypothesized relationships, the age-of-capital stock co-
efficient is negative and significant at the 5 percent level. The
coefficient on the unemployment insurance benefit ratio is also
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Table 6.6
Final Results,
(Eq.
Textile Industry
6-4)
F Stat
KL A U UE UI SSR
n
1969-70 Recession
.384 -45.233 .081 -.723 25.023 1.56
(.7704) (20.6292) (.1114) (1.6925) (41.475) 110.18
[.499] [-2.193] [.726] [-.427] [.603]
1973-75 Recession
-.048 -2.494 -.015 -.071 4.495 3.048
(.0204) (1.1785) (.0099) (.0801) (1.3688) 120.59
[-2.352] [-2.116] [-1.479] [-.890] [3.283] 23
Combined 1969-70 and 1973-75 Recessions
-. 052 -2.330 -. 008 -. 132 4.751 .0
(.0366) (2.0931) (.0178) (.1422) 2.4583 587.98
[-1.421] [-1.113] [-.456] [-.927] [1.932] 32
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consistent with the hypothesized relationship, but contrary to the
results of the all-industry results. What might explain the difference
in signs between the all-industry and textile industry results?
As can be seen in Table 6.6, the coefficient on the age-of-
capital stock coefficient is negative and significant when textile
industry data from the 1973-75 recession are used to test the model.
The implication is that areas with old capital are more cyclically
variable than states with new capital. The coefficient is -2.5 with
a T-statistic of -2.1. The comparable coefficient for the all-industry
model, as shown in Table 6.1, is a positive 11.1 with a T-statistic
of 2.0. The implication is that regions with new capital are more
cyclically variable than regions with old capital.
The reversal in sign can be explained by the maturity of the
textile industry. Recall that the positive coefficient for the all-
industry model was explained in terms of cross-state differences in
firm birth rates. High-growth regional economies, with high-firm
birth rates, experience greater cyclical variability than slow-
growth regions, because new firms are more susceptible to failure
during periods of economic stringency.
In contrast to the behavior of all-industries, the textile firms
that comprise the textile industry tend to be well-established and
mature. The movement of firms in and out of the industry, that
characterize more dynamic industries, is not typical of textile
manufacturing. The maturity of the textile industry is indicated by
comparing the age-of-the capital stock variable for all manufacturing
to that of the textile industry. The all-state average, for 1972 is
.25 for all-manufacturing (or approximately 25 percent of the state's
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capital stock was put into place during 1971 and 1972. The comparable
figure for the textile industry is .18.
While new firms are more likely to fail during a recession, well-
established firms adjust to the short-run decline by contracting out-
put. The evidence of this study suggests that the contraction of
output, at least for the textile industry, is spatially uneven, as
hypothesized, with older less efficient plants bearing the dispro-
portionate burden of the recessionary impact.
Without the "noise" of the firms entering and exiting the industry,
the hypothesis proposed in Chapter Three does appear to hold for
mature industries. However, the data suggest the fact that the in-
fluence of inefficient old capital on the severity of state recessions
are outweighed by the effects of instability of new firms. This can
be determined not only by the positive coefficient on the age variable
for the all-industry equation, but by the magnitude of the coefficients.
At the all-industry level, the coefficient is 11.1, as shown in Table
6.1, wheras the coefficient of -2.5 for the textile industry is closer
to zero.
The all-industry and industry-specific results suggest that the
relationship between the age-of-capital and cyclical variability is
more complex than originally anticipated. In dynamic industries, the
high death rate of new firms leads to greater cyclical sensitivity in
new-capital regions. In mature industries, where firms adjust to an
economic downturn by contracting output, the regions with a high
proportion of older plants, appear to experience the most severe
recessions, when all other variables are held constant. Thus the
relationship between age and cyclical variability appears to depend
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upon the proportion of new to well-established firms in the industry.
In industries with rapid growth and high firm birth rates, the age-of-
capital variable and cyclical sensitivity should be positively associated.
Where the industry is comprised of well-established firms the age-of-
capital variable and cyclical variability should be negatively related.
We can imagine that there are industries for which the two effects
cancel each other. The machinery industry may well fall into this
category. As shown in Table 6.4, the coefficients for the age variables
in the machinery industry are insignifically different from zero.
The textile industry results also indicate a positive association
between UI and the amplitude of the business cycle. This result is
consistent with the hypothesized relationship, but again in contrast
to the all-industry results. The positive association between cyclical
sensitivity and high unemployment insurance benefits may be explained
as follows. For the reasons described in Chapter Three, high UI may
promote layoffs in manufacturing industries. However the impact of
high UI on residentiary activities have the opposite effect. In its
role as an automatic stabilizer, high UI leads to relatively stable
incomes, and consequently stable demand for the output of the resi-
dentiary sector. Thus at the all-industry or macroeconomic level,
high UI leads to relative stability during the recession, even though
high UI is associated with more severe employment cycles in the
industries of the export sector.
The textile industry data support three of the hypothesized reasons
for cross-state variations in business cycles. Differences in industry's
capital-labor ratios, age-of-capital stock, and UI all appear to
influence the cyclical nature of the textile industyr.
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With data from the textile industry, equation 6-4 explains approxi-
mately 24 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. It is
interesting to note the rational component, E, explains none of this
variation, implying that, in the textile industry, the local component
explains 100 percent of the explained variation.
As stated above, these estimates were derived by including a
constant equation 6-4 and estimating an R2, as well as regressing the
dependent variable on a constant and E, without a coefficient; and
again estimating an R2. These two equations were calculated for the
1973-75 recession only. As indicated earlier, results of the F-test
indicated pooling of the data was not justified. The unexplained
residual may be explained by the same factors identified earlier.
Conclusion
These findings offer evidence of a local component to state's
business cycles. Regional cycles are not only national cycles appro-
priately weighted by states' industry mix, but appear to have a com-
ponent determined by local economic and institutional factors as well.
The significance of the capital-labor ratio and age-of-capital stock
variables suggests that, holding industry composition constant,
recessionary cutbacks in output are distributed unevenly across space.
The statistical significance of the unionization and unemployment
insurance variable provides evidence that layoff policies vary across
regions, explaining in part cross-state differences in employment
fluctuations over the business cycle. The statistical significance
of the multiplier parameter suggests that at least a portion of the
gap between actual and expected state recessions can be explained by
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multiplier impacts on the local residentiary sector.
It was argued, in Chapter Three, that during recessions, loss-
minimizing firms shift cutbacks in output to their high-variable-cost
plants. To the extent that these plants are located across state
boundaries, we would expect milder recessions, ceterus paribus, in
states with high capital-labor ratios. Relying on microeconomic theory,
it was also argued that between two loss-minimizing firms faced with
declining revenues, the labor-intensive plant will close its doors
earlier than the capital-intensive plant. The result is a greater
reduction in output and more unemployment in areas where labor-intensive
firms are located. In either case low capital-labor ratios would be
associated with more severe recessions. The findings support this
view. As shown in Table 6.2, during relatively severe recessions,
an increase in the value of capital per worker leads to an increase
in the severity of a state's recessions. Clearly the impact of the
capital-labor ratio on the local cycle is small. This is not surprising
given that the theory underlying these results refers to individual
firms.
The capital-labor ratios, by region shown in Table 5.9E indicate
that, in 1972, the Southern and Western regions had the highest capital-
labor ratios in the nation. The lowest ratios were in the Northeast
and the West North Central. The capital-labor ratio for the West was
highest at 13.4 or $13,400 worth of capital per manufacturing employee.
The ratio in the West North Central was the lowest at 9.7. The impli-
cation for egional employment cycles are that the relatively high ratio
of fixed to variable costs in the South and West promote cyclically
stability in those areas, while the reverse situation in the North
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Central and East explain, in part, the cyclical sensitivity of those
regions.
It should be noted that the magnitude of the coefficient on the
variable KL should depend upon the cross-state variation in capital-
labor ratios. If all states had equivalent capital-labor ratios, managers
of multiplant firms would have no incentive to distribute cutbacks un-
evenly across plants.
A second reason that industry composition does not explain all of
the variation in regional cycles is that the proportion of new firms
in a region appears to influence an economy's cyclical sensitivity. The
newer a state's capital stock the more cyclically sensitive its employment.
The age variable should have a destabilizing effect on rapidly grow-
ing regions: the regions with the newest capital stock are the West and
the West North Central. The old capital stock appears to be located in
the East North Central and Northeast regions. As shown in Table 5.9E
in 1972 the West had the highest age ratio of .20, whereas the East
North Central region had the lowest age ratio of .13. Recall that the
age ratio approximates the proportion of the state's capital stock put
into place in the previous two years.
The results of the industry-specific model, particularly in the
case of textiles, suggests that this high death rate of new firms
masked another relationship between age of capital and cyclical
variability. When firms of an industry are well-established, and
new entrants to the industry are rare, then efficiency of capital
does appear to influence cyclical employment. The data suggest
that within mature industries, regions with older, inefficient
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production techniques do suffer from relative instability. In dynamic
industries this effect appears to be masked by the cyclical instability
of new firms.
A third local component that explains part of the variation in
regional cycles is union strength. States with large proportions of
the work force belonging to unions appear to have greater fluctuations
in cyclical employment. For example, the results of Table 6.2 suggest
that the 30 percent increase in the proportion of the manufacturing
labor force that is unionized will lead to a .03 percent, times the
expected recession, decrease in the severity of a state's recessions.
In the East North Central region approximately 30 percent of the
labor force is unionized. This area has the highest proportion of
unionized workers'. The Southern region has the smallest proportion of
union members with approximately 18 percent of its labor force unionized.
The Western states are relatively heavily unionized as is the Northeast.
The results of this study suggest that the presence of unions contri-
butes to the amplitude of the employment cycle in the Western, North-
eastern and East North Central states. Statistics on proportions of
the labor force belonging to unions are shown, by region, in Appendix V.
Fourth, the results of this study indicate that UI has a dampening
effect on employment cycles at the all-industry level, but an aggravating
effect on employment cycles at the all-manufacturing level. The inclu-
sion of the residentiary sector at the all-industry level captures UI's
role as an automatic stabilizer. Thus higher benefits, appear to
lead to a more stable income, and a relatively stable residentiary
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sector. The results of the textile industry model and, to some extent,
the machinery industry model do support the hypothesis that high UI
encourages layoffs.
The dampening effect of UI at the all-industry level should be
strongest in the Northeast where benefits are highest and weakest in
the South where benefits are relatively small. The data of UI by
region is also displayed in Appendix V.
Fifth, multiplier impacts on local service sectors also appear to
cause cross-state differences in cyclical fluctuations. Employment in
residentiary or local service industries depends upon employment in
industries that serve national markets. Larger fluctuations in the
export sector due to industry composition, capital-labor ratios, age
of the capital stock unionization or UI will cause greater cyclical
unemployment in local services. The evidence of this thesis suggests
that the short-run export-base multiplier is equal to approximately .4.
Thus for every percent decline in state employment, due to the decline
in export employment, the service sector will experience a .4 percent
decline in employment.
This result is consistent with economic theory as well as empirical
evidence. Since pis a short-run temporary multiplier we should expect
it to be smaller than the long-run permanent multipliers; which, on
the average for all period for all states, approximate 3.3. Resi-
dentiary activities include, in this study, government, wholesale and
retail trade, transportation, public utilities, finance and insurance,
construction, and services. These sectors have been either stable
relative to manufacturing industries or countercyclical.
Thus we should expect a small y , which is consistent with the finding
of this study.
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Both the machinery and textile equations supported the hypothesis
that capital-labor ratios influence cyclical employment. Holding all
other variables constant, high capital-labor ratios tended to be more
stable than their labor-intensive counterparts. Moreover, the size of
the parameters on the capital-labor ratio variable were comparable
all-industry coefficient.
The highest capital-labor ratios for the machinery industry were
in the Northeast with a capital-labor ratio of 12.0. The lowest ratios
were found, in 1972, in the South, with a ratio of 7.6. (see Table 5.13)
The most capital-intensive textile manufacturing was found in the South
with a ratio of 12.0 and the least capital-intensive operation was, in
1972, in the North Central states, with a ratio of 8.8. (see Table 5.16)
Thus the capital-ratio had a stabilizing impace on machinery, employ-
ment in the Northeast and a destabilizing impact on textiles in the
Northeast and North Central states.
To conclude the purpose and findings of this study will be summarized
in Chapter Seven. Chapter Seven concludes with a brief discussion of
policy implications of the research as well as directions for further
work.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This thesis has explored reasons for cross-state differences in
cyclical variability. The fact that cross-state differences in industry
composition explain, at least part of, observed spatial differences in
business cycles has been well documented. National industries have
varying responses to the business cycle, and states comprised of a high
proportion of cyclically sensitive industries tend to experience more
severe recessions than states comprised of cyclically stable industries.
Little previous research has, however, been done on the extent to
which state-specific economic and institutional factors influence a
state's cyclical sensitivity. A contribution of this thesis is the
discovery that cross-state differences in economic structure and
institutions also explain variations in the business cycle. Not only
does industry composition explain a state's cycle, but the capital-
intensiveness of the state's production process, the age of its capital
stock, the extent of unionization of its labor force, and the level of
its unemployment insurance benefits either aggravate or dampen state
cycles.
The results of the empirical work suggest that states with capital-
intensive production processes tend to, holding all other variables con-
stant, experience milder recessions. This result holds whether the
data is tested at the macroeconomic all-industry level or the micro-
economic industry-specific level. The study also finds evidence that
the age of a state's capital stock influences its cyclical sensitivity.
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At the all-industry level, a newer capital stock appears to be associated
with cyclical variability. New capital is a proxy for a high birth rate
of new firms. Since new firms are prone to bankruptcy during recessions,
states with new capital appear to be cyclically variable. The results
for the textile industry suggest that without the "noise" of high birth
and death rates, a mature industry is more cyclically variable in areas
with the oldest capital stock.
Unionization of a state's labor force also appears to influence a
state's business cycle. High rates of unionization are associated with
more severe cycles.
At the macroeconomic level unemployment insurance benefits appear
to act as an automatic stabilizer; the higher the benefit level, the
more stable the state economy. In contrast, at the industry-
specific level the results of the model suggest that high unemployment
benefits encourage larger fluctuations in employment.
Finally, second round impacts of fluctuations in the state's export
sector on the residentiary sector also appear to play a role in explain-
ing state's business cycles. The magnitude of the multiplier is, however,
small, and it appears to contribute little explanatory power to the all-
industry model.
Policy Implications
The policy implications are more difficult to draw than anticipated.
Chapter One listed two areas where the empirical work of this thesis
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might influence policy. One area is in the aiding of countercyclical
investment policy; the second is in the area of determining the spatial
effects of monetary and fiscal policy.
Uncertainty about the extent to which cross-state differences in
percentage declines in full-time employment measure cross-state differ-
ences n welfare presents one complication. As discussed in Chapter Four,
the dependent variable measure does not distinguish between full-time
and part-time employment. During a recession many full-time workers are,
rather than laid off, shifted to part-time work. Is it correct to claim
that welfare is lower in state A, where ten people are laid off, than in
state B, where twenty workers are shifted to one-half time? Because of
limitations in the data, the recession in state A appears to be more
severe than in state B. Therefore great care must be taken before drawing
the conclusion that states with a severe percentage decline in employment
suffer the greatest loss in welfare.
Two of the independent variables are expected to affect industry
trade offs between layoff and work-sharing adjustments to the downturn.
The more unionized the state's work force and the higher the unemployment
insurance benefits, the more likely employers are to favor layoffs to
work-sharing and the more cooperative workers are expected to be with a
layoff strategy. Therefore cross-state differences in trade offs be-
tween layoffs and work sharing are very clearly expected to exist.
A second complication for policy making is found in evidence indicat-
ing industry responds to unintended as well as intended government incen-
tives. The results of the industry-specific equations suggest one
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unintended side effect of the unemployment insurance program is that
the greater the unemployment benefit cushion, the more likely workers
are to be laid off. It is highly likely that anticipated countercyclical
investment policy would have the same effect. To avoid an indirect sub-
sidy to businesses and a situation where workers, who would otherwise
have been kept on private payrolls, end up supported by public funds,
such a countercyclical policy would have to be carefully designed. The
potential for adverse incentives and a policy which would circumvent the
problem are beyond the scope of this thesis.
A third and final complication for policy-making is the finding
that a state's cyclical behavior is not consistent across recessions. A
relatively severely effected state in one recession will not necessarily
experience a severe recession next time. Clearly a more sophisticated
model of cyclical behavior is required. However, the all-industry model
tested here explains only 50 percent of the variation in the severity
of state recessions. Findings presented in Chapter Six suggest that a
3-digit industry-mix breakdown may contribute as much as 38 percent
additional explanatory power. Further refinements of the model, including
such a 3-digit breakdown, would be necessary before the model could be
used for policy making.
Directions for Further Research
There are several possible directions for further research. One
direction is to explore the extent to which the cyclically sensitive
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nature of an industry's employment influences its locational decision.
For example, it is possible that cyclically volatile firms locate labor-
intensive branch plants in low wage areas to absorb the firm's variability
in output. As hypothesized and supported above, low capital-labor
states tend to exhibit greater variability in employment, all other
variables held constant. It is possible this negative association is the
result of a conscious cost-minimizing strategy on the part of cyclically
variable firms to locate labor-intensive branch plants in low wage areas.
To review, the argument is that the cost of idle capital is greater to
the firm than the cost of idle labor. Therefore, costs are minimized if
during a downturn labor-intensive plants bear a disproportionate share
of reductions in output.
It is also possible that cyclically volatile firms are attracted to
states with high unemployment insurance benefits, as it is easier to lay-
off and rehire workers in those states. The effect of cyclical variabil-
ity on locational decisions could be explored by developing a model ex-
plaining the birth or relocations of nationally cyclically sensitive
firms as a function of such factors as insurance benefits, local wages,
and substitutability among capital and labor. These results would then
have to be compared with a similar model, with the birth and relocation
rate of cyclically stable industries.
A second direction for further research is to study the broader
impacts of cyclical sensitivity on economic and institutional factors.
For example, throughout this study it has been argued that unionization
of the labor force and unemployment insurance benefits influence a state's
cyclical variability. It is possible, as stated earlier, that the causal
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relationship moves in the opposite direction and that unionization and
insurance benefits are endogenous and cyclical variability is exogenous.
One way to sort out the direction of the causal relationship would be
to conduct a cross-state historical analysis of the labor union movement
and the inception of the unemployment insurance system focusing on the
relationship between the cyclical nature of industries and the evolution
of the institutional responses to those cycles.
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State Names and Their Abbreviations
Used in the Following Appendices
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
AL
AZ
AK
CA
CO
CN
DE
FL
GA
ID
IL
IN
IA
KA
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MC
MN
MS
MO
MT
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
NB
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PN
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VM
VR
WA
WV
WS
WY
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Appendix I.A
Data for Trend-Adjusted Severity of State Recessions,
Trend-Adjusted Expected Recessions, Unionization, Un-
employment Rate, Ratio of Unemployment Insurance Bene-
fits to Weekly Wages, Capital-Labor Ratio in Manufactur-
ing, and Ratio of Residentiary to Total Employment for
All Industries, 1953-54 Recession, By State.
Sources: See Chapter 4 for description of calculations.
6= 1971; assumes a depreciation equivalent to the
1971 rate prevailed throughout the period.
6 = 1958-62; assumes the annual average depreciation
rate over the period 1958-62 prevailed throughout
the period.
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Ratio of
Trend- Insurance
Trend-Adjusted Adjusted Union- Unemploy- Benefits
Severity Recession ization ment to Weekly
1953-54 1953-54 .1952 Rate Wages
State (%) (%) (%) 1952 1952
A L
AZ
CA
CO
It
F L
GA
1 L
IN
IA
K A
KY
PD
PN
P S
10
PT
NB
kV
ND
0 DOH
OR
PN
RI
SC
TN
UT
VW 0
VR
tV
#s S
2.222
.962
1.620
3.193
3.928
.000
2.703
2.933
5.325
1.218
1.780
3.409
2. 396
1.015
2.211
2.970
4.439
2.151
.000
1.604
2.041
.000
3.217
6.644
2.985
3.574
2.867
1.668
2.459
2.439
.1.917
3.679
2.112
4.611
4.627
6.740
4.267
4.019
3.761
3.826
4.598
4.589
4.033
6.664
3.476
5.275
3.617
3.834
3.713
5.564
2.571
3.859
4.251
4.080
2.387
5.241
4.198
4.103
4.574
3.962
3.883
5.392
4.947
4.158
4.244
5.215
24.6
.27.4
35.'
27.5
18.1
15.9
14.7
39.7
40.0
24.7
23.6
24.7
24.9
37.8
14.4
39.4
46.7
19.4
30.1
33.3
8.0
15.3
37.0
42.8
37.9
26.1
9.0
22.3
26.0
18.9
17.1
39.8
38.0
3.70
1.70
3.30
.70
1.10
2.50
2.40
2.60
2.10
1.50
1.20
4.30
1.80
2.40
4.60
2.10
2.40
1.20
2.20
3.80
3.50
2.90
1.50
4.50
3.20
6.60
2.60
4.60
2.10
3.90
1.70
4.30
1.7
.321
.300
.306
.315
.275
.300
.318
.319
.326
.339
.337
.313
.346
.280
.351
.299
.286
.352
.329
.334
.319
.396
.327
1.306
.373
.351
.333
.295
.394
.357
.306
.294
.353
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1952
Age of Capital
6='1971 =1958-62
.189
.196
.235
.220
.234
.235
.332
.232
.269
.232
.317
.335
.190
.124
.257
.243
.35 E
.220
.142
.181
.137
.398
.272
.364
.268
.181
.250
.243
.174
.190
.273
.295
.205
.204
.193
.282
.311
.245
.332
.446
.269
.306
.311
.371
.472
.241
.154
.307
.223
.532
.225
.220
.214
.160
.457
.218
.361
.302
.208
.21.7
.280
.204
.198
.303
.349
.221
Capital-Labor Ratio
6=1971 6=1958-62
($000's)
6.090
6.072
5.253
6.158
5.779
7.667
2.756
4.739
5.499
4.937
3.572
5.451.
4.874
5.716
4.243
3.260
. 3 14
4.059
16.669
3.792
3.906
9.661
5.252
4.701
5 . 233
3.697
5.344
4.325
9.152
3.618
4.054
6.425
4.870
5.648
6.147
4.391
4.358
5.523
5.428
2.049
4.095
4 .837
3.673
3.049
3.868
3.853
4 .583
3.557
3.559
2.906
3.74
10.794
3.212
3.335
8.402
6.551
4.731
4 .635
3.224
6.143
3.762
7.795
3.464
3.654
5.433
4.517
Ratio of
Resi denti ary
to Total
Employment
.634
.791
.723
.807
.560
.803
. 645
.609
.535
.711
.714
.670
.670
.726
.708
.686
.809
.822
.865
. 665
.558
.928
.543
.684
.553
.368
.585
.645
.794
.606
.696
.521
.564
State
AL
A7
CA
Co
D E
FL
GA
IL
IN
IA
KA
KY
XD
PS
sT
NV
NY
NC
No
OH
OR
PN
R I
SC
TN
UT
VR
4v S
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Appendix I.B
Data for Trend-Adjusted Severity of State Recessions,
Trend-Adjusted Expected Recessions, Unionization, Un-
employment Rate, Ratio of Unemployment Insurance Bene-
fits to Weekly Wages, Capital-Labor Ratio in Manufactur-
ing, and Ratio of Residentiary to Total Employment for
All Industries, 1957-58 Recession, By State.
Sources: See Chapter 4 for description of calculations.
6 = 1971; assumes a depreciation equivalent to the
1971 rate prevailed throughout the period.
6 = 1958-62; assumes the annual average depreciation
rate over the period 1958-62 prevailed throughout
the period.
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Ratio of
Trend- Insurance
Trend-Adjusted Adjusted Union- Unemploy- Benefi ts
Severity Recession ization ment to Weekly
1957-58 1957-58 1956 Rate Wages
State (%) (%) (%) 1956 1956
AL 2.299 5.737 29.3 4.20 .303
AZ 2.113 5.239 30.6 2.60 .297
(A 3.382 5.685 36.5 2.60 .316
C0 3.141 4.667 28.5 1.30 .319
DE 2.780 5.048 33.0 1.60 .318
fL 2.484 3.499 16.5 2.50 .308
GA 2.640 4.419 15.5 3.20 .319
In 1.201 4.911 16.8 3.70 .365
It' .3.124 5.752 .47.3 2.30 .301
IN 4.234 5.793 40.5 2.90 .315
1A 1.915 4.972 29.0 2.C .337
KA 2.090 5.681 24.0 2.30 .349
KY 2.846 5.068 29.7 6.70 .303
PD 2.509 5.644 27.9 1.80 .326
"N 2.0e5 4.380 38.9 3.20 .303
PS 1.514 4.690 15.0 5.00 .35'
ho 2.426 3.788 46.0 3.10 .274
PT 1.481 5.677 47.5 3.10 .311
he 2.702 3.074 22.0 2.50 .349
NV 3.065 5.122 25.0 4.20 .371
NY 1.816 4.727 37.8 3.50 .337
NC 1.252 3.906t 9.0 3.90 .291
ND 2.029 .E?6 24.0 3.90 .395
OH 4.721 6.86 5 40.9 1.90 .343
OR 2.519 5.383 47.0 4.60 .347
PN 2.517 5.792 52.0 4.40 .351
RI 2.497 5.108 27.0 5.10 .380
SC 1.187 4.311 9.5 3.40 .356
SD 2.453 2.727 19.0 2.60 .345
TN 2.142 4.360 23.0 5.90 .301
UT 2.025 4.039 26.8 2.30 .361
V14 1.903 5.625 16.5 2.70 .330
VP 1.497 3.894 18.0 1.80 .288
hV 4.615 5.570 45.0 3.20 .254
wS 3.258 5.776 45.1 2.30 .364
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1956
Age of Capital Capital-Labor Ratio Ratio of
6=1971 6=1958-62 6=1971 6=1958-62 Residentiary
($000's) to Total
State Employment
AL ..222 .224 7.151 7.063 .646
AZ .182 .162 5.200 5.211 .788
CA. .223 .229 5.609 5.460 .714
Co .238 .251 6.229 5.897 .809
DE .340 .343 9.595 -9.527 .5.60
FL .195 .206 7..814 7.423 .849
GA .322 .334 4.401 4.241 .650
ID .'309 .318 8.148 7.928 .780
IL .202 .206 5.765 5.635 .623
IN .237 .241 7.851' 7.700 .558
IA .225 .236 . 5.943 5.675 .736
KA .244 .249 5.509 5.379 .741
KY .209 .219 6.801 6.486 .666
MD .301 .312 6.614 6.381. .722
MN .150 .156 5.861 5.650 .733
Ms .176 .181 4.270 4.153 .696
O .190 .187 4.643 4.709 .691
MT .581 .600 13.288 12.887 .799
he .173 .174 5.251 5.235 .830
NV .185 .313 11.672 6.896 .870
NY .170 .174 3.934 3.828 .680
Nt ..191 .199 4.453 4..340 .563
ND .0t2 .063 8.645 8.422 .929
CH .205 .198 6.810 7.053 .565
OR .207 .206 6.517 6.524 .699
PN .170 .173 6.361 6.237 .577
RI .150 .153 3.986 3.895 .515
sC .161 .157 5.706 5.846 .564
SD .125 .134 5.477 5.117 .888
7N .216 .220 5.808 5.690 .641
UT .230 .236 12.035 11.722 .783
M .150 .152 4.172 4.141 .530
VR .245 .249 5.881 - 5.791 .710
bv .271 .278 10.305 10.056 .572
ws .165 .167 5.552 5.483 .588
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Data for Trend-Adjusted Severity of State Recessions,
Trend-Adjusted Expected Recessions, Unionization, Un-
employment Rate, Ratio of Unemployment Insurance Bene-
fits to Weekly Wages, Capital-Labor Ratio in Manufactur-
ing, and Ratio of Residentiary to Total Employment for
All Industries, 1960-61 Recession, By State.
Sources: See Chapter 4 for description of calculations.
6 = 1971; assumes a depreciation equivalent to the
1971 rate prevailed throughout the period.
6 = 1958-62; assumes the annual average depreciation
rate over the period 1958-62 prevailed throughout
the period.
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Ratio of
Trend- Insurance
Trend-Adjusted Adjusted Union- Unemploy- Benefits
Severity Recession ization ment to Weekly
1960-61 1960-61 1959 Rate Wages
State (%) (%) (%) 1959 1959
AL
A?
CA
CO
DE
FL
GA
ID
IL
IN
IA
K A
KV
MD
MN
,fs
m 0MO
NT
KV
NM
h Y
NC
hD
0,H
OK
OR
PN
P I
SC
SD.
14
UT
VM
V P
w V
wS
.621
.559
1.602
2. 0Q4
.227
1.250
2.792
1.970
2.703
.565
1.860
2.115
1.756
1.176
.9t0
1.726
.905
2.992
.000
1.605
1.140
1.556
1.339
2.840
.37e
2.448
2.006
1.606
1.636
.000
.549
.263
1.664
1.873
1.944
2.600
.5 OVDY
3.555
3.603
2.611
3.333
2.342
2.769
2.975
3.267
4.057
2.636
3.269
3. 068
3.279
2.439
3.641
2.911
3.793
1.896
3.948
2.426
2.698
3.160
1.780
3.794.
3.118
4.226
3.439
3.509
3.045
1.443
2.969
3.695
3.662
2.876
3.188
3.056
30.1
36.1
28.3
32.4
13.5
13.0
16.0
47.2
36.6
28.0
21.4
29.4
26.9
34.6
13.0
45.3
34.5
21.1
20.5
16.5
37.4
8.5
23.3
43.8
17.2
46.8
51.4
26.5
7.2
18.3
. 19.4
- 22.3
16.0
14.0
44.0
4.9
.eu
3.90
4.10
2.20
3.30
3.20
3.80
4.60
3.30
3.10
1 .90
2.70
6.10
5.'00
3.90
5.20
3.60
6.70
2.00
4.90
2.70
5.20
4.10
4.80
3.10
4.10
4.60
6.80
5.50
3.30
2.10
5.10
3.40
4.20
2.60
8.30
2.70
.303
.338
.327
.366.
.330
.317
.331
.432
.303
.306
.308
.367
.345
.360
.321
.363
.311
.338
.352
.391
.312
.351
.2C9
.364
.331
.301
.3e8
.331
.377
.356
.348
.292
.383
.320
.309
.254
.373
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1959
Age of Capital Capital-Labor Ratio Ratio of
6=1971 6=1958-62 6=1971 6=1958-62 Residentiary
($000's) to Total
State Employment
AL .151 .148 9.000 9.201 .675
AZ .236 .237 5.816 5.796 .8D7
CA .181 .173 6.226 6.525 .717
C ' .179 .163 t.242 6.870 .805
DE .083 .082 10.838 10.984 .560
FL .214 .196 7.674 8.372 .836
GA .189 .177 5.589 5.957 .666
ID .169 .161 8.812 9.244 .734
IL .157 .151 7.187 7.485 .63Q
IN .152 .147 10.164 10.524 .574
IA .178 .164 6.639 7.195 .730
KA .202 .194 7.413 7.723 .752
KY .161 .148 7.621 8.290 .690
MD .117 .109 8.160 8.716 .704
PN .152 .142 6.174 6.590 .742
1S .235 .22' 4.989 5.226 .682
M0 .154. .158 5.942 5.795 .701
P7 .115 .109 15.973 16.898 .832
NB .181 .180 7.729 7.771 .E20
tV .160 .142 12.703 14.332 .Q14
NM .478 .. 75 6.898 6.979 .F45
NY .168 .160 4.470 4.691 6EF
NC .169 .162 5.092 5.324 .571
ND .202 .193 9.365 9.806 .929
OH .135 .144 8.496 7.976 .5b7
OK .207 .195 7.584 8.059 .766
OR .188 .189 8.370 8.355 .704
PN, .134 .129 7.834 8.117 .6c1
PI .121 .116 4.241 4.424 .519
Sc .119 .125 5.991 5.734 .576
4D .245 .219 4.269 4.769 .887
TN .179 .173 .6.f81 7.133 .654
UT .130 .124 11.703 12.276 .7E4
V" .157 .155 5.126 5.193 .655
VR .143 .140 6.923 7.117 .713
w .155 .148 14.745 15.406 .597
w .133 .130 6.437 6.584 .602
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Appendix I.D
Data for Trend-Adjusted Severity of State Recessions,
Trend-Adjusted Expected Recessions, Unionization, Un-
employment Rate, Ratio of Unemployment Insurance Bene-
fits to Weekly Wages, Capital-Labor Ratio in Manufactur-
ing, and Ratio of Residentiary to Total Employment for
All Industries, 1969-70 Recession, By State.
Sources: See Chapter 4 for description of calculations.
6 = 1971; assumes a depreciation equivalent to the
1971 rate prevailed throughout the period.
6 = 1958-62; assumes the annual average depreciation
rate over the period 1958-62 prevailed throughout
the period.
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Appendix I.D
Ratio of
Trend- Insurance
Trend-Adjusted Adjusted Union- Unemploy- Benefits
Severity Recession ization ment to Weekly
1969-70 1969-70 1968 Rate Wages
State* (%) (%) (%) 1968 1968
AL .670 3.821 20.1 2.60 .315
AZ .000 3.203 18.9 2.30 .318
AK .692 3.007 19.1 2.E0 .351
CA 1.1E2 4.735 31.9 3.70 .359
CO .177 3.224 21.8 .90 .406
DE 2.049 3.042 26.0 1.70 .325
FL .000 3.499 14.4 1.60 .289
GA .868 3.421 16.6 1.30 .-333
10 .000 1.990 19.3 3.20 .405
IL 1.074 3.269 36.0 1.50 .321
IN 2.650 . 4.968 36.0 1.40 .288
IA .547 2.818 21.3 1.30 .391
KA 2.079 6.201 18.3 1.40 .3e3
KY .000 2.767 27.5 2.50 .339
LA .000 3.253 18.0 2.40 .320
ED .000 4.144 .22.6 1.80 .361
MN 1.135 2.978 30.2 1.70 .349
MS .365 3.&82 13.8 2.10 .282
PO 1.514 4.795 36.0 2.10 .330
MT .000 2.769 31.3 3.10 .298
N .166 2.959 17.2 1.30 .353
NV .000 2.107 29.4 3.80 .328
km .617 -2.462 13.4 2.80 .310
KY 1.322 3.163 36.2 2.50 .323
NC .000 2.432 7.5 1.70 .2F4
ND .000 2.071 18.8 3.00 .409
OH 1.816 4.868 35.8 1.30 .320
OK .195 4.064 16.7 2.30 .272
OR 1.138 3.532 31.6 3.20 .317
PN 1.531 3.595 37.3 2.10 .345
P1 1.597 2.607 24.1 3.10 .391
SC .319 2.243 8.6 1.80 .336
SD 1.704 1.47F 14.4 1.60 .352
T .975 2.807 19.4 2.50 .313
Tx .E25 4.097 13.9 .90 .305
VT 1.654 3.845 18.-4 3.10 .375
VM .745 3.084 20.7 2.50 .375
VR 3.093 3.480 16.6 .70 .314
. bv .681 2.574 41.9 3.20 .247
,NS 1.197 3.745 32.2 1.90 .392
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1968
Age of Capital Capital-Labor Ratio Ratio of
6=1971 6=1958-62 6=1971 6=1958-62 Residentiary
($000's) to Total
State Employment
AL 4185 .171 11.535 12.489 .646
AZ .250 .253 9.252 9.149 .783
AK .226 .212 8.329 8.882 .676
CA .204 .172 8.153 9.677 .755
CO .. 223 .159 9.033 12.680 .820
DE .168 .160 14.745 15 .489 .581
FL .202 .146 8.567 11.840 .838
GA .230 .183 7.427 9.343 .684
ID .200 .171 11.777 13.793 -.785
IL .200 .172 9.434 10.963 .673
IN .174 .153 14.094 16.025 .596
IA .202 .150 9.172 12.393 .741
KA .201 .171 8.741 10.244 .767
KY .260 .196 10.236 13.587 .694
LA .373 .268 18.697 26.019 .777
MD .149 .114 10.302 13.405 .778
MN .215 .169 6.485 0.223 .734
Ps .283 .244 .7.744 8.965 .664
MO .136 .151 9.161 8.278 .699
MT .193 .156 22.532 27.940 .846
No .154 .150 9.990 10.204 .813
NV .273 .180 13.75& 20.842 .Q38
NM .182 .176 6.598 6.962 .E69
NY .202 .169 6.011 7.199 .739
NC .223 .192 7.620 8.864 .586
ND .183 .155 11.393 13.409 .930
OH .191 .238 11.029 8.852 .656
OK .157 .121 7.425 9.669 .783
OR .162 .163 13.984 13.893 .744
PN .1E3 .159 9.931 11.411 .62F
RI .214 .184 5.426 6.315 .553
SC .243 .277 9.208 8.089 .545
SD .255 .175 3.F87 5.680 .893
.TN .200 .176 8.975 10.184 .514
TX .188 .199 .19.597 18.466 .760
UT .134 .109 13.481 16.573 .811
VM .235 .225 6.644 6.936 .695
VP .175 .158 9.651 10.656 .732
av .153 .128 22.297 26.571 .659
ws .189 .174 8.725 9.481 .685
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Appendix I.E
Data for Trend-Adjusted Severity of State Recessions,
Trend-Adjusted Expected Recessions, Unionization, Un-
employment Rate, Ratio of Unemployment Insurance Bene-
fits to Weekly Wages, Capital-Labor Ratio in Manufactur-
ing, and Ratio of Residentiary to Total Employment for
All Industries, 1973-75 Recession, By State.
Sources: See Chapter 4 for description of calculations.
6 = 1971; assumes a depreciation equivalent to the
1971 rate prevailed throughout the period.
6 = 1958-62; assumes the annual average depreciation
rate over the period 1958-62 prevailed throughout
the period.
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Ratio of
Trend- Insurance
Trend-Adjusted Adjusted Union- Unemploy- Benefits
Severity Recession ization ment to Weekly
1973-75 1973-75 1972 Rate Wages
State (%) (%) (%) 1972 1972
fL 3.15 1u.0tu "I.z 2 .9V .347
Al 3.026 6.086 16.6 - 2.30 .347
At 4.032 6.880 16.4 3.10 .362
iA 1.684 5.889 28.9 4.70 .333
to 1.501 5.201 18.9 1.30 .414
EN 1.820 6.288 26.1 4.50 .422
4E 2.197 6.798 20.3 2.50 .327
fL 1.728 6.166 14.7 1.90 .318
A 3.804 7.850 13.9 1.60 .330
2t 1.918 6.318 17.0 4.20 .404
1L 2.936 5.444. 35.6 2.80 .338
a 3.134 6.598 33.9 2.20 -.301
1A 1.891 5.438 20.0 2.20 .413
IA 1.572 5.528 15.4 2.40 - .394
Ky 2.332 5.875 24.9 2.90 .378
LA 1.889 5.873 16.9 3.40 .352
PE 2.685 8.057 19.1 5.70 .394
"D 1.519 5.915 21.7 3.10 .404
PA 2.100 6.325 26.0 5.10 .380
PC 3.218 5.823 38.4 4.40 .319
MP 1.501. 5.704 28.3 3.30 .356
OS 3.494 7.535 12.6 1.70 .323
VD 3.011 5.477 32.9 3.30 .340
PT 1.554 6.483 30.7 4.40 .375
Is 1.373 4.985 17.0 1.90 .386
1.344 4.902 33.6 5.00 .382
2.339 7.d.75 17.2 2.50 .397
kJ 2.175 5.684 29.1 5.10 .397
w 1.064 6.158 13.2 3.70 .360
by .739 5.879 36.2 &.20 .333
oC 4.152 8.700 7.5 1.60 .313
oD 1.810 6.211 16.1 3.90 .420
ON 2.070 6.383 34.8 2.30, .339
ot 1.169 5.462 16.0 3.10 .293
OR . 1.835 7.288 27.9 4.50 .313
PM 1.403 6.780 38.2 4.20 .424
*1 3.4.2 6.909 27.3 5.10 .436
SC 4.282 8.316 9.0 1.90 .3'0
so 1.622 4.2t2 11.4 2.20 .378
TN 3.470 7.187 18.4 2.50 .346
T1 .454 5.557 13.5 1.30 .3'8
VUT 1.425 5.933 19.d 3.50 .411
. " 2.207 6.726 17.7 5.60 .44.6
VR 2.322 6.615 15.5 1.00 .358
VA .123 6.856 38.3 7.10 .371
vv 1.317 5.540 41.3 4.10 .274
1.826 6.522 29.7 4.10 .393
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1972
278
Age of Capital Capital-Labor Ratio Ratio of
6=1971 6=1958-62 6=1971 6=1958-62 Residentiary
($000's) to Total
State Employment
AL
AZ
AK
CA
CO
CN
D E
FL
0 AI D
IN
IA
KA
KY
LA
PE
D C0C A
N h
Ps
r 0
h vNP
NH
AJ
NY
hC
AD
OH
OK
OR
PN
RI
SC
SD
TN
T X
UT
VR
A S
sv S
.129
.212
.163
.146
.255
.112
.100
.202
.207
.187
.147
.109
.177
.161.
.170
.221
.124
.133
.152
.152
.184
.178
.106
.Ie 5
.138
.273
.141
.156
.372
.164
.192
.224
.121
.226
.126
.124
.173
.194
.346
.159
.118
.134
.177
.170
.143
.107
.135
.116
.215
.151
.117
.175
.112
.093
.158
.153
.122
.092
.123
.135
.118
.15
.10-9
.096
.135
.140
.139
.148
.120
.126
.134
.160
.149
.106
.360
.132
.160
.185
.159
.170
.127
.104
.144
.227
.229
.136
.127
.104
.168
.151
.120
.06
.121
12.423
12.378
8.876
9.877
10.036
10.63
17.864
9.179
8.98 8
I 1..631
11.492
16.565
11.225
10.621
10.963
20.212
15.207
13.364
7.564
14.441
- 7.898
8.654
11.950
25.995
11 .705
12.020
10.217
9.673
7.737
9.093
10.637
13.356
8.5E6
16.101
12.268
6.39.
10.885
4.037
10.421
23.976
13.582
9.868
11.593
16 174
25.595
10.103
13.741
12.217
9.579
12.248
14.561
10.63 8
19.074
13.573
11.775
14.186
13.855
19.566
16.172
12.911
15.706
30.666
17.346
18.440
8 .490
15.720
10.455
10.406
10.515
34.033
12.009
19.354
9.653
14.218
6.399
9.612
10.923
12.899
10.193
11.426
15.967
14.599
7.687
9.293
6 .1C9
12.191
22.254
17.44
10.366
13.078
19.312
32.131
11.211
.685
.815
.679
.784
.887
.638
.688
.857
.712
.798
.698
.66
.757
.785
.698
.792
.622
.815
.630
.643
.763
.666
.736
.854
.828
.668
.693
.872
.770
.600
.656
.783
.762
.663
.581
.613
.893
.6e0
.783
.821
.745
.79'
.673
.685
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1972
Trend-Adjusted Severity, Expected Recession Age of
Capital, Capital-Labor Ratio for Machinery Manufacturing,
By State
Trend-Adjusted Expected Capital-Labor
Severity Recession Age of Ratio
1973-75 1973-75 Capital 1972
State (%) (%) 1972 ($000's)
A .12.900 .5.990 .301 5.491
CA 3.372 3.4.70 .268 9.865
to .979 2.821 .296 9.625
Cf 4.876 3.950 .118 15.938
.fL 4.039 4.019 .403 7.670
EA 2.134 4.833 .274 6.971
it 2.760 3.824 - .303 7.169
IL 6.074 3.860 .194 11.012
IN .4.933 4.290 .206 11.855
IA 4.034 4".914 .285 10.057
KY .602 3.630 .398 6.184
LA 7.862 4.727 .185 8.604
sD 4.18 3.917 .257 8.897
PA 5.792 3.44.6 .136 12.904
PC 6.516 4.423 .214 9.705
PH 6.764 3.729 .186 9.1'2
P0 9.151 4.248 .329 10.131
he 4.152 3.772 .298 11.4.10
NH 4.064 4.454 .158 11.895
WJ 3.900 3.617 .197 11.611
& Y 4.930 4.529 .348 6.145
fEC 3.625 4.4.19 .170 11.358
OH 2.126 3.235 .320 6.877
OK 4.103 3.497 .276 5.759
OR .707 3.037 .167 13.465
PN 11.648 4.342 .124 8.798
& . 5.798 4.488 .529 10.035
SC 10.067 5.844 .281 6.963
TN .000 3.502 .271 7.925
TX 2.632 ..596 .149 13.842
6.815 4.752 .307 8.340
YR 1.818 3.362 .155 6.415
6a 2.429 3.974. .215 7.631
bV 4.361 4.251 .157 10.335
Sources: See Chapter 4 for description of calculations.
Appendix II.B
1972
Unemployment Rate, Ratio of Insurance Benefits
to Weekly Wages, Total Employment in Machinery
Manufacturing, By State
State Ratio of
Unemployment Insurance
Ratea Benefits to Total
1972 Weekly WagesbEmploymentc
State (%) 1972 1972
at 3.100 .362 7500.
CA 4.700 .333 135000.
CO 1.300 .414 14300.
Cw -. 500 .422 51700.
FL 2.500 .318 17000.
6A 1.900 .330 127QQ.
ID 1.600 .338 196700.
IL 2.800 .301 68600.
IN 2.200 .413 48000.
IA 2.900 .3?8 32100.
KY 3.400 .352 7000.
LA 3.100 .404 ' 19400.
"D 5.100 .380 74300.
A .400 .319 136900.
0C 3.300 .356 55000.
"N 3.300 .340 30600.
PO 1.900 .386 8700.
0e 2.500 .397 9800.
NH 5.100 .397 62300.
kJ 4.200 .333 -135100.
1Y 1.600 .313 30700.
NC 2.300 .339 198600.
OH 3.100 .293 22700.
OK 4.500 .313 10100.
OR 4.200. .424 122700.
PN 5.100 .436 9000.
P1 1.900 .340 18900.
SC 2.500 .346 25900.
ITN 1.300 .348 70800.
TX 5.600 .446 5000.
V 1.000 .358 10600.
VR 7.100 .371 10300.
A 4.100 .274 4900.
v 4.IC0 .393 97400.
Sources: aManpower Report of the President, 1973.
bHandbook of Unemployment Insurance, 1978.
cCensus of Manufactures and Annual Survey of Manufactures.
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1972 and 1968
Trend-Adjusted Severity, Expected Recession Age of
Capital, Capital-Labor Ratio for Machinery Manufacturing,
By State
281
Trend-Adjusted Expected Capital-Labor
Severity Recession Age of Ratio
1973-75 1973-75 Capital 1972
State (%) (%) 1972 ($000's)
AL -11.218 8.f33 .178 10.882
AK 6.279 7.225 .288 12.045
to 12.870 -11.395 .187 10.958
0E 16.250 7.204 .048 5.720
GA 9.174 8.174 .221 10.242
IL 3.125 8.556 .208 10.197
PE 8.780 7.558 .186 1.316
"D 7.857 10.717 .113 22.537
A 10.372 8.076 .T37 8.407
Fs 7.097 8.090 .236 10.028
O 4.286 6.615 .067 6.713
1% 14.200 8.308 .151 11.135
kJ 7.308 7.617 -.264 10.210
N . 8.840 7.211 .217 8.326
NC 7.532 8.498 .208 11.408
om 7.288 7.391 .164 9.850
PN 7.230 7.277 .205 8.331
RI 11.318 9.439 .113 13.092
SC 10.300 8.194 .156 14.173
Tt4 9.723 7.498 .209 9.141
TX 8.630 7.474 .112 14.616
VR 9.241 8.032 .205 . 11.189
12.712 6.947 .180 8.460
Trend-Adjusted Expected Capital-Labor
Severity Recession Age of Ratio
1969-70 1969-70 Capital 1968
State (%) (%) 1968 ($000's)
AL 2.036
AK 4.146
D E 18.333
GA 1.651
13.333
NY 2.865
0 9.028
Sc 1.558
V 5.083
1.583
1 .59'.
1.472
1.2EE
2.00r,
1.961
1 .695
1 .876
.273
.231.
.099
.324
.156
.203
.264
.220
.218
10.719
11.648
12.900
9 .276
8.477
7.533
10.739
13.557
10.581
Sources: See Chapter 4 for description of calculations.
Appendix III.B
1972 and 1968
Unemployment Rate, Ratio of Insurance Benefits
to Weekly Wages, Total Employment in Machinery
Manufacturing, By State
282
State Ratio of
Unemployment Insurance
Rate Benefits to Total
1972a Weekly WagesbEmploymen tC
State (%) 1972 1972
AL 2.900 .347 43700.
AK 3.100 .362 4100.
. 4.500 .422 ,13000.
DE 2.500 .327 5820.
CA 1.600 .330 111600.
IL 2.800 .338 -4400.
ME 5.700 .394 76100.
oD 3.100 .404 1200.
tA. - 5.100 .380 29100.
Ps 1.700 .323 7.00.
PO 3.300 .340 2000.
NH 2.500 .397 7600.
5.100 .397 29900.
WY 4.200 .333 55600.
NC 1.600 .313 275600. .
CH 2.300 .339 9000.
PN 1.200 .424 61300.
01 5..100 .43e 16900.
SC 1.900 .340 143300.
IN 2.500 .346 32400.
7x 1.300 .348 6300.
'V 1.000 .358 "000.
5 4.100 .398 6A.DC.
State Ratio of
Unemployment Insurance
Ratea Benefits to Total
1968 Weekly WagesbEmploymentc
State (%) 1968 1968
AL 2.600 .315 36500.
AK 2.800 .351 2800.
DE 1.700 .325 1500.
6A 1.300 .333 1C2600.
oS 2.100 .282 6400.
NY 2.500 .323 17200.
ON 1.3C0 .320 7200.
SC 1.800 .336 127500.
VA .700 .31' 36800.
Sources: aManpower Report of the President, 1973.
bHandbook of Unemployment Insurance, 1978.
CCensus of Manufactures and Annual Survey of Manufactures.
Appendix IV.A
Capital-Labor Ratios and Age-of-Capital Stock
for all Manufacturing by Region
1952
(6 = 1958-62)
Capital Labor Ratios Age of Capital Stock
($000's)
Mean Standard Mean Standard
Deviation Deviation
Northeast 3.41 .690 .24 .042
Northcentral 4.74 1.465 .27 .090
East 4.86 .981 .27 .047
West 4.64 1.808 .27 .116
South 4.87 1.784 .31 .091
West 5.27 2.841 .56 .782
Source: See Chapter 4 for description of calculations.
Appendix IV.B
Capital-Labor Ratios and Age-of-Capital Stock
for all Manufacturing by Region
1956
(6 = 1958-62)
Capital Labor Ratios Age of Capital Stock
($000' s)
Mean Standard Mean Standard
Deviation Deviation
Northeast 4.52 .938 .17 .033
Northcentral 6.10 1.175 .19 .056
East 6.65 .978 ,22 .037
West 5.74 1.228 .17 .063
South 7.04 2.541 .23 .058
West 7.41 2.856 .33 .178
Source: See Chapter 4 for description of calculations.
Appendix IV.C
Capital-Labor Ratios and Age-of-Capital Stock
for all Manufacturing by Region
1959
(6 = 1958-62)
Capital Labor Ratios Age of Capital Stock
($000' s)
Mean Standard Mean Standard
Deviation Deviation
Northeast 5.64 1.486 .14 .016
Northcentral 7.63 1.670 .16 .030
East 8.39 1.566 .14 .016
West 7.09 1.611 .18 .026
South 8.94 3.556 .15 .035
West 9.70 3.916 .20 .111
Source: See Chapter 4 for description of calculations.
r')
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Appendix IV.D
Capital-Labor Ratios and Age-of-Capital Stock
for all Manufacturing by Region
1968
(6 = 1958-62)
Capital Labor Ratios Age of Capital Stock
($000's)
Mean Standard Mean Standard
Deviation Deviation
Northeast 8.50 2.393 .17 .027
Northcentral 10.52 2.764 .17 .024
East 11.57 2.865 .18 .034
West 9.78 2.642 .16 .011
South 13.28 5.790 .18 .049
West 14.45 6.151 .17 .036
Source: See Chapter 4 for description of calculations.
Appendix IV.E
Capital-Labor Ratios and Age-of-Capital Stock
.for all Manufacturing by Region
1972
(6 = 1958-62)
Capital Labor Ratios Age of Capital Stock
($000's)
Mean Standard Mean Standard
Deviation Deviation
Northeast 11.40 3.234 .13 .023
Northcentral 12.64 3.463 .14 .036
East 14.11 3.747 .13 .025
West 11.58 3.085 .15 .040
South 15.81' 7.051 .14 .034
West 16.58 7.244 .17 .076
Source: See Chapter 4 for description of calculations.
Appendix V
Unionization, Unemployment and Ratio of Insurance Benefits
to Weekly Wages for All Industries by Region
1972
Union (Percentages) Unemployment Ratio of Insurance Benefits
(Percentages) to Weekly Wages
Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard
Deviation Deviation Deviation
Northeast 27.23 7.545 4.54 .961 .40 .036
Northcentral 30.40 7.557 2.88 .972 .35 .037
East 35.08 3.501 3.04 1.413 .34 .035
West 24.55 7.337 2.68 .732 .38 .032
South 17.60 8.457 2.49 .905 .34 .035
West 28.50 7.931 4.40 2.381 .36 .045
Source: See Chapter 4 for description of calculations.
o
Appendix VI.A
Real Investment by State, 1952-1976
for All Manufacturing
($000' s)
Alabama Arkansas Arizona California Colorado
1952 124492.7 64510.9 13550.8 554370.5 41383.8 1952
1953 117346.4 83578.6 8570.2 669419.0 31646.4 1953
1954 96990.6 50371.5 16273.6 696921.0 35520.0 1954
1955 109921.6 60899.7 18223.8 675339.1 38861.6 1955
1956 259146.1 54583.3 15174.2 834885.3 69980.5 1956
1957 307537.3 87170.6 20429.0 885549.5 53940.8 1957
1958 165144.0 48227.0 27698.0 753163.0 50713.0 195b
1959 147831.7 52579.3 33608.6 709502.9 43880.6 1959
1960 196564.6 68405.2 33706.5 752992.2 58672.5 1960
1961 161192.5 68065.8 65018.4 673749.5 57152.8 1961
1962 124019.2 72456.2 37650.3 876248.8 79809.8 1962
1963 141047.8 70223.0 47321.5 942692.8 65096.7 1963
1964 266972.6 69639.5 37127.7- 976737.9 60244.1 1964
1965 345912.6 96627.0 48405.6 1099032 78724.7 1965
1966 384472.8 110440.1 71218.7 1335008 118376.6 1966
1967 340186.7 154965.0 98671.2 1372957 89423.6 1967
1968 295404.3 123574.5 91234.0 1307489 117106.4 1968
1969 311219.5 -147073.2 96260.2 1399106 126097.6 1969
1970 320430,1 161904.8 89477.7 1203840 171198.2 1970
1971 260821.7 125972.1 104328.7 1039545 174834.9 1971
1972 254369.6 136103.2 142120.3 1181232 163896.8 1972
1973 331815.0 159765.4 151414.8 1323119 214354.7 1973
1974 607266.7 235733.3 164733.3 1722400 238666.7 1974
1975 680258.1 221096.8 188967.7 1659671 235483.9 1975
1976 719937.5 295437.5 114500.0 1791937 240750.0 1976
Source: Census of Manufactures, and Annual
goods deflator.
Survey of Manufactures, deflated by durable
1 1w
wAppendix VI.A
Real Investment by State, 1952-1976
for All Manufacturing
($000's)
Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Idaho
1Q52 178013.3 38148.9 105901.9 ?25503.6 30098.1 1952
1Q53 159944.0 32171.4 122863.1 171269.0 20021.4 1953
1954 152819.6 27564.9 12,3912.7 204087.3 24324.3 1954
1955 172910.0 26106.1 92667.8 226252.6 38845.4 1955
1956 206169.9 162771.6 126627.7 251099.6 33041.1 1956
1Q57 229334.0 60243.1 185635.3 199948.9 19554.6 1957
1958 195441.0 27926.0 152303.0 169871.0 19196.0 1958
1Q59 165696.7 24539.1 152927.6 171595.9 22945.2 1959
1960 192393.6 30931.0 148970,8 168245.9 36384.8 1960
1961 165580.3 56328.8 217942.9 143493.2 25142.2 1961
1962 215184.4 55512.0 184098.9 183711.8 25514.9 1962
1963 205364.6 84981.8 182408.6 193457.4 27144.5 1963
1964 210213.8 68772.0 157778.6 224500.5 '42963.1 1964
1965 251073.5 65424.2 276937.7 287321.9 75595.3 1965
1966 -366269.5 82397.5 278385.7 335675.1 52302.2 1966
1967 400161.6 104058.2 269976.7 380050.3 51804.6 1967
1968 341531.9 80595.7 240936.2 352510.6 36255.3 1968
1969 308455.3 62195.1 254390.2 417886.2 42195.1 1969
1970 263594.5 51843.3 .290169.0 348156.7 40860.2 1970
171 238224.5 57373.4 305942.8 373000.7 39765.2 1971
1Q72 237535.8 65544.4 331661.9 493481.4 53653.3 1972
1073 244789.5 78744.0 358799.2 462111.8 51897.9 1973
1974 319400.0 97933.3 490666.7 608133.3 88400.0 1974
-1Q75 375871.0 109483.9 528516.1 443 25.8 .92258.1 1975
1)76 299937.5 99812.5 541875.0 533062.5 99937.5 1976
Source: CM and ASM, deflated by durable goods deflator.
Appendix VI.A
Real Investment by State, 1952-1976
for All Manufacturing
($000's)
Illinois Indiana, Iowa Kansas Kentucky
459314.8
507198.8
355244.1
517655.1
634309.5
665548.5
515295.0
381075.3
533728.9
367372.3
366894.3
531336.8
859317.9
976809.3
976233.2.
901777.7
848936.2
949918.7
780491 .6
621496.7
649928.4
764113.2
934933.3
971483.9
921937.5
72376.5
76921.4
91587.3
87963.1
142500.0
112932.6
103193.0
108773.0
134541.3
120589.0
104759.8
121485.2
162913.9
171325.6
201253.2
207128.7
191234.0
217398.4
216205.8
192663.2
235959.9
225465.8
341800.0
444645.2
443437.5
68116.2
69897.6
62520.0
74438.3
96760.8
91143.0
98959.0
75260.3
57882.4
54870.4
70202.7
101743.5
95898.8
87783.3
102879.3
139971.3
113787.2
99512.2
106528.4
97212.0
142693.4
184403.0
203600.0
207290.3
205187.5
156540.0
129770.2
180362.0
110109.6
129323.6
157103.2
112525.0
100545.0
111292.5
118052.2
134807.9
213934 '.0
154346.3
208382.3
262882.9
303735.0
314893.6
272764.2
237020.0
208363.9
272206.3
348102.1
366466.7
3.12580.6
326000.0
Source: CM and ASM, deflated by durable goods deflator.
1952
1053
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1060
1961
1962
1963
1964
1 965
1Q66
1067
1969
1970
1071
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
74
71
67
64
88
04
73
65
69
67
73
74
86
1
.1
1
1
-1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
8681 .6
6735.7
b340 .8
8614.8
9967.5
3236.0
0728.0
1446.2
8552.0
9185.7
8245.0
2195.2
5046.4
067932
312929
340815
271660
213415
163902
083125-
120415
172395
436333
437742
459500
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Appendix VI.A
Real Investment by State, 1952-1976
for All Manufacturing
($000's)
Louis.iana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan
1952 282887.4 37872.9 116946.7 218934.6 735891.0 1952
1953 291964.3 45944.0 138017.9 187157.1 843221.4 1953
1954 205655.7 69498.8 110740.6 213087.3 1026492 1954
1955 106712.8 62667.8 204877.7 224918.1 929416.4 1955
1956 176818.2 54298.7 346346.3 247629.9 1098328 1956
1Q57 307104.2 60415.7 276577.1 249183.9 709604.7 1957
1958 173383.0 44329.0 128085.0 2'28513.0 465273.0 1958
1059 137047.9 40821.9 116823.9 264048.9 522631.1 1959
1960 134963.1 53219.6 174065.1 280524.8 637389.7 1960
1061 160125.7 52359.8 189078.3 26789.2 544581.2 1961
1062 141445.7 46627.3 215110.5 275859.7 533869.4 1962
1963 201757.9 59798.1 168714.8 261227.8 729007.7 1963
1964 217759.7 66844.8 148136.2 291405.9 975040.7 1964
1965 320301.4 105580.5 208856.7 318861.4 1351550 1965
1966 442347.5 121341.2 245539.0 444422.0 1351331 1966
1Q67 665649.1 88705.3 225893.3 443257.3 1221225 1967
1968 517106.4 97191.5 210553.2 375148.9 1024085 1968
1969 456178.9 84227.6 252764.2 404308.9 1115122 1969
1970 361443.9 107680.5 295238.1 474731.2 999001.5 1970
1971 393617.0 88628.0 228540.0 333308.9 882098.3 1971
1972 407020.1 99498.6 2-22277.9 385028.7 1'483811 1972
1973 486059.4 77225.7 218840.6 461697.7 1378813 1973
1974 632133.3 115466.7 292400.0 509666.7 1900467 1974
1975 751032.3 202838.7 297096.8 400258.1 1460194 1975
1976 975500.0 317125.0 263125.0 488500.0 1476937 1976
Source: CM and ASM
N)(.0
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Appendix VI.A
Real Investment by State,
for All Manufacturing
($000' s)
1952-1976
Minnesota Mississippi Misouri Montana Nebraska
1952 67262.7 35592.0 156565.4 13266.3 26400.7 1952
1953 114420.2 37344.0 134338.1 37953.6 42894.0 1953
1954 96919.8 43o41.5 146691.0 24261.8 42941.0 1954
1955 91496.0 38177.6 166543.3 75062.3 24093.4 1955
1956 106772.7 37885.3 180033.5 90537.9 33851.7 1956
1957 104065.4 50223.7 177956.1 20427.0 76276.8 1957
1958 108521.0 67665.0 185879.0 19898.0 49906.0 1958
1959 102617.4 62524.5 171798.4 15702.5 34756.4 1959
1960 113577.3 39710.4 155196.3 17217.7 32845-.5 1960
1961 135200.2 38009.7 165152.8 17572.5 39266.9 1961
1962 133922.2 104827.1 198118.2 22449.6 41844.4 1962
1963 .152211.5 125551.2 201971.3 36925.4 44099.5 1963
1964 158242.2 98141.9 215244.1 39597.9 47480.6 1964
19t5 148931.2 109260.5 258968.4 29085.6 53291.2 1965
19t6 191046.3 170270.4 288049.9 28380.2 68531.8 1966
1967 207667.4 247979.9 311366.5 61860.3 64104.9 1967
1968 220085.1 122297.9 263404.3 30553.2 58042.6 1968
1969 248943.1 150731.7 -243333.3 21382.1 77073.2 1969
1970 230414.7 210983.1 291397.9 32488.5 63748.1 1970
1971 220102.7' 138664.7 266544.4 36977.3 63462.9 1971
1972 218839.5 168982.8 283596.0 54298.0 73280.8 1972
1973 228088.3 164941.3 300621.1 45755.7 74879.2 1973
1974 325800.0 213133.3 364800.0 66533.3 95533.3 1974
1975 314580.6 167290.3 392838.7 49225.8 103741.9 1975-
1976 309312.5 210562.5 373437.5 53500.0 104687.5 1976
Source: G and ASM, deflated by durable goods deflator.
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Appendix VI.A
Real Investment by State, 1952-1976
for All Manufacturing
($000' s)
Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York
1952 5707.0 23141.6 376905.6 5778.5 666882.6 1952
1953 5707.1 17358.3 396356.0 - 4681.0 612065.5 1953
1954 5719.3 21806.6 462712.3 7765.3 685238.2 1954
1955 5952.7 24254.9 427613.6 15651.7 633109.6 1955
1Q56 5323.6 38769.5 532160.2 14384.2 750198.1 1956
1Q57 8939.7 25955.1 538799.8 20380.0 744024.5 19.57
1958 5155.0 24365.0 449734.0 24545.0 792201.0 1958
1Q59 5391.4 24489.2 420956.0 18327.8 679940.3 1959
1960 5283.8 25601.6 456008.7 18858.1 724098.1 1960
1961 3462.3 27674.1 452263.1 10681.8 659376.2 1961
1Q62 5715.7 29945.2 511614.8 8802.1 728171.0 1962
1963 8277.5 28983.7 502398.1 9911.0 749814.4 1963
1964 7772.9 38361.4 475125.8 9493.9 889148.5 1964
1Q65 15980.5 37045.6 574494.0 11826.0 1021739 1965
1966 5745.0 65772.2 704502.7 10451.0 1076421 1966
1967 13826.5 67875.7 740079.0 9517.0- 1176423 1967
1Q68 12085.1 45957.4 650638.3 10212.8 1142638 1968
1969 13414.6 83252.0 758699.2 15609.8 1295935 1969
1970 9984.6 56221.2 693010.8 9370.2 1166667 1970
1971 15920.8 58474.0 585766.7 32208.4 1050404 1971
1972 16833.8 70988.5 673424.1 22063.0 1078797 1972
1Q73 8764.7 70393.4 .65Q282.3 40717.7 1134369 1973
1Q74 16200.0 69333.3 802133.3 96133.3 1465467 1974
1975 18387.1 62709.7 774322.6 114774.2 1401355 1975
1976 33125.0 86000.0 760187.5 74687.5 1439812 1976
Source: CM and ASM
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Appendix VI.A
Real Investment by State, 1952-1976
for All Manufacturing
($000's)
North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon
1952 17082.3 1500.0 905259.1 46334.1 97038.7 1952
1953 - 161203.6 1555.9 875506.0 74873.8 75448.8 1953
1Q54 152856.1 1915.6 908733.5 61014.2 79965.8- 1954
1955 197997.7 1606.0 783778.5 52457.9 93275.7 1955
1Q56 210540.0 1564.0 1140206 54720.8 99748.9 1956
1957 199424.9 3724.2 1234458 60563.8 106795.7 1957
1958 191292.0 9142.0 795773.0 61927.0 123339.0 1958
1Q59 230365.0 2610.6 663743.6 83288.6 103147.7 1959
1960 243738.6 2347.9 783416.9 63894.1 116409.1 1960
1961 219805.6 3604.4 727529.0 43285.3 110078.3 1961
19o2 282604.2 2770.4 745915.5 44658.0 104293.9 1962
1963 300888.0 7716.7 811292.8 60824.9 126329.2 1963
19t4 333533.6 16093.7 1026507 58632.9 133896.9 1964
1965 475898.6 10409.3 1239051 6207.0.7 214429.8 1965
1966 664695.1 6402.9 1438976 64048.1 257806.7 1966
1967 596696.0 7362.2 1521009 72634.2 210271.1 1967
1968 542638.3 9106.4 1495234 71574.5 168851.1 1968
1969 614796.7 5365.9 1605772 106422.8 207804.9 1969
1970 548387.1 9447.0 1310061 112212.0 173655.9 1970
1971 594570.8 9904.6 961261.9 116214.2 170432.9 1971
1972 706876.8 14398.3 1214470 160315.2 191475.6 1972
1973 727122.2 22291.2 1338371 174948.2 229537.6 1973
1974 799400.0 20466.7 1682400 226133.3 275133.3 1974
1Q75 797871.0 23548.4 1393871 231161.3 283419.4 1975
1976 809125.0 30500.0 1337812 256625.0 236375.0 1976
Source: CM and ASM, deflated by durable goods deflator.
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Appendix VI.A
Real Investment, By State, 1952-1976
for All Manufacturing
($000's)
West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming
1952 113605.3 221692.5 1F331.7 1952
1953 .135447.6 203256.0 17170.2 1953
1954 116607.3 199790.1 8135.6 1954
1955 156278.0 200148.8 5861.6 1955
1956 213632.0 242457.8 13179.7 1956
1957 269080.7 317377.9. 10649.6 1957
1958 171937.0 203747.0 6985.0 1958
1959 101300.4 196624.3 4193.7 1959
1960 122763.8 269315.8 11145.8 1960
1961 110063.8 220416.8 10132.5 1961
1962 161031.7 245246.9 4063.4 1962
1963 165552.2 268578.9 13369.4 1963
1964 170622.5 289310.3 13541.2 1964
1965 184738.6 329136.7 8744.2 1965
1966 226265.0 432380.2 15145.2 1966
1967 241515.5 454839.3 6823.5 1967
1968 179234.0 393106.4 7574.5 1968
1969 160975.6 384715.4 7317.1 1969
1970 193471.6 359523.8 3609.8 1970
1971 177036.0 298165.8 4622.2 1971
1972 154727.8 383452.7 16762.2 1972
1973 159213.3 487508.6 10766.0 1973
1974 199733.3 595266.7 11466.7 1974
1975 234774.2 568000.0 13677.4 1975
1976 180500.0 570687.5 19062.5 1976
Source: CM and ASM
Appendix VI.B
Capital Stock Values, By State,
for All Manufacturing,
($000' s)
1952-1976
6 = 1958-1962a
Alabama Arkansas Arizona California Colorado
1v52 1203151 353100.2 131188.1 4147772 258808.7 1952
1953 1288012 427498.2 138446.5 4725940 290248.1 1953
1954 1350227 466754.7 153335.6 5318890 325535.9 1954
1955 1423692 515518.7 170026.0 5877213 364137.1 1955
1956 1644398 556698.6 183500.0 6582800 433826.3 1956
1957 1907537 629395.0 202094.0 7323528 487420.0 1957
1958 2021177 661257.7 227771.1 7915573 537743.1 1958
1959 2114437, 696644.3 259102.0 8450934 581193.5 1959
1960 2253912 746936.8 290217.5 9018005 639401.0 1960
1961 2354249 795582.2 352333.7 9493359 696042.3 1961
1962 2414703 847355.2 386460.7 10160753 775295.3 1962
19t3 2490554 895547.0 429917.6 10879909 839771.7 1963
1964 2690282 941902.3 462746.1 11617289 899343.9 1964
1965 2963557 1014040 506524.2 12460740 -977349.1 1965
19C6 3268014 1098115 572677.7 13521612 1094944 1966
1967 3519964 1224529 665622.1 14597094 11b3491 1967
1962 3720329 1316266 750200.0 15583447 1299651 1968
1969 .3931100 1429116 38958.1 16639717 1424709 1969
1970 4145390 1553864 920046.3 17477483 1594767 1970
1971 4294286 1639435 1015174 18132523 1768326 1971
1472 4432710 1732913 1147143 18914840 19-30808 1972
1973 4644842 1847623 1287086 19821832 2143619 1973
1974 5126698 2035318 1438949 21108152 2380570 1974
1975 5668535 2203496 1613527 22303643 2614150 1975
1976 6235422 2441643 1711892 23604900 2852808 1976
aSource: Census of Manufactures and Annual Survey of Man
depreciation rate from 1957 to 1962.
ufacturers, based on average
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Appendix VI.B
Capital Stock Values, By State, 1952-1976
for All Manufacturing, 6 = 1958-1962
($000's)
C h t i t I Dlaware Florida Georga a
324034.2
351345.2
373639.9
394141.4
551000.9
602979.0
621860.3
637071.6
658446.5
704898.6
749837.1
823571.4
879989.8
932214.2
1000628
1089677
1153928
1198814
1232675
1271558
1318029
1377003
1454281
1541951
1618634
603713.7
725973.1
849159.9
940978.6
1066665
1251234
1402286
1553811
1701228
1917470
2099651
2279960
2435459
2709961
2985637
3252628
3490311
3741211
4027639
4329554
4656887
5011029
5496685
6019704
6555559
603351.1
769793.3
967722.2
1186233
1427843
1616369
1773309
1930718
2083519
2210344
2376373
2550819
2754913
3020196
3331709
3685106
4008136
4393957
4706962
5042307
5495450
5913598
6474422
6865853
7343989
134118 .6
149177.6
167982.3
200612.4
226230.9
237415.0
'247826.6
261602.3
28F307.8
302782.6
317094.5
332506.5
363166.9
425325.1
461890.2
496604.9
514485.9
537645.0
558612.4
577708.9
609987.0
639315.3
704060.7
770268.5
841706.1
Source: CM and ASM.
Idaho
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
905
'v66
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
1613233
1713488
1802908
1909111
2044644
2198326
2312429
2392566
2496434
2569647
2689754
2795598
2902375
3046060
3299626
3577701
3786858
3955200
4072452
4159996
4243612
4331387
4490526
4700248
4826276
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
onnec c-u
Appendix VI.B
Capital Stock Values, By State, 1952-1976
for All Manufacturing, 6 = 1958-1962
($000's)
Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky
1952 5142244 2958982 586685.5 432269.9 561618.9 1952
1953 5725282 3424755 661846,8 491793.0 688019.4 1953
1954 6254765 3732053 751448.6 542510.1 864253.4 1954
1955 6740756 4197459 837157.3 603928.1 969177.4 1955
1956 7455464 4773004 977145.8 686194.7 1092686 1956
1957 8204858 5371731 1087147 760869.0 1243233 1957
1958 8722260 5811822 1187079 841567.1 1348299 1958
1959 9146927 .6111532 1292290 896629.8 1440754 1959
1960 9c07659 6559699 1422955 932993.1 1543402 1960
1961 10037045 6835235 1539275 965471.7 . 1652194 1961
1962 10514327 7106436 1639417 1012503 1777088 1962
19o3 10983150 7538283 1755984 1089947 1980360 1963
1964 11562634 8292065 1913630 1159687 2122824 1964
19t5 12329937- 9152785 2079214 1219637 2318469 1965
1906 13322288 10000879 2274230 1293245 2567441 1966
1967 14316724 10762645 2474536 1402179 2855772 1967
1968 15216149 11460904 2658346 1482314 3153531 1968
1969 16033943 12250370 2867770 1546250 3407374 1969
1970 16780962 12859356 3075372 1615669 3623949 1970
1971 1742?783 13300821 3258809 1674105 3810569 1971
1972 18095076 13764538 3484993 1776620 4059912 1972
1973 18796998 14335948 3700004 1918384 4383655 1973
1974 19744610 15070178 4030704 2075943 4723820 1974
1975 20668992 15830679 4463257 2233410 5008057 1975
1976 21591098 16530987 4893305 2384996 5304009 1976
Source: CM and ASM.
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Appendix VI.B
Capital Stock Values, By State
for All Manufacturing, 6 = 1
($000's)
, 1952-1976
958-1962
Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan
1952 1240040 311685.9 1004442 2212515 * 4597464 1952
1953 1498523 357006.6 1134425 2308959 5302762 1953
1954 1663719 425791.4 1236090 2427379 6170170 1954
1955 1725511 487607.6 1431079 2552774 6914482 1955
1956 1855741 540931.1 1765977 2695740 7805375 1956
1957 2112740 600265.0 2028426 2834399 8280819 1957
1958 2229079 643393.5 2140284 2946702 8497667 1958
1959 2305942 682928.6 2239985 3069936 8765369 1959
1960 2378644 734782.4 2396130 3243773 9139797 1960
1961 2474547 785672.6 2566040 3137568 9410184 1961
1962 2549180 830728.5 2760622 3284787 9661748 1962
1963 2682110 888865.1 2907252 3411339 10100903 1963
1964 2827452 953932.3 3032130 3562880 10772917 1964
1965 3071413 1057605 3216730 3735663 11801279 1965
1966 3430832 1176831 3436535 4026923 12798572 1966
1967 4003849 1263183 363493t 4305076 13635840 1967
1968 4412851 1357848 3816410 4503717 14250850 1968
1969 4749883 1439360 4038643 4723373 14938446 1969
1970 4983080 1544161 4301572 5004446 15489295 1970
1971 5242154 1629701 4495699 5132573 15906714 1971
1972 5507636 1725940 4682011 5307166 169133?4 1972
1973 5844989 1799714 4863396 5551270 17784737 1973
1974 6319307 1911581 5116889 5833334 19151661 1974
1975 6899718 2110597 5373050 5994426 20037305 1975
1976 7688926 2423501 5593191 6237154 20913124 1976
Source: CM and ASM.
(A)
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Appendix VI.B
Capital Stock Values, By State, 1952-1976
for All Manufacturing, 6 = 1958-1962
($000' s)
Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska
1952 971167.6 284495.7 1346200 50596.8 210886.1 1952
1953 1061309 317572.3 1453614 88297.4 249562.4 1953
1954 1131696 356450.3 1571233 112117.7 287512.2 1954
1955 1194899 389281.1 1706352 186619.4 305855.4 1955
1956 1271800 421327.2 1852258 276224.2 333590.0 1956
1957 1344070 465231.0 1993169 295270.0 403195.0 1957
1958 1418989 525917.5 2139185 313691.6 445037.1 1958
1959- 1486132 580553.2 2268199 327825.7 470892,7 1959
19t0 1562556 611555.3 2378032 343404.3 494320.3 1960
1961 1658692 640391.7 2495624 359259.8 523700.9 1961
1962 1751147 735612.9 2643829 379913.1 555071.2 1962
19t3 1659580 850129.9 2792924 414938.9 5b8069.3 1963
1964 197.1333 935519.9 2952310 452462.1 623788.5 1964
1965 2070980 1030748 3152232 479285.3 664603.9 1965
1966 2210252 1185557 3377237 505269.1 719843.6 1966
1967 23o2ob3 1415753 3621059 564603.1 769551.6 1967
19t8 2523682 1516815 3812042 592333.3 812203.1 1968
1969 2709533 1644794 3979134 610753.7 873032.2 1969
1970 2e72209 1831106 4190950 640188.4 919319.6 1970
1971 3020507 1942304 4373675 673964.7 964396.2 1971
19o72 3163834 2082152 4569797 724892.9 1018389 1972
1973 3312826 2215861 4779022 767024.1 1072900 1973
1974 3555805 2395756 5048242 829722.3 1146976 1974
1975 3781491 2527110 5340116 874799.5 .1227778 1975
1976 3996266 2699766 5606751 923925.5 1307910 1976
,Source: CM and ASM.
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Appendix VI.B
Capital Stock Values, By State, 1952-1976
for All Manufacturing, 6 = 1958-1962
($000's)
Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York
1952 36019.2 193834.9 3263857 4368.7 6262580 1952
1953 41366.2 208091.9 3604728 8687.1 6642930 1953
1954 46671.9 226569.0 4006160 15731.4 7082380 1954
1955 52157.8 247198.8 4365669 30077.3 7453441 1955
1956 56959.9 282013.1 4823613 41965.1 7927862 1956
1957 65330.0 303456.0 5280411 58862.0 8378556 1957
1958 69831.7 322965.7 5640378 78521.5 8860750 1958
1959 74524.8 342287.5 5965448 90332.0 9212843 1959
1960 79063.3 362412.4 6320044 101692.5 9596066 1960
1961 81734.9 384287.9 6664866 103933.9 9900388 1961
1962 86633.3 408084.6 7063178 104109.5 10262244 1962
1963 94044.4 430538.9 7445502 105379.4 10632356 1963
1964 100876.9 462011.7 7794054 106126.7 11128107 1964
1965 115848.6 491665.1 8236050 109144.3 11738106 1965
1966 120435.1 549570.7 8800539 110536.3 12380217 1966
1967 133057.3 608653.3 9391009 110878.8 13098572 1967
1968 143811.9 644872.3 9882000 111888.6 13756563 1968
1969 155788.4 717806.4 10472705 118211.6 14543505 1969
1970 164215.1 762542.7 10987680 117770.2 15172062 1970
1971 178493.6 808816.0 11386656 140203.7 15661100 1971
1972 193542.6 866863.4 11866507 150629.8 16160436 1972
1973 200371.9 923387.0 12324059 178845.3 16696868 1973
1974 214568.1 977946.2 12916683 260134.4 17544551 1974
1975 230809.6 1025009 13471422 353317.5 18296757 1975
1976 261626.5 1094609 14002596 398679.6 19059590 1976
Source: CM and ASM.
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Appendix VI.B
Capital Stock Values, By State,
for All Manufacturing,
($000's)
1952-1976
6 = 1958-1962
North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon
49540.3
49610.0
50037.3
50142.2
50201.8
52420.0
59989.4
608 00 . 3
61324.2
63088.9
63966.7
69764.4
83765?1
91661.5
95314.5
99817.3
105929.2
108117.1
114320.6
120795.6
131570.0
149914.2
165883.4
184455.3
209421.6
8751969
8962326
9189922
9275267
9710552
10207008
10227048
10113536
10128324
10086101.
10065473
10111789
10369800
10820747
11437346
12089117
12665578
13308767
13607362
13534464
13720315
14015942
14633131
14914884
15119165
334899.7
406089.7
462636.8
510005.7.
559116.4
613530.0
668708.2
744641 .0
800344.1
834825.6
870300.5
921552.1
970047.9
1021448
1074260,
1135078
1194166
1287453
1385503
1486477
1630441
1787454
1993925
2203154
2435544
652653.4
713743.8
778007.3
854166.8
935124.0
1021347
112?216
1200675
1290670
1372353
1446455
1540962
1640958
1819287
2037069
2202525
2322920
2479621
2598725
2711986
2843798
3010772
3219668
3432255
3593120
Source: CM and ASM.
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CD)
1952
1053
1954
1I55
1956
1957
1Q58
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1 Q8
1969
1970
1971
1 Q72
1973
1974
1Q75
1976
1395789
1543034
1680460
1861653
2053577
2232466
2401433
2t07784
2825445
3016996
3269430
3537624
3835781
4273322
'489 5284
5443027
5931235
6486720
6970239
7495108
8127033
8772885
.9484556
0187582
0894831
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1
1
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Appendix VI.B
Capital Stock Values, By State, 1952-1976
for All Manufacturing, 6 = 1958-1962
($000's)
Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina S. Dakota Tennessee
1952 7115589 424570.3 1273792 60684.4 984309.8 1952
1953 7881622 447638.7 1266161 60268.7 1154797 1953
1954 8454743 462364.0 1263059 60050.9 1320350 1954
1955 9035395 479230.5 1281999 598'26.5 1438707 1955
156 9763399 501430.3 1314155 59487.9 1636122 1956
1957 10525659 517367.0 1351223 57822.0 1833335 1957
1958 11110414 526567.3 1344415 58927.6 2013714 1958
1459 11536071 537909.7 1356084 63433.6 2141968 1959
1960 12100846 551668.3 1413626 66247.6 2314491 1960
1961 12552707 572591.9 1481200 71440.5 2463953 1961
1962 13012980 597170.5 1549474 81562.3 2611152 1962
1063 13470886. 614534.4 1627047 82794.3 2803725 1963
1964 13959649 634599.2 1743525 86179.0 3042859 1964
1965 14652464 659637.5 1900313 90210.0 3356728 1965
1966 15621836 701348.2 2147542 90782.4 3766422 1966
1967 16744667 740451.7 2390576 91699.0 4076423 1967
1968 17731177 788706.0 2586028 94294.8 4420817 1968
1969 18599058 822930.1 2720069 92965.7 4775694 1969
1970 19397866 845850.1 2838707 95812.2 5089221 1970
1971 20062749 870710.2 3031870 98914.1 5396422 1971
1972 20681039 907873.1 3209963 106289.5 5696898 1972
1973 21309010 932772.9 3425405 121034.2 6070551 1973
1974 22203545 973128.6 3782188 132907.4 6597023 1974
1075 23002550 1011300 4072120 147019.4 7024438 1975
1976 23746807 1060473 4366221 167081.0 7400360 1976
wA
Source: CM and ASM.
Appendix VI.B
Capital Stock Values, By State, 1952-1976
for All Manufacturing, 6 = 1958-1962
($000's)
Texas
3002963
3552731
4057605
4429982
4953566
5698598
6212794
6529531
6918562
7426219
7864694
8273831
8838586
9624288
10563907
11649180
12719399
13714795
14725192
15579999
16279108
17061024
18794920
20929987
23554240
Utah
253815.5
271429.*5
298734.7
340511.0
390395.6
424377.0
455263.6
483662.6
515983.6
550222.9
588083.8
615822.1
637000.9
659739.8
707307.8
759751.9
792183.6
832610.9
876555.6
928430.3
976140.9
1024026
1119535
1203319
1290803
Vermont Irni
146102.9
149408.9
151658.4
154782.0
158895.6
172281.0
174403.5
181242.9
184839*1
192872.2
201447.7
205370.9
213689.5
235485.5
253471.1
271044.0
289923.8
315604.0
349781.9
367007.5
373183.2
381988.7
407179.3
434203.8
470072.6
880639.8
1028875
1144055
1305143
1477070
1675727
.1798730
1890915
2011310
2156190
2301707
2491288
2716883
2984070
3282364
3547957
3784924
4048114
4294358
4553606
4909483
5265250
5714537
6068082
6550253
Vermont
Source: CM and ASM.
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CD
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
19t8
1Q69
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Virginia Washington
942551.4
1071666
1222663
1427998
1638974
1846183
1967858
2040065
2137160
2228761
2361069
2448725
2565093
2737571
3059545
3412515
3659660
3831669
3990068
4173701
4339420
4556298
4833949
5253726
5557273
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970,
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Appendix VI.B
Capital Stock Values, By State, 1952-1976
for All Manufacturing, 6 = 1958-1962
($000's)
West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming
1052 729920.2 2100527 165865.3 1952
1953 860988.3 2234466 175074.0 1953
1954 972429.7 2360519 174806.1 1954
1955 1122873 2482770 172277.0 1955
1956 1329768 2643297 177187.3 1956
1957 1590870. 2873446 179332.0 1957
1958 1753262 2982369 177709.1 1958
1959 1844043 3080575 173372.8 1959
1960 1955742 3248232 176196.6 1960
1961 2054072 3361457 177871.7 1961
1962 2202779 3495776 173397.3 1962
1963 2355114 3648994 178443.6 1963
1964 2511606 3817888 183419.4 1964
1965 2681275 4021034 183359.5 1965
1966 2891452 4320720 189703.4 1966
1967 3115619 4632976 187421.1 1967
1968 3276159 4873194 185999.4 1968
1969 3417478 5097094 184388.5 1969
1970 3590445 5288414 179147.7 1970
1971 3745938 5412062 175170.7. .1971
1972 3878190 5616917 183524.7 1972
1973 4014134 5919067 185481.6 1973
1974 4189783 6319004 188045.1 1974
1975 4399418 6678477 192696.4 1975
1976 4553522 7028775 202509.5 1976
Source: CM and ASM.
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Appendix VII
for States
Machinery Industry
Real Investment, By Year,
Included in Machinery Industry
($000's)
Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut
1963 1318.7 49444.0 2283.3 28756.0 1963
1964 1343.4 52177.9 1749.3 30196.8 1964
1965 1517.2 67253.0 9971.2 38346.0 1965
1966 4314.0 94987.3 29942.8 62214.2 1966
1967 2693.5 138893.9 11222.8 63296.8 1967
1968 2212.8 116851.1 15659.6 58638.3 1968
1969 4227.6 123658.5 10325.2 50894.3 1969
1-970 3302.6 132565.3 13210.4 38402.5 1970
1971 5209.1 113939.8 14967.0 29200.3 1971
1972 3866.2 11816.6 12535.8 29369.6 197w
Flori da Georgi a Ill inoi s Indiana Iowa
1963 3004.8 3576.1 32524.4 79646.9 20498.6 1963
1964 6414.4 2516.6 118562.0 31434.2 28822.1 1964
1965 4192.6 4557.2 174763.7 50299.5 37079.1 1965
1966 8075.3 2428.3 166499.1 55740.5 40232.3 1966
1967 14006.1 6464.4. 161608.9 61591.0 62488.8 1967
1968 16510.6 5106.4 148936.2 48085.1 38553.2 1966
1969 17642".3 6991.9 140650.4 46829.3 29187.0, 1969
1970 21428.6 4838.7 149616.0 48771.1 41397.8 1970
1971 17314.7 10564.9 140278.8 41159.2 28833.5 1971
1972 13753.6 8882.5 137894.0 56303.7 47134.7 1972
nufactures and Annual Survey of Manufactures.
Analysis
wA
Source: Census of Ma
Appendix VII
for States
Machinery Industry
Real Investment, By Year,
Included in Machinery Industry Analysis
($000' s)
Kentucky Louisiana Maryland Massachusetts Michigan
1958 13051.0
19'59 5625,2
1960 6165.2
1961 7879.1
1962 11446.7
1963 11749.3 1716.7 5882.3 30347.4 63519.6 1963
1964 16550.6 1913.0 4873.2 30304.6 78734.2 1964
1965 16068.8 2090.2 11049.3 33632.6 103581.4 1965
1966 28030.9 3076.2 12059.9 54265.0 127982.8 1966
1967 22266.1 3681.1 11492.2 48572.5 153438.7 1967
1968 23914.9 2297.9 10212.8 44510.6 122212.8 1968
1969 21544.7 3089.4 9024.4 51707.3 123577.2 1969
1970 24500.8 6605.2 17357.9 69585.3 96467.0 1970
1971 28026.4 4548.8 73.4 45267.8 64049.9 1971
1V72 39613.2 6086.8 13395.4 55229.2 80014.3 1972
Source: CM and ASM.
oo
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Appendix VII
Machinery Industry
Real Investment, By Year,
for States Included in Machinery
($000's)
Industry Analysis
Minnesota Missouri Nebraska New Hampshire New Jersey
1963 30063.2 11424.9 1354.1 3757.9 26938.8 1963
1964. 22081.4 13268.7 656.6 4091.8 31614.9 1964
1965 30526.5 13584.2 3887.4 2780.5 37893.0 1965
1966 34187.8 13294.0 4205.1 8363.0 36424.7 1966
1967 38696.4 31244.4 6284.8 11133.1 56742.7 1967
1968 33021.3 15319.1 9361.7 5531.9 42978.7 1968
1969 45365.9 14146.3 12276.4 5528.5 52439.0 1969
1970 40629.8 22503.8 10906.3 7680.5 37711.2 1970
1971 3b077.8 14159.9 8657.4 11151.9 31401.3 1971
1972 35001.7 15257.9 9455.6 14469.9 48137.5 1972
Source: CM and ASM.
CD
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Appendix VII
Machinery Industry
Real Investment, By Year,
for States Included in Machinery Industry
($000's)
Analysis
New York North Carolina Ohio Oklahoma Oregon
1957 117482.1 130668.0
1958 70081.0 82601.0 3320.0
1959 58994.1 68369.9 2116.4
1960 78186.6 '88237.1 2949.5
1961 76525.1 67940.0 1624.8
1962 66767.5 72779.1 3513.0
1963 71670.8 3785.6 79646.9 5330.1 2014.4 1963
1964 89469.3 8085.1 108012.3 11522.2 2142.9 1964
1965 123608.4- 7760.9 128704.2 7456.7 5430.7 1965
1966 114539.9 3081.7 156993.6 11794.9 5700.5. 1966
1967 118962.1 24241.3 161608.9 9696.5 6374.6 1967
1968 98723.4 41872.3 153191.5 10383.0 2553.2 1968
1969 140406.5 2195.1 160000.0 12113.8 3008.1 1969
1970 103763.4 4761.9 137327.2 10445.5 7987.7 1970
1971 91049.2 25311.8 113059.4 7997.1 4035.2 1971
1972 113681.9 35530.1 131948.4 3151..6 4011.S 1972
Source: CM and ASM.
CD.
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Appendix VII
for States In
Machinery Industry
Real Investment, By Year,
cluded in Machinery Industry Analysis
($000' s)
Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina Tennessee Texas
1963 64635.4 3407.7 4536.8 6138.8 17085.2 1963
1964 74289.5, 8425.7 4309.4 4734.2 27357.6 1964
1965 79562.8 .5368.4 9191.6 7991.6 29551.6 1965
1966 77562.6 14490.0 1681.5 9971.9 35413.8 1966
1967 128568.9 6464.4 8619.1 20919.4 41120.5 1967
1968 116510.6 8595.7 8085.1 22893.6 47b29.8 1968
1969 136991.9 6260.2 7479.7 14308.9 12113.8 1969
1970 108064.5 2918.6 20890.9 12826.4 52688.2 1970
1971 89361.7 2934.7 53191.5 19956.0 49b16.6 1971
1972 78151.9 3939.8 26289.4 17836.7 49283.7 1972
Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin
1963 2699.5 3836.4 2882.3 1638.3 39023.0 1963
1964 2357.6 3784.3 2456.0 1123.9 42487.2 1964
1965 2763.7 5137.7 2793.5 1104.2 59193.5 1965
1966 3311.3 488.2 3980.9 1249.5 102925.6 196-6
1967 4758.5 7362.2 6913.3 2603.7 105315.1 1967
1968 3659.6 7404.3 5191.5 2723.4 78042,.6 1968
1969 6991.9 12601.6 3902.4 2195.1 79918.7 1969
1970 3840.2 8679.0 4070.7 1152.1 50998.5 1970
1971 2201.0 9317.7 2347.8 4182.0 ~50110.1 1971
1972 4298.0 9169.1 3868.2 2722.1 57235.0 1972
w--
Source: CM and ASM.
Appendix VIII
Textile Industry Real Investment, By Year
For States Included in Textile Industry Analysis
($000's)
Alabama Arkansas Connecticut Delaware Georgia
1956 10B22.5 37252.2 1956
1957 12692.5 35028.6 1957
1958 7023.0 27795.0 1958
1959 10239.7 1113.5 1113.5 34904.1 1959
1960 15408.2 832.8 832.8 36609.3 1960
1961 17425.5 1108.3 1108.3 39264.0 1961
1962 6449.6 1635.3 1635.0 48219.0 1962
1963 1b712.8 2089.3 5022.1 2089.3 35558.1 1963
1964 22589.5 2076.6 4186.6 2076.6 76624.9 1964
1965 37505.5 2381.3 5987.7 2381.3 76823.1 1965
1966 36306.7 2018.1 6635.2 2018.1 104702.4 1966
1967 39235.1 3142.4 7811.1 '3142.4 105674.3 1967
1965 31148.9 2468.1 5361.7 2468.1 97702.1 1968
19009 28617.9 5203.3 6910.6 5203.3 117235.8 1969
1970 2t648.2 3533.0 7526,.9 3533.0 94316.4 1970
1971 2559b.8 *6896.6 11005.1 6696.6 68965.5 1971
1972 29942.7 3796.6 8166.2 3796.6 89613.2 1972
Source: Census of Manufactures
durable goods price index.
and Annual Survey of Manufactures, deflated by
c~3
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Appendix VIII
Textile Industry Real Investment, By Year
For States Included in Textile Industry Analysis
($000's)
Illinois Indiana Kentucky Maine Maryland
1963 3216.1 67.2 806.9 3390.0. 566.8 1963
1964 1832.5 443.1 1050.7 2421.1 707.2 1964
1965 1427.6 349.1 2180.7 3850.5 2159.9 1965
1966 1936.5 310.3 3354.8 3780.4 349.4 1966
1967 1795.7 179.6 1616.1 3860.7 1346.7 1967
1968 1446.8 425.5 13276.6 4000.0 1021.3 1968
1969 3252.0 325.2 11463.4 3983.7 975.6 1969
1970 3149.0 460.8 7834.1 4685.1 1305.7 1970
1971 3154.8 1394.0 2567.9 7116.7 1100.5 1971
1972 3008.6 286.5 2507.2 6805,2 644.7 1972
Massachusetts Michigan Mississippi Missouri New Hampshire
1963 132b5.3 1314.1 1356.4 676.3 2043.2 1963
1964 11509.1 1951.2 2146.4 267.9 3173.2 1964
1965 16677.4 3253.5 5492.0 561.0 2768.2 1965
1966 20234.1 6726.0 4589.8 553.5 2906.5 1966
1967 10594.4 3322.0 1975.2 448.9 5387.0 1967
1968 15319.1 2553.2 1872.3 595.7 4595.7 1968
1969 16504-.1. 3252.3 4146.3 1463.4 4390.2 1969
1970 11520.7 2611.4 7450.1 537.o 5222.7 1970
1971 2127.7 1907.6 5355.8 220.1 3888.5 1971
1972 19914.0 1432.7 4727.8 143.3 3653.3 1972
Source: CM and ASM, deflated by durable goods price index,
1w
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Appendix VIII
Textile Industry Real Investment, By Year
For States Included in Textile Industry Analysis
($OOO's)
New Jersey New York N. Carolina Ohio Pennsylvania
1956 17508.7 7214.3 1956
1957 15263.5 3466.8 1957
1958 16622.0 2605.0 1958
1959 13612.5 2935.4 1Q5Q
1960 14665.7 2915.5 1960
1961 14952.6 4092.8 1961
1962 13411.1 2172.9 1962
1963 10852.1 15440.9 103845.3 5480.3 18083.6 1963
19e4 8840.2 15698.6 133076.6 3382.8 23086.1 1964
1965 11838.2 22255.4 182439.0 7139.1 27015.1 1965
1966 13775.0 23013.6 280279.5 10701.5 28689.7 1966
1967 14006.1 25677.9 199946.1 6195.0 25318.7 1967
1968 13702.1 23659.6 177617.0 3489.4 28766.0 1968
1969 18699.2 19187.0 198211.4 5284.6 38861.8 1969
1970 19892.5 18433.2 178264.2 4685.1 33026.1 1970
1971 2b833.5 39104.9 198752.8 3081.4 35143.1 1971
1972 31733.5 42908.3 276790.8 6733.5 36533.0 1972
(~)
Source: CM and ASM, deflated by durable goods price index.
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Appendix VIII
Textile Industry Real Investment, By Year
For States Incl uded in Texti
($000's)
le Industry Analysis
Rhode Island S. Carolina Tennessee Texas Virginia Wisconsin
1956 52145.0 14661.3
1957 44870.3 12731.4
1958 30349.0 70-!73.U
1959 46390.4 10662.4
1960 62650.1 13604.5
1961 52302.7 14407.2
1962 76414.0 15270.9
1963 6526.4 84161.4 10378.9 4770.4 15643.6 1080.7
1964 6134.9 109467.9 12643.1 2394.3 22539.7 1984.7
1965 8222.3 126015.1 13212.9 4579.9 33569.5 2041.6
1966 11945.6 174835.8 17880.2 7784.9 32132.5 3047.2
1967 9517.0 137816.5 14724.4 4578.9 22984.4 3142.4
1968 17021.3 68085.1 26468.1 13531.9 29872.3 2723.4
1969 21056.9 95609.8 28861.8 2764.2 26829.3 3739.8
1970 6758.8 104377.9 2 090.9, 153t6.1 19662.1 5376.3
1971 7703.6 96845.2 24 71.6 5942.8 24578.1 2567.9
1972 10530.1 115902.6 16045.8 2865.3 56876.8 1790.8
Source: CM and ASM, deflated by durable goods price index.
(A)
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Appendix IX
Durable Goods Price Deflator
For Years 1952 to 1976
Year Deflator
1952 .826
1953 .840
1954 .848
1955 .867
1956 .924
1957 .979
1958 1.000
1959 1.022
1963 1.029
1961 1.034
1962 1.041
1963 1.045
1964 1.057
1965 1.075
1966 1.102
1967 1.114
1965 1.175
1969 1.230
1970 1.302
1971 1.363
1972 1.396
1973 1.449
1974 1.500
1975 1.550
1976 1.600
Source: Historical Statistics of United States, part I:
1975, and Survey of Current Business. 54,7:1974.
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Trend-Adjusted
Indus try
M NING
Cod S I
SIC20
SIC 21
SIc 22
SIC23
SI C 24
Si C25
S I 26
SIC2 7
SIC 2
SI C 2'9
SIC30
SIC31
SIC 32
SIC33
SIC34
S I C35
51C36
S I C 37
SI C 56
SIC 39
TRANSP
TRAD
F I NANC
SENVIC
OV EkN
Appendix X
Severity of Recessions in
(Percentages)
1953-54
4.631
1. 4 8 7.
.914
4.123
3. 73
4.343
13.231
5.660
1.545
. 624
2.445
.709
1.171
3.8b1
4.561
8.273
5.136
5.231
6.407
10. 393
4.786
4.595
2.414
1 .543
.086
.2t3
1.111
1957-58
4.669
7.017
1.475
4.311
4.303
4.211
6.838
5.329
2.746
.195
2.403
-. 004
6.757
5.450
5.874
10.414
6.877
8.966
7.409
9.467
5.412
3.336
3.085
2.253
-. 000
.303
.001
National Industries
1960-61
3.270
4.770
.405
1.639
3.282
3.307
5.684
5.912
1.310
.142
1.240
1.381
1.351
1.029
4.938
7.389
5.254
3.846
3.428
5.838
3.4 88
3.343
1.560
1.252
-. 002
-.005
-'.002
1969-70
-. 002
2.313
.785
7.810
1.823
1.626
3.319
3.168
3.573
1.366
.920
.731
4.484
1.338
1.581
6.554
3.773
3.712
2.729
15.831
3.156
2.764
1.916
. 3n6
.U0O
.003
.000
w.
1973-75
-.017
5.586
2.151
5.19.5
11.143
9.446
10.741
11.111
8.879
1 .585
3.148
2.962
13.535
9.789
5.113
6.989
6.376
4.578
6.714
6.604
4.867
6.662
1.716
.455
-. 005
-. 031
.328
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Data. See Chapter Four for a
description of calculations.
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Appendix XI
Trend-Adjusted Severity of National Recessions for
Machinery Industry, at the 3-digit SIC Category,
for 1973-75 and 1969-70
1973-75 1969-70
Industrya Recession Recession
SIC 351 4.70 1.96
SIC 352 5.35 2.00
SIC 353 1.30 2.43
SIC 354 4.53 5.54
SIC 355 4.87 1.87
SIC 356 3.22 2.78
SIC 357 3.05 2.97
SIC 358 10.50 4.04
SIC 359 3.35 2.00
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
aSee Chapter 4 for description of categories.
Appendix XII
Trend-Adjusted Severity of National Recessions for
Machinery Industry, at the 3-digit SIC Category,
for 1973-75 and 1969-70
1973-75 1969-70
Industrya Recession Recession
SIC 221 7.72 1.43
SIC 222 7.51 1.88
SIC 223 8.37 8.27
SIC 224 13.57 2.73
SIC 225 6.14 1.86
SIC 226 8.70 1.18
SIC 227 8.70 1.73
SIC 228 11.99 .91
SIC 229 7.23 2.65
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
aSee Chapter 4 for description of categories.
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